



Effective and efficient pest management decisions of farmers

Webinar: Pathways for advancing pesticide policies

Organized by World Food System Center and Agricultural Economics and Policy Group, ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

Niklas Möhring & Robert Finger

Agricultural Economics and Policy Group ETHZ

www.aecp.ethz.ch

Agenda


- Framing the problem
- Farmers' decision making process
- Policy instruments for effective and efficient pest management decisions
- Adoption of pesticide-free production systems

Framing the problem

- Farmer behavior is central for effective and efficient pesticide policies.
- Crucial pest management decisions are made by the farmer.
- Recent studies: 20-40% of current pesticide use levels can be attributed to inefficient pest management decisions of farmers (e.g. Lechenet et al., 2017; Jacquet et al., 2011; Nave et al., 2013).
- Understanding farmers' behavior is crucial for the uptake of policies, new technologies and alternative production systems (Dessart et al., 2019).

Farmer decision-making processes

- Decisions made by farmers in a complex system under strong uncertainty (e.g. Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1994).
- Deviation from profit maximizing behavior: uncertainty, information, (risk) perception & preferences, farmers' objectives and habits (e.g. Pedersen et al., 2012, Perry et al., 2019, Möhring et al., 2020a,b).



- Uncertainty may e.g. lead to the use of more toxic pesticides or deviation from effective timing (Möhring et al., 2020a,b)
- Perceptions and risk preferences may, e.g. lead to reduced adoption of technologies/production systems for pesticide reduction.
- Farmer behavior and preferences are heterogeneous (e.g. Pedersen et al., 2012, Iyer et al., 2020).

Horowitz, J. K., & Lichtenberg, E. (1994). Risk-reducing and Risk-increasing Effects of Pesticides. *J. Agric. Econ.*, 45(1).

Pedersen et al. (2012). Optimising the effect of policy instruments: a study of farmers' decision rationales and how they match the incentives in Danish pesticide policy. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 55(8), 1094-1110.

Perry et al. (2019). Product concentration and usage: Behavioral effects in the glyphosate market. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 158.

Möhring, et al. (2020a). Are pesticides risk decreasing? The relevance of pesticide indicator choice in empirical analysis. *Agric. Econ.* 51, 429-444.

Möhring et al. (2020b). Why farmers deviate from recommended pesticide timing: the role of uncertainty and information. *Pest Manag. Sci.*, 76(8).

Iyer et al. (2020). Measuring farmer risk preferences in Europe: a systematic review. *Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 71(1), 3-26.

Policy instruments for effective and efficient pest management decisions

- Heterogeneous behavior and decision rationales of farmers need to be accounted for in policies:
- Differentiated pesticide taxes and subsidies.
 - Account for heterogeneous toxicity of products, heterogeneous preferences and risk premia ((Finger et al., 2017; Möhring et al., 2019).
- Targeted insurance solutions (Norton et al., 2016, Möhring et al., 2020c).
 - Have to consider both, effects on risk and land use decisions to reduce pesticide use.
- Independent and reliable information and extension services.
 - Target uncertainty and lack of information , e.g. information about arrival and severity of pests, new techniques, substitution of pesticides (Rose et al., 2016, Möhring et al., 2020b).
- Heterogeneity of farmers implies that allowing for farmers' self-selection can reduce complexity and specificity and may increase cost-efficiency of policies.

Möhring et al. (2019). Quantity based indicators fail to identify extreme pesticide risks. *Science of the total environment*, 646, 503-523.

Finger et al., (2017). Revisiting pesticide taxation schemes. *Ecological Economics*, 134, 263-266.

Norton et al., (2016). Applying weather index insurance to agricultural pest and disease risks. *International Journal of Pest Management*, 62(3), 195-204.

Möhring et al., (2020b). Crop insurance and pesticide use in European agriculture. *Agricultural Systems*, 184, 102902.

Rose et al., (2016). Decision support tools for agriculture: Towards effective design and delivery. *Agricultural systems*, 149, 165-174. |

Möhring et al. (2020b). Why farmers deviate from recommended pesticide timing: the role of uncertainty and information. *Pest Manag. Sci.*, 76(8). |

Adoption of pesticide-free production systems

- Swiss Producer organization IP-SUISSE currently establishing pesticide-free wheat production program.
 - No synthetic pesticides allowed in wheat (but not organic!)
 - Incentives: markup on market price (label) + direct payments
 - Major Swiss retailer Migros: only sells «pesticide-free» bread from 2023 on
 - Goal: large-scale adoption
- PestiFreeWheat Project - ETH (AECP), IP-SUISSE, Migros (JOWA):
 - Goal: Identify determinants, challenges and adoption barriers for the uptake of pesticide-free wheat production in Switzerland
 - Large-scale survey and bio-economic model (Böcker et al., 2019, Möhring & Finger, 2020):
 - Farmers expectations of the program & risk preferences are central for adoption and have to be accounted for.
 - Not only expected yields and production risk- expected environmental benefits central.

Take-home messages

- Pest management decisions are subject to uncertainties, (risk) preferences and expectations.
- Effective and efficient pesticide policies have to account for heterogeneous farmer behavior.
- Adoption of novel, pesticide-free systems is driven by expectations and risks.
- Farmer behavior is central for the reduction of environmental and health risks from pesticide use.

Thank you very much for your attention

www.aecp.ethz.ch

<https://agrarpolitik-blog.com/>

