

October 17th, 2015

Workshop on Comparative Examination of Ethnic Conflict in MENA

As planned in the Agenda of the site visit, the PPAD department at AUC has organized a workshop entitled: “**Comparative Examination for Ethnic Conflict in MENA Region**” which witnessed in-depth and elaborated discussions among the different participants and experts.

The **Workshop Objectives** were identified as follow:

To use a comparative approach to assess the similarity and differences attributed to conflict management in the different countries of the MENA region, with special focus on the different stakeholders and policies developed to address existing root causes and possible management solutions.

The panel discussions have attempted to analyze the effects of the ethnic and identity conflict on the political stability and power balance in the region. The workshop was moderated by **Dr. Hamid Ali**, PPAD Chair. It focused on selected counties in the region including **Libya, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Palestine** and more specifically **Sudan and South Sudan**. In addition, the workshop has benefited from the presence of the different partners of the project to allow for various feedbacks by comparing the **Indian, Ethiopian, Zambian and Swiss** models as well. The details workshop plan along with the list of participants is provided in Appendix 1.

After the opening note of Dr. Hamid Ali, the first panel started by the note of **Dr. Ibrahim Awad**, in which he attempted to show a brief approach to ethnic conflicts in the MENA region.



Dr. Awad elaborated that ethnic identity in the MENA region is important but not the only source of conflict. It reflects shared culture and religious beliefs. Ethnic groups are a social construct and one should not neglect the social aspect of group formation. Violent conflicts are usually driven by demands of accommodation and inclusion. Dr. Awad then examined different situations of ethnic confrontations in the MENA region to analyze the ethnic conflict approach in the region.

Two hypotheses were formulated: First, confrontational situations characterized as ethnic conflict may be understood as demands for democratic governance. Second, policies may redistribute material and symbolic resources in ways that help give credence to the ethnic conflict proposition.

The first country he examined is Algeria. The claims of the Amazighs have not descended into open violent conflict; they were about the redistribution of resources. The civil war of the 1990s cannot be characterized as ethnic conflict. Violent Islamists were fighting the state and other Muslims. This was an obvious ideological confrontation.

The second country is Egypt. The quasi-liberal and quasi-secular political system of Egypt should not be disregarded along with the weakening of the democratic camp should, when attempting to analyze the Instances of discrimination and violence against citizens of Coptic Christian. However, religion cannot amount to ethnic conflict.

The third country is Lebanon. In this country, the political system nurtures confrontation and cooperation along its corresponding fault lines. This is as true of systems built along socioeconomic or religious and sectarian lines. Therefore, in Lebanon, religious and sectarian confrontation is a natural outcome of the structure of its system. Since the subject of confrontation and cooperation is the distribution of resources, it is in this distribution that the causes of the collapse of cooperation should be sought, not in an immutable and unavoidable confrontation.

The fourth country is Iraq. In this case, the Lebanese model of political system was transposed. Iraq, which lacked any experience in the cooperation between leaders, associated itself with the so-called “consociational democracy”.

The fifth country is Palestine. The Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as it is now defined, is not a religious confrontation. It is about land and national rights.

The sixth country is Bahrain. The dispute which started as a socioeconomic dispute over resources and equity rights, shifted into a religious conflict. The shift in conflict can only be understood within the larger evolution of regional politics. Along with other factors, the changes in Iraq can be considered crucial in this evolution.

At the end of Dr. Ibrahim’s note, the main conclusions reached were that Ethnic conflict in MENA should not be essentialized. Its different current manifestations have not always existed. They are not immutable. These manifestations have resulted from policies that resulted in confrontation and undermined cooperation. Democratic principles of politics and of policy-making based and aiming at effective equality and non-discrimination should shape the approach to analyzing confrontations formulated at present as ethnic conflict.

Next, *Dr. Ibrahim Elnur* has presented a reading into the conflict in *Libya*. From his perspective, the MENA uprisings could be seen as the implosion of, and violent collapse, of the past authoritarian regimes of patronage. These regimes built the seeds for the crisis. The dynamics of demand for change could not be accommodated within a static structure. The quasi-rentier countries, which are the non-oil countries, are patronaging with taxation.



For the case in Libya, for 40 years while being in power, Qaddafi used oil to carry out urbanization. In 2010, almost 70% of the population lived in urban areas. This was accompanied by weakening of the national army and strengthening of the security apparatus, which became a family-led, clan-based apparatus. In addition, the Libyan people suffered from low wages. It was a grossly under-funded patronage package. In 2011, the Islamist groups were well prepared and organized as opposed to the army, which was weakened across the tribal lines. However, Dr. Ibrahim stressed that Islamists represent a slightly different version of tribal militias and that they did not succeed to organize a General National Congress or to create a coherent system along the lines of national dialogues.

Dr. Ibrahim then moved to showing the similarities between countries like Iraq, Syria and Libya. On one hand the similar factors between these countries lie in destroying the state and dismantling the national army and the rediscovery of the deep state to shift it into security/ethnic minority states, and the collapse of the system. On the other hand, as far the international intervention is under examination, it could be seen that in Libya and Iraq, it accelerated the regime collapse or even made it possible. As opposed to Syria, in which the reverse international intervention prolonged regime's survival and protracted the status quo. Yet, it has to be noted that in lapse of the past four years, Libya still faces major challenges.

At the end, Dr. Ibrahim Elnur presented his conclusions as follows:

The conflict in Libya is essentially about the control of the security sector. Restructuring of national army fronts and institutions of security and army is a necessary condition for successful transition. Inclusion of differential actors with conflicting causes is a must and the process of integrating the security sector should be systemized. In addition, transparency has become very essential.

And not far away from Libya, South Sudan, which is the newest nascent independent country in the region, has also been witnessing political struggle and instability, which is reflected onto the fabric of the society, causing a sharp alignment across ethnic and tribal lines, as highlighted by *Dr. Zacharia Akol*. According to Dr. Akol, the tribal and ethnicity differentiation cannot explain the current conflict in South Sudan; it is just a tool to mobilize the different actors. He stressed that many experts, scholars and activists have been trying to warn all actors since the beginning of independence and bring their attention to the current repercussions, predicting the current explosion according to the pre-existing facts and indicators that were only showing a latent crisis.



According to Akol, the conflict started as a political one and then turned into ethnic conflict which has led to sharp alienation among the different groups. Akol attributes the main reasons of the current conflict to the lack of administrative and political reform from the part of SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement). In addition, the lack of good governance, transparency and accountability and the absence of administrative structures along with the excessive use of force and power among few of the powerful groups and elites, highlighted by the fact that the top positions in the national army are only given to favored few, all these factors have favored the nurture of the current conflict and led to wide resentment among the different isolated and excluded groups.

There is a peace agreement currently being drafted. However, as it calls for administrative reform in its core, it is in doubt that it would be carried out since the SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) never reforms. It lacks the respect of law and even for the governing system of the party. In fact, the power is concentrated in the hands of others.

At the end of his note, Dr. Akol concluded the use of both military rank and civilian positions have resulted into the aggravation of violent conflict and not the establishment of a sustainable national dialogue. He also highlighted the importance of reaching an agreement that forces SPLM to respect the dignity and life of South Sudanese people

Following Dr. Akol, *Dr. Ahmed H. Adam* has presented the latest development in the Sudanese situation, saying that Sudan has been living in crisis and conflict constantly and so now is the case in the two countries, Sudan and South Sudan, both witnessing civil conflicts and wars. He also highlighted that there are no guarantees to avoid the recurrence of conflict between the two countries.



Hussein then shed the light on the ethnic conflict in Sudan and highlighted the important notion that the state is attempting to impose a “one identity” state by excluding the demands of the different ethnic and regional groups.

Dr. Hussein has also tried to show the holistic picture in Sudan, by showing the deep failure of the state, which is reflected and evident in the increasing corruption and poverty rates in which more than 90% of the population are living.

From his point of view, the crisis could be better pictured by noticing the absence of any national project in addition to the divisions among the international community in regard to the best approach to deal with the Sudanese crisis, where some of the international actors believe that the status quo should be maintained. However, this approach tends to disregard the fact that keeping the current regime in place, will only lead to further divisions in the Sudan.

He added that although 19 resolutions have been issued by the Security Council and more than 50 by the African Union, the crisis remains in standstill position. There is a clear lack of strategic vision.

At the end, Ahmed has noted that although the government has early announced in 2014 the initiation of a National Dialogue, however, the lack of trust among the different actors still govern the current situation and holds any progress. There is an urgent need for a dialogue that is not dominated by one of the actors.

The last speaker in panel 1 was **Dr. Amr Abel Rahman**, who attempted to explain the dynamics of the religious tensions in Egypt. According to Dr. Abel Rahman, Egypt does not have tribal conflict; instead it constantly faces religious tensions. Dr. Abdel Rahman has highlighted six major points of religious tensions that remained for centuries and have been reproduced continuously.

These six points could be summarized as follows:

The conflict results from the religious tensions stemming from the differences in notions concerning public order and public morality. It also generates from the regulation of houses of worship as it allows for the Sunni to build mosques, however, limit the opportunities of Copts to build churches, which again contributes to the triggering of religious tensions.



Moreover, what contributes to the sources of religious conflict is the inter-religion conversion. In addition, there are tensions that are related to politicized violence that resulted from the perception that Egyptian Churches supported Mubarak and his strive with Islamists. Furthermore, there are other sources of religious tensions between Copts and Muslims that result from conflict around land ownership and property rights.

Dr. Abdel Rahman has highlighted that the EIPR has documented more than 63 cases of contempt of religion in courts, against Copts and Shi'a Muslims, who have become another major actor in the religious conflict in Egypt and have been subjected to violent attacks and who are being perceived as a threat to national security and social stability.



In the second panel, *Dr. Alison Hodgkins* discussed with the audience and attendees her article in the Cairo Review of Global Affairs “Behind the Palestinian Stabbing Spree”

Dr. Alison attempted to share the following ideas and arguments:

“Since 1967, all policy making in the city has directed at the singular goal of insulating Jerusalem from any possible future territorial compromise. While these policies have succeeded in cementing a physical and political separation between Jerusalem and the West Bank, they have also created a leaderless, under-educated, impoverished, and disenfranchised under-class from which these knife-wielding youth have sprung”

“While the expansion of Jerusalem created room for new settlements, it also added some sixty thousand Palestinians, or “non-Jews” in municipal parlance, into the demographic balance sheet. A hastily conducted census revealed this minority constituted 26 percent of the population, with a much higher birth rate. This meant that securing a stable, Jewish majority would also require managing, or rather minimizing, the “non-Jewish” population in addition to increased migration”



“Zoning policies were both the swiftest and sharpest arrows in the municipal quiver as they could both facilitate and constrain, often at the same time. For example, zoning certain areas as national priority zones allows the expropriation of privately owned land, whereas setting aside certain areas as “green areas” would preserve the un-built land until, as former Mayor Teddy Kollek explained, “we are ready to build there.”

“On the flip side, the absence of zoning was used to limit growth within the 13 percent of east Jerusalem territory designated for Palestinian use. As in any modern, urban landscape, construction in Jerusalem required new construction fit within established town planning schemes. While such plans existed for the burgeoning Jewish settlements, the municipality was reluctant to impose them on the Palestinian neighborhoods in deference to the residents “nationalist sensitivities.”

These constraints left growing Palestinian families with two choices: build without a permit and risk demolition, or move a few kilometers over the green line where housing was more abundant.

The unintended consequence of this more stringent compliance regime was that Palestinian Jerusalemites came flooding back to the city in a desperate attempt to preserve the right to live in their native city. Rents increased, families crowded into smaller and smaller spaces, and more built without the requisite permits. Housing demolitions accelerated: ninety-eight in 2014 alone. This influx brought further deterioration to the already pressured living conditions in the “non-Jewish” sector.

This legal, political, and territorial limbo leaves Palestinian youth in the city with few choices. Taking opportunities abroad, or even in the West Bank could result in permanent exile.

Add to this combustible mix ramped up efforts by rightwing settlers to insert themselves within Palestinian areas and the ground is prepared for explosion. Without the Palestinian Authority to keep a lid on things, as they do in the West Bank, it is wholly predictable that provocations—or even perceived provocations over the holy sites—become a catalyst for rage. While the daily indignities of life in Jerusalem are a shared, individual trial, the shrines are a collective responsibility—one of the few places beyond the reach of the ministry of interior or the municipality. In a city where there is no earthly future, it is unsurprising that martyrdom is enjoying renewed appeal.

From his side, *Dr. Hani Sayed* elaborated on the dynamics of the conflict in Syria. He started his note by clarifying that the category of “ethnic conflict” has become embedded in many disciplines of the social sciences particularly political science for at least the past two decades. Some have argued that ethnic conflicts have become a growth industry with millions channeled to grants, conferences, research centers, policy think tanks and academic journals dedicated to the study of “ethnic conflicts.”



For international lawyers the category “ethnic conflict” is rather mysterious. A conflict from a legal perspective is a question of fact. This means among other things that any qualification about the specificities of a particular conflict—like when we characterize a conflict as international or internal-- should in principle be based on facts that can be easily established, and are neutral as to the motivations of the combatants or the structural causes of war.

There are two remarks that one can make on this notion of ethnic conflicts: First, one has still to find an analytically clean a way to ascertain in particular situations that “ethnicity” is indeed the core motivation in the conflict after controlling for all the other variables. Second, and even if we assume that such a link can be established, there is still the fact that in the concept of “ethnic conflict” a great deal of weight is placed on how the category “ethnicity” is defined. And it seems that a preponderant part of the scholarly literature on ethnic conflict assumes that “ethnicity” is a primordial, pre-political constituent of identity; that it is primitive and irrational.

But when we look closer at particular cases, it often becomes quickly clear that ethnicity is in fact an effect of historically and politically contingent legal/institutional arrangements. In other words, and in light of the fact that ethnicity expressed politically is always a construct internal to the legal/institution framework and not ontologically preceding, it cannot by definition become the critical cause of the conflict. Of course, once the incoherence of the category of “ethnicity” is in doubt, and therefore by extension that of “ethnic conflict,” then the question arise as to whether and under what conditions the category “ethnic conflict” is relevant for the purposes of policy discussions. Surely it would be also irresponsible to deny the relevance of ethnicity all together. But we can still make use of ethnicity when it is useful—that is to explain in a very localized context certain dynamics of the conflict; or, when the use of ethnicity is desirable on normative grounds. And in both cases a reference to a explicit conception of ethnicity should be justified and not presumed

In the case of Syria, analysts and policy makers, across the political spectrum, are committed to an understanding of the Syrian situation in which the distinction between an ‘Alawi regime allied with Shi’a Iran and a Sunni majority population supported by Sunni Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries is an epistemological starting point for analysis and policy decisions. This choice is infelicitous. Sectarian tensions in Syria are not the causes of the current conflict, but the effects of deliberate regime strategy

Sectarianism is not a continuation of traditional, pre-political forms of solidarity that were repressed by the modern post-colonial state only to surface in violent forms when the state enters into a period of fragility. Sectarianism is a mode of governance, and an instrument for controlling society that was constitutive of the modern state and has a colonial pedigree.

Violence inter and intra-communities is one of its manifestations. In modern Syrian history, this mode of governance has been consistently used to pacify political dissent and disperse it.

Over the past four decades, the Syrian regime consolidated its hold on power by creating a highly centralized and repressive political space in which the Assad family arbitrated among elites in the different religious sects, Muslim and Christian, competing for rent extracted through the oppressive apparatus of the state. Sectarian violence during the Syrian uprising is a continuation of this mode of governance through other means.

Throughout the struggle against the regime the composition of those who mobilized to bring the down the regime mirrored statistically the demographic composition of Syria. The more experts and policy makers embrace a sectarian view of the conflict, the more the Assad family regime will be able to instrumentalize international responses in support of its own nefarious objectives

Mass Destruction is not a Weapon. It is a Policy

In Syria mass destruction is not a weapon. It is a policy pursued systematically and incrementally, in many cities, towns, and neighborhoods throughout Syria. Entire communities have been obliterated through the destruction of the physical space. Residential buildings, roads, schools, hospitals, factories were reduced to rubble through a slow, continuous, and systematic campaign of bombardments and air raids.

What distinguishes weapons of mass destruction is that they ultimately obliterate the social fabric of a community by destroying the physical space and the infrastructures that make it possible. What weapons of mass destruction can achieve in seconds, the regime succeeded in achieving cumulatively over months of bombardments and air raids. From this perspective there are no such thing as "indiscriminate" attacks (i.e., attacks without specific military objective) in what the regime is doing. If the military objective is the destruction of a network of social relations, then barrel bombs, SCUD missiles, chemical weapons, or eviction orders are interchangeable, and they cannot miss their objectives

Assad or We Burn the Country

The conflict in Syria started in March 2011 as a fairly inclusive social movement pursuing non-violent tactics for expressing political dissent. At the height of its success, this broad social movement achieved what was considered by a great majority of Syrians impossible. It succeeded in creating an alternative public sphere in which Syrians overcame alienation and mutual suspicion and met to negotiate the terms of their political association.

The exponential expansion of the social movement clearly meant for the regime that Syria is no longer governable. The regime was forced to a battlefield in which its security and army apparatus are qualitatively inferior. The Assad family regime confronted the challenge with bloodcurdling chilling pragmatism. The regime's strategy unfolded in two distinct but mutually supportive directions. First, the regime attempted to target those aspects of economic/social/political life that are necessary conditions for any alternative public sphere. The fragmentation of space through security checkpoints, the indiscriminate bombardment of neighborhoods and towns targeted primarily the actual physical spaces, the squares and street intersections in which demonstrators gathered regularly and performed the rites of their political communion.

The resulting mass displacement and dispersion of the population in those villages, towns, and urban neighborhoods made a political public sphere outside the control of the regime physically impossible. Second, the regime and its regional allies spent considerable resources to alter all the elements of the battle by picking the enemies, and changing the nature of the battle and the conditions of the battlefield so that its security

and army apparatus could enjoy unquestionable qualitative superiority. The excessive brutality directed towards revolting neighborhoods and towns radicalized Syrians and forced them to a military style confrontation. In addition, starting June 2011, the regime released Islamists who had participated in Al Qaeda and its offshoots operations in Iraq after 2003. The relationship between Syrian security services and these groups is complex.

The policy objective of containing a sectarian war will most likely lead to further entrenchment of sectarian-based forms of solidarities. The policy objective of managing the consequences of a humanitarian crisis, including ultimately through accountability and transitional justice is unlikely, given consistent failures of past experiences in humanitarian response in different parts of the world, to reduce on the short run the number of casualties and the scale of destruction. The policy objective of preventing ISIS from gaining territorial base from which it could launch a campaign of attacks outside the Middle East can only succeed in pushing ISIS and its future re-incarnations to relocate elsewhere.

And when progressives acquiesce to the characterization of the Syrian question as a humanitarian crisis caused by a vicious sectarian war creating also the opportunity for terrorists to regroup they cede important grounds that allow debates about the role of the US to be dominated by US conservatives. Reiterating platitudes about Sunni/ Shia divides when discussing details of the Syrian conflict is the effect of orientalist mystification. Humanization of the Syrian conflict is also a form of mystification. By focusing on the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Syria, humanizers take the humanity from Syrians and turn them into a mass of helpless victims. There is more in the reality of the Syrian conflict than the spectacle of death and destruction. There is a political battle for a life with dignity, equality and social justice that many Syrians are continuing to fight despite the successes of the Assad regime, and other international actors of reducing the conflict to an asymmetric sectarian war



Following in the third session, *Elhaj Warrag* has attempted to provide an in-depth examination of the Sudanese crisis and the current conflicts and the role of civil society.

Elhaj Warrag has divided the conflicts into two categories. The first is low impact conflicts of medium risks while the second represents severe danger and threats. From his side, Warrag has elaborated that the role of civil society lies in the fact that it should adopt the transition process. At first, it should start by increasing the awareness and shed lights on the crisis to convince people with the severe atrocities that took place. In addition, the civil society should be able to address the root causes of the problem.

Mr. Warrag also holds the current ruling regime responsible for political, social and ethical accountability for the current crisis. Furthermore, Warrag pointed to the fact that the root causes behind such atrocities and human rights violations are deeply embedded into the culture of the society and communities and the fact that they did not reject or object to these violations. He thus called for a radical and comprehensive critique to the prevailing culture. He also stressed the urgent need to move to a new social contract and to change the rules of the games.



Mr. Warrag concluded his note by emphasizing the importance of a Sudanese Identity to solve the current crisis, he also stressed the need for a stable decentralized system and a relative law for elections that would allow for everyone to participate.

From examining the conflicts in Sudan, from her side, *Ms. Asmaa El Hussainy* identified that the he main characteristics of these conflicts is that they are based on tribalism and ethnicity, which were aggravated by various factors including the absence and weakening of national armies and the strengthening of militias. In addition, the colonial countries have nurtured these conflicts. Moreover, the persistent unfortunate conditions of unemployment, poverty for some of the groups along with the presence of abundant natural resources have all been contributing factors that aggravated the conflicting situation. These conflicts have only resulted in aggravating inequalities and injustice; for instance, they have negatively affected women's situation in the region and have only resulted in internalizing the violence culture against women.

In order to deal with the current situation, countries must support the different development processes. They should ensure the strengthening of their national armies. They should also gather their efforts to combat corruption unemployment. In addition,

there is a huge role for the media to play in such development processes to help resolve the present conflicts.



As for **Mr. Hamid Elnur**, he highlighted the notion that the central governments have deliberately worked on centralized marginalization since the beginning of independence.



As for the activist *Abdelbagui Jibril*, he examined the current situation of human rights in Sudan, pointing to the fact that the crisis has been going on for so long without any change in how human rights are treated. He also referred to the recent resolution of the Human Rights Council, and expressed the frustration and disappointment of the victims that resulted from the weakness and unrepresentativeness of the resolution.



Before moving to the proposed points of the policy briefs, the panel listened to the feedback of the various participants. From his side, *Dr. Manuel Vogt* clarified that the legal framework is the result of a specific political identity," he added, "Why should this race or that prevail?" Vogt stressed that we cannot separate race for the balance of power - the balance of power is the result of the identity being politicized ", and went on saying that the political conflict is nothing but a reflection of the particular ethnic conflict.

Furthermore, Vogt attributed the young men who enjoy deep knowledge of sociology especially dialectics of race conflict and power relations, also Vogt attribute the stability enjoyed by countries like Switzerland to what he called elite cooperation, and added at the end of his note that there is a need for a group of elite has a moral and legal obligation.



Then *Dr. Madhushree Sekher* presented the Indian model and emphasized that the only reason behind the current stability goes back to the structured roots within the institutions level. She stressed that the federal state and strong democratic and decentralized system allowed for the inclusion of marginal groups which help in sustaining the stability of the country.



In the fourth session, the different participants were then divided into three groups and each was asked to come up with solutions to deal with the ethnic conflict in MENA region generally and specifically Sudan.



The solutions of the first group were as followed:

- 1- The acknowledgment of the major atrocities and genocides
- 2- The establishment of a true democratic system that respect and preserve human rights and dignity and abide by the international human rights conventions.
- 3- The acceptance of the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity along with the establishment of the norms of freedom of expression and association.
- 4- The acceptance of civil society diversity
- 5- The rejection of any discrimination based on cultural, ethnic or gender lines.
- 6- The establishment of a general decentralized system
- 7- Social and political responsibility and accountability in regards to the violations and atrocities and granting support to the international criminal court.
- 8- Fighting corruption as it is one of the major causes for social and ethnic tensions. In addition, it represents a resource for the militias to secure their destructive weapons
- 9- Adopting an inclusive development approach which aims at providing social protection, and especially for marginalized and vulnerable groups
- 10- The adoption a new law for elections based on open participation

The solutions proposed by the second group were as follows:

- 1- Widening the actors involved in the peace process to include other African actors
- 2- Adopt the approach of institutional inclusiveness to bring together the conflicting parties in the country

The solutions proposed by the third group, which were focused on South Sudan, were as follow

- 1- Addressing root causes of conflict by raising awareness and educating the public at the grass-root level, both at the outside and within the country. The main items of awareness are as follow:
 - a. People that benefit from ethnic discrimination are forming a cartel of elites
 - b. The government is racist and base its interests on ethnic interests
- 2- Developing inclusive civic institutions that engage the public
- 3- Coordinating stakeholders workshops
- 4- Specifying the ethnic identify constructs which are mainly centered around the elite
- 5- Highlighting the importance of civil society organizations.

The next step is to use these solutions and work on them to draft a policy brief.



Appendix 1

Comparative Examination of Ethnic Conflict in MENA Region Workshop

Time	Theme	Speaker
9:00 – 9:10	Opening Note	Dr. Hamid E. Ali
9:10 – 9:25	Ethnic and Religious Cleavages in North Africa	Dr. Ibrahim Awad
9:25 – 9:40	Evolution of intra-state Conflict in Libya	Dr. Ibrahim Elnur
9:40 – 9:55	Nature of Conflict in Egypt	Dr. Amr Abdelrahman
9:55 – 10:10	Ethnic, center versus peripheries Conflict in Sudan	Dr. Ahmed H. Adam
10:10 – 10:25	Tribal versus political Conflict in South Sudan	Dr. Zacharia Akol
10:25 -10:50	Reflections from Attendees	
10- Minutes Coffee Break		
11:00 – 11:15	The determinants of conflict Syria, does ethnic component matter?	Dr. Hani Sayed
11:15 – 11:30	The ethnic mobility in Lebanon	Dr. Sandrine Gamblin
11:30 – 11:45	Jordan and Palestine versus Israeli forward looking	Dr. Allison Hodgkins
11:45 – 12:00	Reflections from Attendees	
1-Hour Lunch Break		
1:00 – 1:15	Ethnic and tribal conflicts in Africa	Ms. Assma Al Hussein
1:15 – 1:30	Governing Institutions in Sudan	Mr. Hamid Elnur
1:30 – 1:45	Role of Civil Society in Conflict Mediation	Mr. Alhaj Warrag
1:45 – 2:00	Human Rights in Sudan and Darfur	Mr. Abdelbagi Jibril and Mr. Gasim Abdelrahman
2:00 – 2:15	Role of Media in Conflict Mediation	Mr. Mohamed Yaseen
2:15 – 2:30	Reflections from Attendees	
Ten Minutes Coffee Break		
2:30 – 2:45	Reflections from Ethiopia	Partners from Ethiopia
2:45– 3:00	Reflections from Zambia	Partners from Zambia
3:00 – 3:15	Reflections from Guatemala	Partners from Guatemala
3:15 – 3:30	Reflections from India	Partners from India
3:30 – 3:45	Reflections from Switzerland	Partners from Switzerland
Ten Minutes Break		
3:55 – 4:45	Recommendations for Policy Brief Formulation	Open Discussion
4:45 – 5:00	Concluding Remarks and Final Note	Dr. Hamid Ali

