Contents

Section I: Military Education
7 The Colonel’s Course – a Shortcut to Defence Development  by Michael H. Clemmesen
12 European Military Education Today  by Peter Foot

Section II: Baltic Co-operation and the Future
35 Foreign Military Assistance – Learning from BALTBAT  by Julian Elgaard Brett
44 Debate: NATO Enlargement – With or Without a Baltic Dimension?  by Michael H. Clemmesen & Ole Kvarnø

Section III: Developments in Russia Relevant for Baltic Security
59 Russian Military Reform: An Overview  by Fredric Labarre
72 Some Points about the New Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation  by Igor Lelin

Section IV: Defence Structure and Doctrine
81 Defence Structure Planning and Implementation in the Baltic States – A Discussion Paper  by Andrew Parrott
104 Maritime and Territorial Defence – Some Early Thoughts  by Michael H. Clemmesen
108 Future Naval Development in the Baltic Republics – An Attempt at a Theoretical Approach  by Tor Egil Walter
118 The Dangers of Doctrine  by Richard Møller

Section V: Military History
133 The Myth of the Prusso-German General Staff  by Friedhelm Klein M.A.
145 Fulfillment of a Daydream: Estonia’s Path to Independence  by Trivimi Velliste
Section I

Military Education

The Baltic Defence Review in this section continues the discussion of military education in theory and practice. The section offers a leading article by Dr. Peter Foot, Vice Dean at the Joint Services and Command Staff College of the United Kingdom, in which he discusses European Military Education today. The article will also be a chapter in the forthcoming book edited by Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson: “Military Education: Past, Present and Future”, Praeger-Greenwood Publishing, 2002 (copyright).

This year the Baltic Defence College started two new courses: the Colonels’ Course and the Civil Servants’ Course. They are both being run in parallel with the senior staff courses presented in earlier issues of the Baltic Defence Review. The second article in this section by Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, gives a presentation of the Colonels’ Course. This will be followed with an article in Baltic Defence Review no. 6, volume 2001 presenting the Civil Servants’ Course.
The Colonel’s Course – a Shortcut to Defence Development

By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General

Background and Requirements

The Senior Staff Course of the Baltic Defence College is endeavouring to develop general staff officers with a holistic attitude to their profession and who have the theoretical foundation for playing key roles in the development of their countries’ defence forces.

However, as with graduates from other Command and Staff courses, most are only in their early or mid 30s. Because of the early stage of the development of the defence forces of the three Baltic states, their practical service experience is normally still too weak to coalesce with the theoretical background, so creating the solid professional foundation necessary for leading or co-ordinating roles in their forces. Before they become qualified for such posts, they must have a mix of command experience, including practical exposure to lengthy and demanding field exercises. Prior to being ready for leading staff positions like chief of a branch in the central staff or chief of staff in a territorial command, they must have practical staff officer experience from similar headquarters.

On the other hand the three Baltic states urgently need such senior well educated, holistic thinking general staff officers. They are in the crucial stage of their defence development, in the process of creating or starting to implement their medium term structure development plans, linked to the NATO Membership Action Plan process. Consistency in that development urgently requires officers with just the combination of a holistic professional understanding and varied service experience that the BALTDEFCOL graduates are likely to have in 5-7 years. Without officers with that combination of experience among the leading Baltic staff officers there is a risk that the structure development planning and implementation will follow a zigzag course, wasting important time and resources. Without it the strength to sift and stand up to
conflicting and sometimes irrelevant advice and pressure from supporting states will be lacking.

There is, however, a possibility to avoid this, and thus bridge the time gap. All three states have a group of officers of the right age and seniornity, often with a significant service background. They are in their late 30s or 40s, are senior majors, lieutenant colonels or colonels. They have learnt - or taught themselves - to work in the English language. Their experience comes either from the Soviet forces, or they are National Guard officers with a comprehensive civilian academic education. They have often had core staff officer functions since 1992. However, they have typically been in the same position for a long time, as there was nobody to replace them. They have not been candidates for advanced education in the supporting states, because they could not be replaced, and because they might be considered too old to play any significant role in the future.

Now there is a possibility to free them for the advanced Western type professional education they lack. Inspired by the right type of teaching, their experience can support the professional development that prepares them for the key positions that the BALTEDFCOL staff course graduates are still too inexperienced to fill. The same graduates, and graduates from the supporting states' command and staff courses, are now ready to free them for education by taking over their posts.

Until now, the options for experienced field grade officers have been War College Courses in the U.S., Canada, and the UK. However, most of the officers listed here have not been considered candidates for these courses, and the focus of War College Courses in large countries is also different from the immediate requirements in small states in the early stages of defence force development.

**Our possibilities and limitations**

The main project of the Baltic Defence College is its Senior Staff Course. It is the graduates from this course who are to form the main foundation for the development of sound staff work in the future defence forces of the three states. No other activity must be allowed to detract from the quality of this command and staff course and from the possibilities of making it even more relevant and of higher quality. Therefore any new activity such as the endeavour to educate more senior officers to fulfil the above requirement will have to use the resources available.

In one area, the resources for additional activities are becoming available from this summer: the new enlarged lecture area of the College will make it possible to house up to a total of 77 students at any time.

The most critical area remains the Manning with international directing staff. The number of seconded staff from supporting states has been decided by the requirements for the Senior Staff Course. That number does not allow for a totally different course to take place at the same time, parallel with the staff course.

A significant part of the staff course is conducted by external lecturers, sent by
supporting states, or in some cases invited and paid for by the College. There are presently no possibilities to add significantly to the number of external lecturers to conduct a separate, parallel course.

One possibility that would minimise the extra burden on the directing staff would be to integrate the more senior officers in the staff course. The College has already had a couple of students in the Senior Staff Course that actually would fit better into a course with a higher, different focus. However, even if this would be a satisfactory solution for some officers, it is unlikely to be so for all. It is also important to note that the staff course has elements and a focus that makes it less than ideal for more senior officers that should be prepared directly for leading staff positions.

On the other hand there are several elements already present in the Senior Staff Course in the form it has developed to by mid 2001. A large part of the course is basically relevant for all Baltic states officers, independent of seniority (e.g. the full courses in strategy and political studies, total defence and readiness, and military technology). All other subjects in the course have large parts of general character: the lectures typically have a general focus, even if the problems given to the staff course students mirrors their background and average level.

The Baltic Defence College solution: the Colonel’s Course

Due to the small size of the Baltic states defence forces at present, the requirement in number is comparatively limited. The College estimates that the total number of qualified candidates too senior to be considered for a Command and Staff Course education is between 25 and 35, of ranks from major to colonel (or equivalent). In 5-7 years the graduates of the Senior Staff Course and other command and staff courses will have reached a seniority and experience so that they will begin to fill the positions that the candidates of this new course will have to fill until then. Thus any continuation of a higher level course beyond 2007 should include a change of focus, mirroring the fact that the students would then be staff course graduates. The small number of candidates means that the course can be limited to 4-7 annually. Such a small number can be administered in one group, with a very high level of self-motivation from the individual student, without a major pressure on the College resources.

The College will use the staff course lectures to a very high degree to inspire the discussions and work of the course. That is possible because of their general character. However, the topics that will be discussed on the basis of the lectures as well as the role the Colonel’s Course students in the plenary presentations can be adapted to their more comprehensive experience and background as well as their different post-course employment. The same applies to the role of the Colonel’s Course students in the College exercises and seminars.

The students will not be asked to prepare a “Major Thesis” type of individual paper. The emphasis will be on leading – and contributing to - large and complex
staff projects in the planning and implementation of different types of force structures and operation styles. The emphasis will be even more on joint services operations than will be the aim with the Senior Staff Course. Due to the small size of the class it will be possible to take the individual experience and likely post-course employment of the graduates into consideration when preparing the annual course. The focus, however, will always be to prepare the students for the positions of chief of staff of defence region or higher headquarters, as project leaders or head of staff branches/departments in the central headquarters.

The small size of the course will make it possible to use the seniority of the students in one more way. Beyond the initial phase of the course, the students will have much more influence on the actual way their course is conducted, both pedagogically and in content. The course can tap the professional resources of the College directing staff to support the individual and collective development of the course group as requirements are clarified.

A very important part of the course will be work over the duration of the course with a number of “Course Projects”. Each student will lead one and all will contribute to all. One project example could be: “Joint Operational HQs in each of the three Baltic States. Evaluate the needs during different stages of force development, before and after NATO membership, build on examples, define tasks and organisational options in different stages from peace-time, via crisis and mobilisation to war, relations to NATO reinforcements before and after membership, ... etc.”

All projects will conducted in parallel with each other, with periodic progress report briefings to the Minister/Commander/Chief of General Staff with relevant assistants (here played by the Baltic Defence College Management Group). The final result will be presented in both written form (typically in a 100-150 pages report) and in the form of a presentation to the full College (staff and all courses).

The College hopes to have 1-2 non-Baltic officers on each of the annual Colonel’s Courses. This is partly to add to the in-course professional expertise for the benefit of all, but also as an offer to other Central and East European states that have a very large requirement to have officers for that specific age/rank group developed for the future. The College is very fortunate to have an excellent Romanian navy captain selected for the 2001-2002 course.

Mission and aim

As the result of these considerations, the mission of the first Colonel’s Course is to prepare mature field grade officers for key positions in the developing defence forces as follows:

- At the end of the course the students must be qualified to serve as senior officers in policy-making and long term planning staff positions in the national central staffs as well as in inter-Baltic projects and in international staffs that work according to NATO procedures etc.
- They will have a good understanding of naval and air operations and therefore be prepared to lead joint structure development and operational staff work.
- They must be able to play key, leading roles in the armed forces of a democracy, as
professional military staff in the dialogue with the controlling political and military leadership.

- The course will develop the ability to use English as a daily working language.

The aim of the course is to prepare officers for initial positions:

- as branch chiefs (J/G1, J/G2, J/G3, J/G4) in the central staffs,
- serving in senior staff officer positions in NATO HQs and PfP as well as other international operation HQs,
- as senior staff officers in joint operational staffs,
- as chief of staff in military regions or commanders at air and naval base level,
- as commandants/leaders of the national military education institutions
European Military Education Today

By Peter Foot

Europe's diverse community of defence academies and staff colleges is now engaging in educational opportunities that are institutionally challenging, intellectually exciting and potentially carry great risk. These developments are, in part, the effect of that whole raft of far-from-inevitable responses that the ending of the Cold War made possible. Equally, the enlarged possibilities in professional military education that now exist in Europe are themselves driving further experiments and initiatives. Those changes have developed over the decade and more since 1989 and are still taking place. This paper is, therefore, an interim assessment of a variety of selected developments in military education and training within Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and NATO's European members.

**Trends and Models**

During the Cold War, Europe's military education and training institutions were exercises in maintaining the strategic status quo. Professional military education supported and helped sustain the system of bipolarity based on the division of the continent. This is as true of both sides in the Cold War as it is of Europe's non-aligned states. Warsaw Pact nations had less freedom to base courses on national priorities, perceptions and traditions than NATO and non-aligned states but the overall output of European professional military education was profoundly conservative - and, at least arguably, rightly so. Certainly, while military history has been a very rich area of intellectual investment in such places of learning, few looked to Europe's academies and staff colleges for innovative thought and analysis about either contemporary security issues or ways of enhancing military professionalism. Sources of originality and challenge tended to come from university departments or research institutes, and from governments themselves. From the early 1980s, the big questions - about, for example, the wisdom of mortgaging national and alliance futures to the nuclear response, about the long-run sustainability of economies heavily investing in defence technologies, about the strategic utility of arms sales, about meeting challenges to interests outside the creative European stalemate, about the utility of armed force itself - were reflected in the better courses, but that was about it.
Active, informed debate of a kind that impacted on policy-makers, policy-implemen ters and military staffs took place largely outside military academies and colleges.

Nothing here is surprising. Given strategic stagnation, it would only be odd if things had been different. But, in Europe today, no such stasis exists. That greater fluidity is producing a qualitative shift in the role occupied by such institutions tasked with providing professional military education. As the profession of arms itself becomes less confident of its role, it is likely that its education and training centres become a natural place for discussions about military fundamentals in a way that is fresh, certainly in relation to general practice since 1945. As more and more inter-state discourse in a European setting is carried out between individual government departments, whether agriculture, internal security, economic ministries, bilaterally or multilaterally, so the relationship between defence and foreign policy becomes less mechanistic, giving opportunities for professional reflection within the international military community. It has certainly given Commandants and their staffs, both civilian and uniformed, time to think about what their purpose is. That thinking process has already produced a discernible shift in the way military academies and staff colleges are perceived and perceive themselves.

That process of change can be seen by characterising the different kinds of Staff College that Europe has produced over time. These can be grouped across a spectrum of three basic types. Each reflects particular conditions and traditions; none is inherently superior to the others. All three include a mixture of training and education; the issue is about the interdependence of, and balance between, the two. This, of course, blurs important distinctions but, for present purposes, this paper uses ‘training and education’ as a continuum of activities. Given European complexities across two hundred years, the models are illustrative rather than definitive. For convenience, we can name each of them after a conflict, ‘Jena’, ‘Falklands’ and ‘Kosovo’, reflecting responses to strategic conditions and consequent judgements about officer training needs.

The ‘Jena’ model, the most traditional type of Staff College, was developed after the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806, an event which discredited the Frederician army and required a reconstruction of the officer corps from first principles. Its basic motto might be said to be, “Never Again”. Unintended war should not occur; defeat must not happen; military access to strategic decisions, leadership and proper planning will ensure this; restructure the institution in support; create a training regime to sustain the new system; enemies will be deterred by the robustness of the new model forces; should they make the mistake of not being deterred, their comeuppance will rapidly ensue. This system tends to work well when the strategic context is relatively stable, the prevailing political culture is approving and the professionalism of the officer corps high. It is the model most adopted or continued after 1945. “Never Again” plus deterrence and high profes-
sionalism were exemplified by the British Army Staff College at Camberley, by the French at Saint-Cyr, the Germans at the Führungsakademie and the Russians at the Frunze Academy. This model might also be termed the in-house option. Here, the prevailing assumption tends to be that the military profession, or individual Service, is best supported if its most talented officers are taught by fast-track, uniformed individuals who embody the professional attributes and personal virtues held to be most militarily valuable for the officer corps. Participation in the course is essential for promotion and being on the military directing staff is itself evidence of a special set of career expectations. This is analogous to any of the traditional professions looking after their own education. There is therefore little or no role for permanent academic staff. Outsiders, whether government officials or visiting academics, have a function in being invited to participate in exercises and give lectures but the weight of activity is Service-oriented and inward-looking. Quality of thought among students is admired but mostly when it conforms to the ‘Staff solution’, a set of ‘answers’ drafted by, and for, the military Directing Staff. Its best products range from moral exemplars and superb professionals; through to graduates who are as personally splendid but operationally maladroit as the Colonel played by Alec Guinness in the film Bridge on the River Kwai. However, the extent to which European Staff Colleges fully fit the model in large part has depended on the extent to which military teaching staffs really do represent the cream of the Commander/Lieutenant Colonel strata of the Service, and the degree to which Staff College attendance is essential for career development.

The second major type of Staff College, the ‘Falklands’ model, reflects conditions that are somewhat less strategically stable. Rather too much is made of the events of 1989 as a point of radical departure. Clearly, the bringing down of the Berlin Wall is an event of great significance but some changes in perception were already taking place prior to that. Challenges to Western interests were possible, global in opportunity and not necessarily Soviet inspired. Lebanon, much of Africa and the Iran-Iraq War all looked worrying to proponents of stability at all costs. The outbreak of the Falklands War in April 1982 confirmed those concerns for many. It followed that the purely in-house ‘Jena’ model of professional military education had limitations and that the military profession operates in an environment which ought not to be divorced from its social, educational, economic and political context. Just as the Falklands War came as a surprise - both as an event and in its conduct as a war, it lay some way outside prevailing expectations - so this ‘Falklands’ model recognises the need to go beyond normal professional comfort zones, at least for a few. Consequently, it ensures that the most talented of the officer corps are given opportunities to go beyond relatively parochial staff training and education and become exposed to a wider agenda of security thought. This means giving access to postgraduate education in defence and secu-
This model might be also termed the bolt-on option and can be delivered in one of two ways. With the first, a standard staff course is paralleled with an externally accredited university degree. This usually involves a few selected Staff Course officers being given the opportunity to acquire additional qualifications, normally delivered by visiting academics during sports afternoons or other gaps in the programme. With the second, selected individuals are sent to universities or research institutes in addition to their staff training regimes. This normally involves a rather small percentage of the fast-track officer corps being sent to prestigious university departments before being given high-profile command or staff appointments. Again, the success of the ‘Falklands’ model depends on the standing of the individual Staff College in relation to whole-career development. The intellectual advantages for those lucky enough to be selected are obvious; the down side is that, as command structures become flatter through budgetary and other pressures, the pool of postgraduate educated officers may be too small to support the needs of the most senior officers.

From the mid-1990s, in a number of countries, the ‘Falklands’ model has not been able to meet the needs of the sponsoring defence ministries, and individual armed forces. The trend in western Europe now favours what can be called the ‘Kosovo’ model for officer education. At first glance, it might appear that this is just an extension of the ‘Falklands’ model to as many officers who are intellectual capable of postgraduate study. But there is more to it than that. Here, it is taken as axiomatic that the conditions in which armed force is used are highly complex; where concepts such as victory and deterrence mean very little; where military skills may be largely irrelevant, save for the power of command and organisation; where national concerns are remote; in which the legal, political and social context is highly controversial; where tactical issues become strategic in a flash; and where politicians take a minute-by-minute interest in the conduct of operations. The ‘Kosovo’ model trains for this kind of operational complexity and educates for this kind of political ambiguity. It involves high quality military staff working alongside embedded academic staff, teaching a training and education programme that has a dual purpose: a traditional staff college result at a postgraduate standard which is externally accredited by a university. This does not imply that the military requirement is subservient to the academic. To take the British example, the ‘passed staff course’ post nominal is independent of any university involvement. Nevertheless, the operational level of the course is so clearly parallel to postgraduate work that large areas of the course can be accredited by the University of London, thereby helping ensure postgraduate standards across the board. It is an acknowledgement that the intellectual attainment of officers in contemporary peace support operations, for example, requires a level of sophistication in conceptualisation, political analysis and military decision-making which neither the ‘Jena’ nor ‘Falklands’ models offer in
sufficient manpower abundance within the officer corps.

The experience of the 40-plus European countries never lends itself readily to easy summary and these three models are no exception. The real point is the direction of the main trend. Training and education establishments in western Europe are moving towards the ‘Kosovo’ model; those in central and eastern Europe are breaking away from the ‘Jena’ model. This is therefore a general professional military acceptance across Europe of the need to encourage greater intellectual enquiry within Staff Colleges. Externally accredited programmes are part of the benchmarking for this. Hence, by implication and necessity, a somewhat different function is emerging for academic staff within or associated with such establishments. A real partnership between Directing Staff and academics is beginning to be developed, one that will work best where both sides have a mutual regard for each other’s professional expectations. In February 2001, at a Seminar in Moscow on Military Reform organised by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the general military case for the trend was made:

We need to produce officers from platoon commander to Chief of Staff who can deal with this increased level of [strategic and operational] complexity. They need to be able to look at this chaos from many different and previously unexplored angles so that they can derive pathways through it and thereafter communicate and explain these pathways in terms of orders, directives or policy papers. This facet of modern military life occurs not only in the battlespace but also in the area of policy formulation, acquisition and budget management. Nothing is straightforward any more.

The partnership implicit here between civilian academics and directing staff is obvious. It is a particular reflection of what Moskos argues is the blurring of the dividing line between military and civilian activities in the ‘postmodern’ world. From the perspective of professional military education, the ‘Kosovo’ Staff College option represents that in microcosm. Certainly, to take the point further, as the model does provide the operating basis for, or the aspiration of, many Staff Colleges in Europe today, it would be reasonable to expect that the general movement towards west European integration be reflected in the military training and education arena itself. This is not the case - at least, to date. The actual or intended upgrading of standards has produced a degree of educational and training homogenisation across the EAPC membership. It has been a relatively easy process so far. This is partly because national training institutions have not been required to revisit programme content, with the concomitant possibility of accepting compromises to national sovereignty in these matters. All that has been required is a general rise in the academic content of courses and intellectual levels reached by students. Equally, the momentum towards common, higher standards has been driven by a variety of factors, many of which are largely unconnected with direct European security concerns. In the west European part of the EAPC com-
munity, there are clear difficulties in getting common understandings as to how far this process of defence training integration should go. There has been some discussion, for example, about the extent to which specifically European Union-related interests in regional security should find expression in staff training and education. The incorporation of the Western European Union’s contributions to defence and security into EU institutions provided the occasion for this unavoidable discussion. Inherently, this is a more controversial issue than pan-EAPC or intra-NATO developments. It provides a useful test of the degree to which the ‘Kosovo’ model can be developed for Europe as a whole.

Where there is American leadership, responses can be focussed, either as agreement or otherwise, including the wish to modify the superpower sponsor’s position. In the absence of that simplifying feature, European matters become imme-

diately more complex. National factors are more sharply involved when the issues are simply west European - even though west European states are closer on defence issues than for some time. As François Heisbourg has argued, the enhanced standing given to the EU membership’s aspiration to provide a security and defence policy for themselves is directly traceable to the change in the approach of the British government from 1998 onwards.7 With that new commitment - either to the Atlanticist notion of ESDI or the more Eurocentric one of CESDP - comes the logic that, if west European states are to be ready to deploy together, then such efforts ought to be supported by combined military training at the operational level. The problem to be encountered here, not surprisingly, is aligning the general tendency towards equality of standards with national institutions’ own reputation, agenda, tradition and training needs (especially in relation to service traditions and post-course appointing). The phrases selected to discuss this often cite ‘overlap and duplication’: no one wants to invest in a Euro-defence-something which looks duplicative of national things going on already. For example, there are already visits between Staff Colleges across Europe and specific exercises are held annually involving the (limited) exchange of British, French, German, Spanish and Italian students. Virtually all European Staff Colleges accept a range of foreign students for full time courses. Commandants across the EAPC, meeting annually under NATO Defence College auspices, discuss curriculum content and delivery. Surely, the question is asked rhetorically by those unconvinced of the need to adjust to this new situation, not much more than this is required?

The issue does not disappear so readily. Assuming that a west European common curriculum of some kind is necessary, the range of options on how this might be achieved, delivered and managed is interesting. Because of the speculative nature of the subject, a series of questions is the best way of presenting the issues.9

- Is a new, permanent college to be established, staffed and funded internationally, with a remit to deliver excellence European staff training? Would its course
be an add-on or some kind of replacement for and equal to national staff courses?

- Does a small international team prepare a module in European staff training to be offered by all European staff colleges, under the team’s guidance and supervision?

- Or is there merit in establishing a rotating lead establishment, hosted sequentially by interested national participants, which would act as lead coordinator for initiatives in the field of European staff training, arranging seminars, teach-ins and exercise rehearsals for staff in the established national colleges?

Higher policy concerns are obviously not far away from these education and training specifics. To what extent does an incoming Bush administration see any development along these lines as a challenge to the integrity of the Atlantic community? How are Partner nations to be incorporated? Will Europeans actually approve a college with a curriculum and quality standard which is hard or impossible to control? This by no means exhausts the list of questions currently being addressed. Clearly, all these matters are controversial because of the tension between European national and broader alliance concerns. Nevertheless, for as long as there is some aspiration for, or expectation of, west European states acting militarily in concert but independently of Canada and the United States – for whatever reason - the idea of some common curriculum elements, with or without a ‘European Staff College’, is unlikely to go away. Leaving national policy niceties on one side, operational imperatives suggest a greater degree of commonality, if only to avoid embarrassment in the leadership and conduct of United Nations humanitarian operations and their transfer from one nation to another, as primary responsibility is shifted over time.

**Parallel and Reinforcing Developments**

Despite the challenge which west European states may make to any process that is seen to be too interventionist, the movement towards commonality between colleges across Europe continues. For reasons lying outside direct security concerns, other factors confirm the general trend. Notable among these are: changes being experienced in many European countries within the military profession itself; considerations being given in Washington DC to the through-life career development needs of US officers; the emerging importance of Joint doctrine at the Operational level of war; and, finally, practical training requirements for UN, humanitarian and Combined activities of nations within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

This is not the place to rehearse the debate over what brings people into the military profession and what keeps them in. However, some things need to be addressed. Pure military vocations are few and far between. For a great many officers, time spent in the regular, volunteer officer corps is the first of at least two careers. This is not to say that the first choice of career is taken lightly or with-
out commitment. But it does mean that, as marriages happen, children appear and years seem to pass more rapidly, attention shifts marginally to what time spent in the military will produce by way of preparations for the next stage of an individual’s career, beginning roughly any time from ages 30 to 50. This in itself has increased interest in postgraduate qualifications that are recognised as equivalent to other marks of professional standing. This new enthusiasm varies according to country. Some countries, such as Hungary and Germany, have long had military universities; others are looking to equal such opportunities, even though establishing new universities is not part of the plan.\(^1\) Where the military is held in high regard, the need for civilian-equivalent qualifications is likely to be less than in other countries. Conversely, even where status is assured, when defence budgets are in real decline, a readiness for enhancing opportunities after military service tends to be considerable. Especially in central and eastern Europe, where the post-Cold War status of the military is low, or has slipped, relative to other professions, interest in non-military marks of attainment is much sought after. Where an undergraduate degree is the norm for officer selection, then as in other professions, postgraduate degrees later in the career are a natural development. In only a very few countries is there any move in the opposite direction, away from postgraduate-level Staff Courses.\(^2\)

Career management issues are therefore reinforcing the emerging pattern of postgraduate aspirations for officers across Europe. Another kind of reinforcement derives from the role of the United States within the EAPC training and educational arenas. For domestic purposes, the US military have a strong preference for Masters Degrees in association with staff training. This has two implications. First, US military students sent abroad for staff course attendance wish to have the postgraduate study opportunities afforded by, say, Brown University for the Naval War College, Newport, RI. To return to the United States without such a degree is scarcely career enhancing. As European staff colleges wish to attract the best available US students, there is pressure to provide postgraduate opportunities. Secondly, from an American perspective, the drafting cycle makes for many disruptions in an officer’s through-life education. It is therefore natural that the Pentagon’s interest is growing in the range of possibilities offered by information technology-based distance learning programmes that can provide continuity of education, regardless of a sequence of postings from South Korea, Indian Ocean or continental United States. Moreover, that range of opportunities is being offered to PfP countries. An example of this is the offer to PfP members to convert existing courses to e-learning modules free of charge, using the newly developed Learning Management System.\(^3\) It is too early to tell how far, or how fast, this general set of ADL developments will go in the direction of fully accredited postgraduate degrees but it clearly has the potential over time to impact considerably on European military education. US institutions such as the US Joint Forces Command.
and Regent University, with a large commitment to leadership education at postgraduate levels, are working within the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes to extend access to their courses. In a military setting, this is more than clever niche marketing for postgraduate e-learning: it is core business and likely to be very attractive to many Commandants for directing staff and students alike. Going even further, the most ambitious Atlanticist proposal made so far in this direction has come through the United States - that NATO itself consider establishing a NATO On-Line Defence University, for both graduates and undergraduates. This is far from being created but it shows the extent to which momentum has been developed towards multinationality based on e-learning in a defence university setting for EAPC countries.

A broader kind of reinforcement to the general trend comes from a consensus that military doctrine, at the Operational level, is essential for success in Joint warfare and other operations. Degrees of success in achieving Jointness differ considerably across Europe. However, the intellectual high ground is occupied by those who are thinking through the issues of how to get the best from static or shrinking defence budgets, and from smaller, more professional forces. Virtually everyone makes the case for greater cooperation, coordination and synchronisation between maritime, ground and air force components. The restructuring of NATO commands assume this as a given; so does the process of NATO enlargement. It is as though, half a century late, all accept the colourfully expressed logic of the British wartime commanders, Tedder, Cunningham and Montgomery when they set up the British Joint Service Staff College in 1947.

Under the pressure of the late war the fundamental interdependence of the three Fighting Services was effectively realized. The combination of forces of sea, land and air, united as never before by common dangers towards a common end, proved irresistible. Our enemies lacked this team spirit. They lost. Nor, without it, should we have been able to win. In peace, the bow is unbent and the spur of great events no longer presses, and each Fighting Service tends to travel its own particular path and, lacking a common purpose, to wander farther apart from the others. This has happened before. The JSSC has great responsibilities to ensure that it shall never happen again.15

The JSSC failed in this partly because the Services were institutionally not ready to give more than token support to the idea of interdependence; inter-Service rivalry still seemed the best way to achieve single-Service goals. But it also failed because there was no coherent effort to give the Chiefs’ aspiration any intellectual support. Thinking about the conceptual component of fighting power was undernourished. No doctrine was developed; Joint operations lacked a thought process; real Joint institutions such as Operational Command headquarters were not to appear for decades.16 Today, Joint doctrine not only exists – it tends to proliferate; the conceptual component of fighting power is given equal weight to the physi-
cal and moral ones. And Joint Colleges, such as those in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, have become either the suppliers and refiners of Operational level doctrine, or consume and test it. This is very much an intellectual effort in a military setting and fits easily within the purposes of the 'Kosovo' model. Precisely because doctrinal development and understanding are thinking activities, the United Kingdom adopted for its new Joint Service Command and Staff College the 'end state' against which it would assess individual student achievement: "To have developed a mind that is flexible, and able to analyse and conceptualise in a military context in order to make timely and logical decisions in all types of subsequent appointment."

The last reinforcing strand of common developments derives from the Combined, multinational dimension of contemporary military involvement. Whether planning for general war or for a revolutionary through humanitarian operations in Africa, the Balkans or elsewhere, European national forces assume unilateralism to be virtually dead as a credible option to recommend to their respective civilian authorities. The NATO members' line since the end of the Cold War that there should be no re-nationalisation of defence underpinned the point. This is a function of the thankful absence of a direct military threat; a re-ordering in many countries of national budgetary preferences away from military expenditure; reductions in size, shape and structure - as well as some capability - of Europe's armed forces; and, linked to this, limitations to political will in long deployments not connected directly to national interests.

Share the load, share the responsibility, minimise the risk - these might be the watchwords of the current outlook. For this to work a Combined setting is virtually essential and one that goes beyond NATO membership. This is at the heart of what the PfP cells within NATO headquarters are seeking to achieve. Where Staff Colleges and other military institutions come in are the efforts of Sweden, Switzerland and the United States to establish common training modules for Combined operations, using simulation and modelling techniques. Specifically designed to improve interoperability between Partner and NATO nations and to promote regional security, prototypes are already being developed for the Baltic region and southeast Europe. These initiatives are backed by NATO's Military Committee and the Conference of Commandants, facilitated by the PfP Consortium and attached to Staff Colleges.

This initiative is beginning to have an integrative impact on European officer education. Participation in simulations exercises requires the same information technology as ADL and the two are being sponsored together in a Partner setting. The more countries there are ready to play a role in the Balkans, the more sense it makes to play a part in real-time, simulated exercises for southeast Europe. As these have a multinational and doctrinal component, the Staff College setting will often be a natural one. Furthermore, as defence budget constraints, manpower reductions and high levels of operational activity limit the familiar round of NATO
exercises, more and more emphasis will be placed on modelling and simulation. Here, training considerations begin to loom larger, vis-à-vis those of education. This does negate the claim for the 'Kosovo' type being the Staff College model of choice: as with the other two presented here, that model does not see all training as devolved somewhere else. Staff Colleges almost always seek to play host to intellectually enlarging opportunities as well as to the continuation of narrower, but no less valuable, military skills. Academic staff can be frequently dismissive of this kind of activity; war games and military exercises are often seen as tests of procedures rather than being intellectually demanding. Even if that is sometimes true, the attitude is an unhelpful one. The best staff courses exercise procedures which belong within intellectually coherent frameworks. Training regimes should not be – certainly need not be – in competition with postgraduate learning programmes broadly conforming to being an academic year in length and provided for officers selected for future potential. The two are professionally complementary. The European college with the best claim to be 'on the front line', the Baltic Defence College, in Tartu, Estonia, is a superb example of how an intellectually rigorous academic programme, delivered by a small team of academics in conjunction with an international, military directing staff, can be aligned well with severely determined and operationally essential considerations of territorial integrity and the defence of a military region, including capital cities. Few living in the Baltic area can be other than aware of both the history of Soviet-German-Soviet invasions in the 1940s, or forgetful of the current geographical corridor problem exhibited by Kaliningrad, the Russian territory on the Baltic Sea isolated from continental Russia by the intervening states of Belarus and the three small Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. What has so far prevented the emergence of an externally accredited postgraduate award at Tartu is the differences that exist between the three participating Baltic States in their respective Education Ministries. From the beginning, the Baltic Defence College's intent, founded on practice, is that the intellectual development of selected officers proceeds in parallel with operational improvement. This may be an operationally extreme case in terms of Staff Colleges but, as with the other European Staff Colleges living in far gentler conditions, the assumption has been that the latter is conditional on the former.

It was almost inevitable, therefore, that the Baltic Defence College should be selected as the site to host testing of the Baltic Simulation and Modelling (BALTSIM) exercise in late 2001. Equally predictable, reflecting its growing standing in training and education, the Baltic Defence College has also been selected as a test centre for Advanced Distance Learning (ADL) practice, with all of its postgraduate teaching potential, within the Partnership for Peace. There are two significant aspects to this development, with applicability beyond the college itself. The first main issue is that the course selected for partial ADL conversion is a new course
designed for desk level civilians in the three participating Baltic states’ defence ministries. Small, newly created ministries, often staffed with people in their twenties, find it hard to let their staff have an academic year away for study and professional development; the distance learning element allows the work to be done with a mixture of residential and distance learning components. The course’s output will help create and consolidate defence reform in the region precisely because it will give the civilian leadership of the military establishments in those countries an intelligent and growing appreciation of the requirements of those military institutions for which they are responsible. Civilians and military personnel, destined to work alongside each other, will talk the same strategic language and be educated in each other’s management assumptions. This, then, is a course which could have wide applicability across the new states of central and eastern Europe. By extension, it also suggests that some thought might be given to whether more established civilian ministry hierarchies in western Europe might not pay more attention to aligning civilian and military education and training needs. The second main issue is the more technical one of the extent to which course conversion to partial distance learning can be successfully integrated into existing course design, support, teaching and student assessment. Many colleges within the EAPC community will be watching this development to evaluate the transferability of success. Those showing the keenest interest in the trials runs will be those in central and eastern Europe.

Educational Reform in Central and Eastern Europe

It is in central and eastern Europe that the largest risks to regional order exist. It is there that the challenge facing Staff Colleges is greatest. At one level, this is a policy matter. Partner countries not seeking early NATO membership, if at all, are showing great interest in demonstrating their readiness as Partners to be regarded as equals. The ability to demonstrate a proven and exercised interoperable capacity is a part of that. The acceptance of distance learning technologies and practices, their integration into residential, national courses designed to increase interoperability, becomes a badge of national standing within the EAPC. But interoperability is much more than a technical matter. The old Warsaw Pact was very proficient at interoperability but failed; NATO, by contrast, never achieved alliance-wide procurement that addressed the technical issue of different, national specifications for materiel. But NATO did have the attitudes needed to overcome the problems of interoperability and to make the alliance machinery work. It was ‘ethos over tactics’, or knowing how and why to do something, rather than relying on the formulaic what to do. Participation in coalition operations in southeast Europe, or elsewhere, confirms the professionalisation of the armed forces and their institutions. For countries determined to go further, to seek NATO membership, transparent training and education programmes to educate the officer cadre in-
 intellectually, to consolidate respect for democratic accountability, to create a matching civilian staff able to deliver skilled civilian control of military power through well-structured defence ministries operating in harmony with ministries of foreign affairs - these are all goals for which Staff Colleges will be crucial in the long run sustainability of security sector reform. The two levels are implicit in the point made by the Hungarian Brigadier-General Dr Zoltán Szenes, ‘It is clear that the interoperability issue is not limited to technical aspects. Interoperability actually starts in the heads of people.’

This perception, in content unremarkable to Western military thinking, represents a profound shift of attitudes for militaries brought up within the Warsaw Pact. It is not yet a universally held view. The suggestion that success in interoperability is a matter of changing attitudes goes to the heart of the intellectual and professionalisation problem confronting trainers and educators of the military in this disparate region. Slow though the West was in recognising the fact, the human potential has been found to be often unpromising. At first, with the building of military-to-military contacts after 1989, there was a tendency to assume that Warsaw Pact militaries were different but equal. Half a century of talk about the ‘growing threat’ predisposed Westerners to think that Warsaw Pact armed forces were coherent and well-led by officers who could be respected as professionals. As it turned out, this was either only occasionally true or a more general error of understanding. Initial post-Cold War contacts were limited to professional exchanges of experience. As the Danish Brigadier-General, Michael Clemmesen, pointed out in 1999, ‘It was considered insulting and arrogant that they might be less right than we. This approach, however, has probably delayed reform...for several years’. When measured against those factors which have led to reform in other government aspects of central and eastern European countries - constitutionality, economic and institution-building, for example - it has been the early application of reform programmes that has yielded the greatest success to date. To that extent, the military area for reform has been later than it might have been in some countries. However, it needs also to be pointed out that the military domain is by no means the slowest to respond; education, domestic policing and environmental management often lag even further behind.

Given the conditions inherited by post-Cold War militaries in central and eastern Europe, the degree to which progress has been made is cautiously encouraging, despite the awareness of what there is still to be achieved. From an educational viewpoint, the inhibitions to progress include an intellectual legacy from Soviet times which is clear the moment a visiting Western lecturer encounters questions from a central European audience of officers. The reluctance to challenge any figure in authority is obvious; questions usually take the form of factual clarification. From earliest primary school experience, individuals now going through staff courses have been used to a system that venerated the committing of ‘truth’ to memory, that
intellectual enquiry was, by definition, going to produce something other than the correct solution. Soviet-determined ideological orthodoxy fitted well with the "Staff solution" approach to teaching. And a number of west European staff colleges took a view not wholly remote from this during the Cold War - the "Staff solution" being often the means of assessing learning by rote. Nevertheless, whether despite or because of Staff College attendance, individual attributes of independence in thought and judgement were, in general, usually recognised and rewarded in subsequent career progression. This is almost wholly absent from the educational background of those going through the system at the moment throughout central and eastern Europe. And the most senior officers are even more remote from the winds blowing through military education. What has persuaded so many of them of the need to accept changes otherwise alien to their own development and personal success is the prevailing wish of countries in the region to participate in the European structures of stability that the European Union and NATO represent.

The civil-military context for this is an area of enlarging study. How is the relationship seen between the newly independent states' institutional apparatus and the profession of arms? Newly independent states are likely to take very traditional views about the role of military power and its relationship to the nation-state. Whatever the validity of the (largely Western) intellectual debate about the declining utility of military power, neither the politicians who inherited and managed the consequences of the collapse of communism, nor those who hastily created new national military structures, would have been very interested. Their text would not have been Sir John Keegan's argument that war as an instrument of national purpose is in terminal retreat - and that, as a consequence, the military dimension of national security represented an invitation to waste scarce, national economic resources. Nor would the post-Cold War "new security agenda" have been dominant in decision-making circles. Rather, the instinctive view tended to be the traditional one, namely that the military instrument is the one guarantor of last resort of national sovereignty without which a state cannot be accorded respect in a supposedly anarchic system. The "vanquished" superpower's successor leadership certainly took that view, difficult though affording the consequences was found to be. Countries with distinguished military traditions, such as Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, were hardly likely to use the moment of independence from Soviet control, with the distinct possibility of Russian resurgence, at least in the short run, in the years immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. States which lacked such traditions would naturally use the new national forces as others did, as a focus for state building. In states slow to respond to the possibilities offered by the new freedoms, such as Belarus, Slovakia, Ukraine and (for a while) Bulgaria, the existing military structures were useful for shoring up a variety of repressive regimes.
From a Western perspective, it is too easy to register disappointment at this. In many central and eastern European states, there is no single, authorised provider of violence on behalf of the nation state. Militaries have to compete with other, legitimately ‘armed forces’, such as Paramilitaries, Border Guards, security forces and other groups shading into criminal activities but with strong if covert links to government. In other places, competition between single Service elements of the military militates against national effectiveness. Thus, before going much further, it is important to note that judgements and assumptions derived from the aggregated experience of the commitment to a unified Canadian Forces ethos, the US patchy application of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the European variations on the Jointery theme, are often poor guides to understanding what is going on in central and eastern Europe.

Four areas need a degree of clarification to give Western perceptions some context. First, former Warsaw Pact militaries remain very different from Western models, either all-volunteer or conscript-based. The countries in the region often have little in the way of recognisable career structures. Explaining promotion systems causes embarrassment to those involved; appointing patterns for military personnel are often diverse and equally hard to understand. Secondly, non-military control of armed forces is not yet always fully secure. It is true that the general, constitutional case for civilian and democratic control of the armed forces is formally accepted as the central and eastern European norm. Institutions embodying this are now mostly in place. However, the problem lies in knowing the extent to which these new systems are actually the processes through which policy is implemented, resources distributed and the Armed Forces held to be accountable. Thirdly, more generally, there are inevitable tensions within the military hierarchies in the region about both the changes which have already taken place and those which might be yet still have to be accommodated. Within the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union, dissidents from the profession of arms were as rare as from history or philosophy. The national military institutions, as they emerged during the 1990s in central and eastern European countries, had little tradition, preference or incentive to make significant changes - except for blaming everything on the Soviet Union. The larger truth is that the old system had served military personnel well; military institutions may have not been independent but there was never any question about professional security, protection and elite privileges. Finally, the collapse of communism is held by westerners as the natural consequence of trying to sustain a system that was, by its nature, intellectually, morally, economically and politically bankrupt. Such a sweeping condemnation precludes a fuller understanding of the role of the military in the Soviet system. Those currently serving with a legacy of service as officers in the old system, not unreasonably, can point to the social and national unifying effects of the old ways - and, by implication, question whether Western models, given the ethnic com-
complexity of their region, can hope to be as constructive.  

This list might make it seem that structural impediments are going to make reform of the military - never mind the military education part of that - extremely difficult in central and eastern Europe. What makes this such an absorbing area to watch is the way that perception needs to be turned on its head. The prevailing movement is a tendency moving from the defence training and education establishments into long-term systemic change. This runs against the normal, expected direction, when the armed forces know what they want and require their training establishments to provide it. Two colleges show this particularly well; one, the Baltic Defence College in Estonia, has been mentioned already, the other is the "G S Rakovsky" Defence College in Bulgaria. The experiment in establishing a tri-nation staff training and education centre is remarkable enough in itself. Three newly independent states eschew that mark of national sovereignty, a national Staff College. But the success of the venture is measured against the things the three participating states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are finding themselves doing to ensure that success. Graduates are being intelligently appointed to maximise the reforming momentum. Greater cooperation is developing between the three states, consequent upon the operational experience being developed, exercised and tested at Tartu. The participation in BALTSIM will internationalise that still further. Graduates are being considered for postgraduate study abroad, following the completion of the course in Tartu. The Civil Servants Course is creating a civil-military partnership of mutually reinforcing strengths. Parochially, approaches to initial officer training and education, an area most countries jealously guard as sacred to the nation's purposes, are changing to make officers better prepared for Tartu. More widely, these reforms are seen as crucial to meet NATO entry standards. Given the salience of NATO membership to so many states, it is scarcely surprising that Staff Colleges have come to regard themselves as the leaders of change.

The second example is even more radical. Bulgaria, a state late in exploiting the opportunities offered by the retreat of the old system, is investing impressive professional and intellectual energy to catch up. The Deputy Commandant of the "G S Rakovsky" Defence College in Sofia, Colonel Valeri Ratev, sums up the ambition in a phrase used as part of the title of his article, 'changing the strategic culture through the modernisation of military education'. Using the national resources of the college, a series of innovations are in progress which will seed themselves through the military establishment. The most important of these, he argues, is the development of abilities to think critically - it will produce better officers and their international standing will be confirmed when university accreditation is granted. Not only is this sought as a desirable end in itself but is part of the distinction and difference between the old and the new ways: 'Critical thinking was forbidden during the Warsaw Pact years, at every level of military competence'. That critical thinking
has already seen results in the form of the new Bulgarian Military Doctrine, adopted in 1999. Here, the emphasis is not on sovereign, national defence tasks. Instead, the 'strategic culture' is deeply internationalist:

Its philosophy emphasises that involving the country in military conflict can and should be avoided by peacetime engagement in strengthening general international security and stability. At the same time, the sovereignty, security and independence of Bulgaria should be guaranteed through interaction and integration within the European Union and NATO.

The college is working on teaching programmes for both civilians and uniformed students, stressing the conceptual basis of international and international security, which exercise skills of defining national objectives in an international setting, balancing military aspects of security against other contributions, and managing defence as a set of complex priorities, requiring abilities in communication and leadership. ‘Changes in the way

we think about war, national defence and the Armed Forces, changes in our military mentality, and in the style of implementing defence policy – these are the pillars of transformation. The new building will show no similarities to the inherited habits of the old Warsaw Pact machine.’

These are courageous developments because they carry risk. Changing the intellectual culture within institutions resistance to change can invite a backlash. Internationalising national defence in domestic, political conditions that are not entirely stable could provoke opposition that undermines the process. It is here that the international community has a major role to play. Since the collapse of the communist system, many NATO former non-aligned countries have been engaged in what the United Kingdom calls ‘defence diplomacy’ in the training and education fields. Teams have gone in for specific jobs or stayed for long periods to help more generally. This has ranged from NCO training to Staff College curriculum development. The NATO School at Oberammergau and the George Marshall European Security Studies Center, two of the Atlantic institutions to move rapidly and wholeheartedly into this area, have welcomed more than a decade of military students from central and eastern Europe. The reforming impact of this has been gentle and steady. The example of three new NATO members has encouraged others to experiment with training and education. The role of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in training and education is one of support, resources and transparency. In terms of the Staff College models suggested earlier, the process of adjustment away from a pure ‘Jena’ model is clear. The danger to be avoided by the international community is to press the process too far, too fast. Few newly independent countries have the human, intellectual and institutional resources for the full-blown ‘Kosovo’ type. But something like the ‘Falklands’ version does offer enough of the old, with sufficient of the new to press reform forward at a speed which does not attract destruc-
tive opposition. Apart from anything else, the substantial numbers of central and east European graduates from US, Canadian and west European defence colleges who return to their own countries with postgraduate degrees will find themselves very much at home in that professional and intellectual environment.

There will be, of course, considerable variations across Europe and within the newly emergent states of its central and eastern regions. The broad trends across the continent, incorporating higher intellectual standards and an increased degree of commonality, will not produce colleges which are clones of western best practice. Nor should it. As is appropriate, each country will find, as it were, its own ‘Staff College solution’. Each country will find its own way of responding to the seismic shift from upholding the balance of power to the more complex task of maintaining continental order. In most, the new teaching partnership, more the child of that strategic change than of academic advocacy, promises to free civilian academics in Europe’s military academies and Staff Colleges from the setting that has constrained and inhibited them for half a century. They will be liberated from being seen as second class citizens within the academies themselves, and as second class scholars within academic life more generally. It is not the least of the reasons for being grateful to their military colleagues.

1 Martin van Creveld’s recommendations addressed this point in his campaigning book on professional military education. See his The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, New York: The Free Press, 1990, pp.103-104

2 The Moskos thesis on the postmodern military may not be applicable to conditions in all countries but it is an excellent summary of challenges to the military profession. Charles C Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R Segal (eds.), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, especially the Moskos essay, pp. 14-31.


4 Postgraduate education in the sciences and engineering has long been part of European officer development. With rare exceptions, however, those with education in such areas do not rise to command their Service or become the main channel for military guidance to governments.


The initials stand respectively for European Security and Defence Identity and Common European Security and Defence Policy.

I am grateful to a number of officials in the UK Ministry of Defence for the opportunity to discuss these matters.

See the Bush-Blair joint media briefing on 23 February 2001. The President clearly laid the responsibility for resolving the potential European and Atlantic divide about these matters on the Europeans. See reports and editorial, The Times, 24 Feb 01.

The German case is instructive of some difficulties. In Hamburg, there are both the military university and the Führungskademie. The former comes under the responsibility of the local Lande; the latter is centrally controlled from Berlin. Despite the two organisations trying to develop together, the separate lines of accountability have made this impossible. This has meant that the Führungskademie does not have externally accredited degrees.

Ukraine is one such example. It is developing courses that are purely military in focus, partly to establish a Ukrainian pattern of military service which is different from the old Soviet one with its heavy investment in intellectually demanding staff training (three years at the Frunze Academy for the best Army officers).

See the ADL pages of the following website: http://www.pfpconsortium.org

See, as examples, websites http://www.regent.edu and http://exeter.ac.uk/leadership

Framed Charter document, donated to JSSC by Major General Napier White, now displayed at JSCSC, Shrivaham, UK.

The hope, held briefly in early April 1982 within the Royal Navy, that the Falklands would be an exclusively Navy affair was a late echo of single-Service autonomy.


NATO MCM-016-01, dated 26 January 2001, NMA Advice on PFF Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP) – Advanced Distributed Learning and Simulation.

Called, respectively, BALTSIM and SEESIM, a Ukrainian simulation network is also being planned.

For a brief summary of developments to date, see Baltic Defence College, White Book 2000, Tartu: BDCOL, 2000. The College does not yet have formal postgraduate status.

The other two are the "G S Rakovsky" Military Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria and the George C Marshall Center for European Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany


J Kazocius, 'Military Training', in Defence Diplomacy in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges to Comparative Public Policy, ESRC Future Governance Paper, February 2001, p.16

Zoltán Szenes, 'Hungarian Defence Reform in the Light of NATO Membership', unpublished paper. The author is a Professor at Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University and Assistant Chief of Staff at RHQ AFOUTH, Naples, Italy.


Sources for this are the author’s experience teaching at the Baltic Defence College, lecturing in Warsaw and for early Know-How Fund visits by central and eastern European diplomats and officers to the UK. See also Michael H Clemmesen, op. cit., pp. 261-263.

See the first of a number of studies financed through the UK ESRC, Anthony Forster, Andrew Cottey and Tim Edmunds, Professionalisation of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Background Paper, for the ESRC, September 2000.

For a shortened version of his thesis, see his BBC Reith Lectures, published as John


32 Canada is playing a crucial role here in providing English language tuition for all candidates for the Baltic Defence (the only other language option, Russian, is obviously and politically difficult).


34 Valeri Ratchev, 'Changing the Strategic Culture through Modernisation of Military Education - The Case of Bulgaria', *CONNEC-"
Section II

Baltic Co-operation and the Future

Since the three Baltic States regained independence and most notably since Western support and military assistance gained weight from the mid-nineties a number of common Baltic projects have been implemented, the most prominent being BALBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL of all the multi-donor military assistance projects with the Baltic States, the Baltic Battalion - BALTBAT - is certainly the largest and longest running. The first article in this section offers an article by Mr. Julian Brett, MA, Advisor to the Danish Ministry of Defence on foreign military assistance and the experience gained from the BALTBAT project.

The second article of this section deals with one of the most crucial topics in the discussion about the future security arrangements of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, namely the discussion about membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This second article by Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, Commandant of the Baltic Defence College and Professor Ole Kvernø, Director of Strategy and Political Studies at the Baltic Defence College, revisits the most frequently heard arguments in this debate.
Foreign Military Assistance – Learning from BALTBAT

By Julian Elgaard Brett

BALTBAT - the Baltic Battalion - is the largest and longest running of the many military assistance projects with the Baltic States. As an ambitious and long-term commitment, it has had its share of supporters and critics. Some argue that the resources and effort expended could have been more productively used elsewhere. They see that BALTBAT has satisfied a political need but has had limited practical military value in the national defence context. Others take the view that the project has had considerable impact in both these areas. A further perspective is that the project has not achieved its full potential and a more integrated or “holistic” approach to project management has been required.

Whichever position is held, there is no doubt that the past seven years of cooperation provides a rich source of lessons learned. When it began in 1994, BALTBAT coincided with (and arguably helped to create) the first substantial opportunities for collective support to the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian defence structures after independence. It was a pathfinder project that also fitted well with the new international themes of cooperation, participation, peacekeeping and multinationality. Foreign military assistance activities in the Baltic states have since provided considerable impetus to the three countries’ defence development and have helped substantiate their engagement in wider international security activities - for example, in the Partnership for Peace and in NATO/Partner peace operations in the Balkans. The multinational Baltic Battalion has been an important enabling element in both respects.

To examine such issues and draw out lessons learned that could have practical value for BALTBAT’s future, as well as other assistance projects, the British and Danish Ministries of Defence commissioned a study of BALTBAT’s project management. “An evaluation of the multilateral project supporting the Baltic Battalion between 1994 and 2000” was completed in
January 2001. This article provides an overview and discussion of its principal conclusions.

What can we learn?

The main lessons can be grouped into three (albeit somewhat overlapping) areas of interest: project management, project planning and project implementation. In the overview below, the key points arising from these are presented in a generic form:

- **Project management.** We can see that effective control mechanisms need to be in place amongst recipients, donors and the project as a whole from the outset. This is not simply a matter of establishing working groups with realistic terms of reference. It is a question of the way project participants work together and link into their national management structures. Particular attention should be given to recipients. There needs to be full commitment and to demonstrate this the project should sit firmly within national plans. But we also need to recognise that recipients’ identification with assistance projects depend upon the degree to which they are seen as contributing to the overall development process or, in other words, how they are seen to add value. Viewed from these perspectives, there are a number of institutional “must haves” without which projects may run the risk of losing direction. For example:
  - Decision-makers must be engaged and actively support the project.
  - Participation and transparency must be optimised (to develop confidence and capacity).
  - There must be consistently clear communication of results. Results must be seen to be relevant and cost-effective.
  - There must be a realistic split of responsibilities based upon the willingness and ability of participants to contribute.
  - Representatives in management groups must have sufficient mandates to take decisions and the necessary connections within their national systems to promote higher-level decision-making and action.
  - If not a distinct feature from the outset, project leadership must shift from donors to recipients as the project progresses.

- **Project planning.** A realistic appreciation of the context in which projects are set should ensure that activities are relevant and that results can actually be used. As assistance projects generally operate within countries undergoing some form of transition, planning needs to be able to respond to change. It must, for example, recognise that long term projects may be set against very different conditions at the beginning and end phases of their implementation. Planning should also include long-term sustainability (involving a gradual taking over of management and support responsibilities by recipients) as a distinct objective. Projects’ abilities to contribute productively to wider development objectives (as catalysts) and link into other assistance activities in the recipient countries are also relevant. Thus we can see that:
  - Pre-project fact-finding in the target area is essential.
  - Sufficient time must be allowed to “entrench” projects so that they can be-
come integrated parts of recipients’ systems.

- An active role in project planning and implementation by recipients should promote a sense of ownership. The converse will happen if they feel excluded.
- Planning should include visible results at various stages to show achievement and promote “engagement”, including amongst adjacent sectors.
- Milestones should be arranged as part of routine assessment and “feedback”.
- Strategies should be in place to ensure that possible spin-offs are fully absorbed by other sectors.
- Strategies should be developed to counter institutional and other constraints that could hamper implementation.
- Synergy with parallel development activities should be maximised.

- Project implementation. A productive mix of donor and recipient activity is needed as projects move from their planning to their implementation phases. Pre-conditions for successful development and sustainment (for example, suitable infrastructure, personnel, logistics and financial support, and command relations) identified during the planning phase should ideally be in place when implementation begins. Project management should be able to recognise where this will not be the case (or will not be met in full) and efforts should be made to address critical shortcomings early in the project’s life. Assistance from donors, for example, could usefully focus on areas where local resources are limited or not optimised on a “help-to-self-help” principle. Such inputs should be seen in the overall development context – meaning that action to address institutional shortcomings for one project can have positive effects elsewhere. A “holistic” approach to development assistance would seek to optimise such spin-offs.
- A “permanent” in-country implementation team can provide valuable on-hand expertise and momentum. Team members’ skills (and personal qualities) need to be related to the task.
- There should be an expectation of gradual progress towards the take-over of projects by recipients. Activities should be designed to achieve this.
- Activities that develop an understanding of “what it takes” in a relevant context should be used to help individuals grasp the complexity of decision-making and build confidence.
- An effective evaluation capability should develop amongst recipients to maintain standards in the longer-term.
- Organisational models, doctrine and procedures from comparable structures outside projects can provide an effective basis from which to work provided they are tailored to local requirements.

There are, of course, many more lessons learned from BALTBAT, but these are the main examples of general interest and it can be seen that they have fairly wide applicability (i.e. they are not only relevant to BALTBAT). In the remainder of this article, I will discuss the particular aspects of the project that led to the lessons learned. We need to begin with a brief consideration of context and ambition.
About context and ambition

BALTBAT needs to be seen in the political and economic “context” of the 1990s - which was a period of great change in the Baltic States and further afield. It can be seen that local conditions around the project had an important influence on its pace and character - both because shortcomings indicated priority areas for assistance in the first place and because project implementation was directly or indirectly affected by them.

After independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had relatively few solid anchor points for development. In defence matters, there were no plans, few operational forces, no defined doctrine, nothing in the way of modern infrastructure and so on. Foreign military assistance as a tool of defence development was itself quite new. This is much less the case now. There are units, policies and plans. The national bureaucracies and defence forces have gained a pool of useful experience. Assistance is much better planned and targeted.

The general situation in 1994 was thus very different to today and, with hindsight, the BALTBAT project looks very ambitious. It was not simply a matter of training and equipping recruits. To sustain a battalion of 700 or so personnel, structured personnel planning, doctrine, command & control arrangements, logistic re-supply, infrastructure etc. was needed. The complexities can be multiplied by three when BALTBAT’s multinationality and the uneven defence development in the three countries are considered. The nature of the task, therefore, required linkages to a large number of areas within the general defence systems that were either non-existent or relatively undeveloped when the project began. It got around such limitations in the beginning by “importing” many of its core elements (equipment, training, planning etc.) from supporting countries with the optimistic hope that the required anchors outside the project would develop in parallel with the battalion. The extent to which this has (and has not) happened is shown by the length of time it has taken for the Baltic States to take over the project’s support and management.

There was also a need for the project’s participants to learn how to co-operate in a new way. BALTBAT was a Baltic idea that found willing support elsewhere. We need to be clear about this. It was Baltic Defence Ministers meeting in Tallinn on 13th September 1993 who agreed that a joint peacekeeping unit would represent a good focus for concrete co-operation between them. They saw that such an endeavour could enable them to contribute to wider security at an early stage and, importantly, enter into a new and more substantive co-operation with donors in the West. Donors, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to build regional stability, target and co-ordinate assistance more effectively and increase its capacity.

There was thus a good deal of consensus in the thinking at this time and it led to the multilateral approach with which we are now familiar.

The choice of a joint peacekeeping ca-
pability as a central objective was reasonable (despite what is often said with hindsight) because it was a realistic candidate for multinational support and because it met fundamental political and military needs. The basic military training provided by the British Royal Marines, for example, fitted the conditions in the Baltic States at the time. UN-related training and support from the Nordic countries enabled it to be used operationally. On the other hand, assistance with developing combat related capabilities on a large scale would have been politically unrealistic in 1994, irrespective of whether it could actually have been absorbed. This is not to say that this option did not become relevant later on. In fact, BALTBAT’s development as an infantry battalion (with enhanced self defence) from 1998 partly reflected the judgement that greater capability would make it more useful in a national defence context (a point that was of obvious concern to Baltic military planners) in addition to allowing participation in a wider range of operational missions.

**But we need to be able to use it!**

The importance of a development project’s utility should be obvious. Unless the result can be used, it will have been a waste of time, effort and other resources. But it is more complicated than this; we need to recognise that the process of development is also an output. This suggests that, even if the tangible results are less than ideal, the process of producing them can be positive. In my view, BALTBAT scores well on both counts.

Training from the BALTBAT Training Team undoubtedly raised basic military skills, promoted interoperability and improved English Language abilities. Some 1200 personnel have served in BALTBAT since 1994. Rotation of personnel, although unsystematic, has enabled the impact of BALTBAT training to be felt more widely and a “training the trainers” approach has led to the establishment of local training capabilities. Over a thousand personnel have been successfully deployed from BALTBAT units to UN and NATO peace support operations since 1996.

Deployments are, of course, part of BALTBAT’s formal *raison d’être* but they have also had important spin-offs in the national development context. Pre-mission training, for example, has cemented the training provided through the project and, in the case of recent deployments with Danish battalions in SFOR, has added a combat environment (with tanks etc) that could not have been possible in the Baltic states. The deployments themselves have – as active missions in a multinational NATO managed environment – boosted individual as well as unit abilities. BALTBAT’s added value in this context has been that that it has provided trained personnel with a relatively even military background and with English language skills – in other words, they have been interoperable and have been able to relatively quickly take responsibility. In relation to national defence development and competing priorities from other areas, there has been no realistic alternative to the “foster” unit format - although it
can be argued that more “independent” deployments could have had a higher political value in view of NATO membership ambitions.

The complaint one occasionally hears that BALTBAT has never deployed as a battalion, and has therefore somehow “failed”, misses an important point. The experience shows how difficult it is to get the level of ambition right. But, we should recognise that BALTBAT has provided the peace operations capability that the initiators of the project required and this capability has been used. The process of getting there has been relevant from a defence development perspective. More telling is the judgement, reached in 1998 when considering what it would take to deploy the full battalion to the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon, that the national defence systems would have been hard pushed to sustain expected manpower, logistic and financial demands. This is more a reflection on the status reached in the national development as a whole than a critique of BALTBAT as such and it included important pointers for Baltic military planners and the donor community alike. As far as BALTBAT was concerned, the BALTCOM (expanded company) deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina from October 1998 were in fact an appropriate compromise.

The project also provided a range of non-military advantages. Again, these were probably most strongly felt in the early years when local capacity was at its lowest. Within the Baltic political establishment, BALTBAT helped demonstrate that defence was able to produce political as well as military dividends. It thus helped generate political support for the armed forces. BALTBAT’s “flag-waving” potential was not missed; the project demonstrated Baltic co-operation and commitment – both relevant aspects from a NATO membership perspective. The business of administering the project (in particular, its interface with other countries) helped establish the new Baltic bureaucracies and encouraged the development of a democratic military culture.

It is not clear that this wide range of political, military and institutional benefits would have been available if the project had been orientated markedly differently. National defence development has needed both its external and internal perspectives and the mix of process and output. On the other hand, one might usefully ask whether the co-operation could have produced greater benefits and faster. This is perhaps more a question of “fine tuning” activities to the context in which they are set – and, as noted above, the experience of the past seven years provides a number of valuable pointers for the future.

The point about assistance to societies undergoing transition

If then, the overall conclusion is positive, why the controversy? The short answer is that the consensus on BALTBAT’s objectives and role that characterised the project in the beginning was not sustained as national defence development took off in 1997/98 and other options became available. Self-defence issues naturally assumed priority for Baltic military planners and, rather than taking the opportu-
nity to fully integrate BALTBAT into the new thinking, the project moved from the centre of the scene to the periphery. Although there is a tendency to place the blame for this primarily on a lack of consensus and common vision within the Baltic States’ military systems, the problem is more a symptom of natural strains within the development process as a whole.

The point about foreign assistance to societies in transition is that such difficulties can be expected. It is a fact of life that there will be shortages of resources, work overload, conflicting advice and gaps in internal consensus (as debates emerge over policy). While project management needs to develop strategies to take account of them, the experience from BALTBAT shows how difficult it is in practice.

To work effectively in transition, we can see that project management has to be especially clear and realistic about its objectives and their implementation. Most importantly, there must be consensus at core levels within the project and in adjacent areas contributing to it. To achieve this, communication and follow-up needs to be thorough and action-orientated. The BALTBAT project’s internal cohesion and capacity have had significant strengths in this respect. But the experience also underlines the importance of cohesion in its widest sense and here the record appears less positive.

In BALTBAT’s case, the foundations of effective project management within recipients were laid relatively late and did not, by and large, extend sufficiently deeply or broadly amongst the military staffs. The effect of this was to enhance and prolong the overall policy and implementation role of the international project fora – the Steering Group, Military Working Group and BALTBAT Training Team - and, where action from the Baltic side was lacking, a degree of micro-management emerged in order to maintain progress. On the plus side, this demonstrated action-orientated management and was thus a useful example. Less positively, it led to frustration amongst donors and recipients alike when activity required was not forthcoming. This supported the perception that BALTBAT was first and foremost a political enterprise driven from abroad.

Learning from this experience, we can see that suitable management mechanisms should ideally be in place from the outset, both within and amongst recipients, to ensure political and military direction, follow-up and the necessary connections between the project and other areas of the defence systems. Without such arrangements, there is a risk that available resources (in the widest sense of the word) will not be utilised to the full. And, where local structures are not yet optimised, tailored support to the local project management from donors should be considered - taking due account of national sensitivities. Such assistance could be expected to reduce or be adjusted according to progress against agreed milestones.

The difficulty experienced by the project until recently in tackling this issue has limited BALTBAT’s cost-effectiveness and restricted the pace with which the Baltic States have been able to assume full ownership of it. Equally importantly, it has limited the capacity for the project to act as a catalyst for general defence de-
Development - no strategy was ever developed for this and potential benefits have not, therefore, been maximised. While a major responsibility for this certainly lies with Baltic States (who should not be passive), donors could, perhaps, have made a greater impact through more direct project management advice and a wider - and more "holistic" - perspective. The BALTSEA process that developed from 1997, for example, could have taken a more pro-active approach in the latter regard by directly addressing the pre-conditions for success regularly identified by the Steering Group and Military Working Group. Doctrine, personnel planning and logistics re-supply are three obvious examples of areas where BALTBAT has been held back by factors generally beyond the remit of the formal project plan and which have only belatedly become the focus of substantial donor assistance.

Learning from BALTBAT

To conclude, we might briefly recall five points from the beginning of this article that can help keep the complex mix of national development and foreign assistance on track; namely the importance of:

- Taking account of the context in which the project is set (and countering weaknesses and maximising strengths).
- Ensuring commitment, engagement and inclusion in national plans.
- Ensuring effective project management mechanisms between and within project participants (in particular recipients) from the outset.
- Targeting donor assistance at "enabling" factors to build up local capacities.
- Ensuring outputs are visible, relevant and recognised.

In these respects, the (Baltic) decision in mid-2000 to re-focus the project so that BALTBAT assumes a framework role in connection with three national battalions (each being capable of taking on national and international roles) is a good decision in order to start the next phase of their national defence development. It will lower costs and keep the benefits available.

1 This article draws from a report produced by the author for MOD Denmark and MOD UK in January 2001 evaluating the lessons learned from the BALTBAT project between 1994 and 2000. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent official Danish or UK policy.

2 The following countries are considered as participants in the project: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

3 Chapter 6 of the Lessons learned from the BALTBAT project, January 2001, provides a comprehensive listing.

4 Trilateral (Baltic) Declaration in the Field of Security and Defence, Tallinn, 13th September 1993. The idea had emerged earlier that year and was subsequently developed further by Baltic CHODs during their meeting on 20th November 1993.

5 Dutch Royal Marines also participated in the BALTBAT Training Team (BTT).

6 Lessons learned from the BALTBAT project, January 2001, page 37.

7 Ibid, page 37.

8 Ibid, page 40.

9 As an example, see General Wesley Clark’s article in NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace (Special Issue 1999).
The Military Co-ordination Group established by the Baltic states in 1999, for example, failed to provide the required forum for decision-making. Its MOD counterpart, the Baltic Management Group has had greater success. Both groups are essential for joint Baltic project management in the future.

BALTSEA - the Baltic security assistance group - was established in 1997 to facilitate a tailoring of defence assistance with defence planning and implementation. Participation includes all major Baltic co-operation partners. Results have so far been disappointing.

ESTBAT, LATBAT and LITBAT. They should be fully operational by 2005.
The purpose of this article is to try to provide a much-needed focus to the debate on whether the next enlargement of NATO expected at the Summit end of 2002 in Prague should be given a Baltic dimension. Being situated in Tartu, Estonia and serving all three Baltic states it is only natural that the Baltic Defence College has developed into being a nucleus in the Baltic debate over membership. The following article investigates some of the arguments provided in this debate.

The Baltic Defence College as an academic institution cannot and does not further any specific political position. Therefore the discussions provided in the article reflect only the personal opinions of the authors. It is further necessary to stress that the Baltic Defence College has a strict policy of non-attribution for inviting external lecturers and guests. All information and all political positions cited in the discussions below are attributable to publicly available information.

The focal interest of the article is not so much NATO enlargement in itself as it is whether or not this enlargement should arguably have a Baltic dimension with extension of membership to one, two or all three Baltic States. It is firmly believed that an enlargement will have to happen if only because NATO needs to avoid that the credibility of the Article 10 open door policy is called into question. And because NATO by not inviting any new members would fail to maintain credibility for its new strategic concept based on the concept of co-operative security and the institution’s obligation under this strategy to take responsibility for security beyond its original geographic and functional scope. It is in this respect worth while noting that NATO has done much to establish wide political expectations of even-

By Michael H. Clemmesen & Ole Kværnø
create a credible concept and structure for the self-defence of their own territory thereby weakening their potential overall contribution to the Alliance.

This could also lead to the undesirable situation that a too limited territorial self-defence capability might be used as an argument against their membership aspirations.

Lastly, it can hardly be an argument for not extending NATO’s security umbrella to vulnerable states that these states cannot deploy capabilities to other more distant parts of NATO’s territory. It would be contradictory to the fundamental principles upon which the Alliance is based.

The limited capability to participate in out-of-region Article 5 operations does not mean that other participation in out-of-area operation could or should be neglected. The Baltic States are giving high priority to being seen to carry their share of the burden in peace support operations like SFOR and KFOR.

When evaluating the strategic outlook of any NATO expansion with the current applicant states we can further go as far as to claim that there would, with exception of Slovenia offering a land bridge to Hungary, be no strategic outlook of any expansion if it will not have a Baltic dimension. NATO’s overall strategy is to project stability to the whole of Europe under the pretext of “Europe Whole and Free”. The only states among the applicants, which in a medium or long-term perspective might be facing an external actor threat, are exactly the Baltic States. A strategic stabilisation of the Baltic rim by granting the Baltic States membership would therefore add a strategic outlook to an expansion that it would otherwise be lacking.

**NATO Cannot Accept Members with Pending Border Issues**

An argument against Baltic and especially Estonian and Latvian membership of NATO is that NATO by its policy cannot accept new members that still have unsettled border disputes with their neighbours. The border agreements between Russia and Estonia respectively Latvia have still not been signed by the Russian side. No border agreement with a Baltic state has yet been ratified by the Russian Duma.

The issue stems from the border dispute between Russia and Latvia, and Russia and Estonia following the end of the Soviet occupation of the Latvian and Estonian territories. With renewed independence Estonia and Latvia initially disputed the administrative borders drawn by Moscow under the Stalin era altering the internationally agreed borders from the first period of independence. However, all issues related to the borders with both Lithuania and the two other Baltic States were later solved in negotiations. The border agreement with Lithuania has been signed by both parties, but Russia has linked any formal progress in the agreements with Latvia and Estonia to the two states giving in to Russian demands in relation to the Russian speaking minorities in the two states. No steps have been taken by the Russian Duma to ratify the border agreements with any of the states. Whereas the Yeltsin administration could
tual membership among the so-called Vilnius Nine not only by stating at the April 1999 Washington Summit that the next summit would review the enlargement process, but also because the Vilnius Nine have been granted status as Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners.

The sole fact that the MAP's have been established and that the aspirant states are making annual implementation plans reviewed by NATO on a bilateral basis thereby turning much of the debate within the states into a technical one must not overshadow the fact, that any decision on enlargement will be entirely political.

The decision will necessarily build on geo-strategic, technical and ultimately political considerations. For this reason the article will take its starting point in revisiting the most frequent geo-strategic, technical and political arguments offered in the debate over the three Baltic States' aspirations for membership of the North Atlantic Alliance.

We will start the discussion by briefly revisiting some of the more substantial and frequent arguments against adding a Baltic dimension to the next round of enlargement.

Russia's Sphere of Influence

Undoubtedly the most frequent arguments against a Baltic dimension stem from considerations over Russia. While NATO and indeed the Baltic States themselves would portray a Baltic dimension as a firm cementing of Northern European stability in a coherent Baltic security region of hitherto very low tension, Russia is more than likely to view it as an encroachment of its sphere of influence by a politically and militarily superior alliance with uncertain future intentions. This argument, which is often heard in the debate in the United States and Germany, bases itself on the assumption that NATO enlargement into the Baltics promises little benefit at great cost as it would exacerbate existing tension with Russia over the Balkans, Chechnya and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) thereby dissuading Russia from continuing to play its role as a partner in the co-operative security framework offered by the West.

The core of the argument is that the relative enhancement of the security of NATO members would be negative because of the substantial deprecation of Russian security. This position is certainly being driven by the Russian security establishment, which is most manifestly witnessed in the 2000 new Russian Security Concept (March 2000) and the new Russian Military Doctrine (December 1999), which both explicitly warn against a NATO enlargement with a Baltic dimension.

It is evident that Russia with regard to NATO expansion has indeed drawn a geographical line in the sand at the territory of the former USSR and in particular regarding the Baltic States, the only former Soviet Republics that have applied for membership. The latest evidence of this was the Russian associate delegation's pulling out from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Vilnius in May in protest to its staging on ex-Soviet territory. The obvious Russian claim is that
Russia has a legitimate sphere of influence including the Baltic States, in which Russia has the prerogative to make security policy.

The logic of the argument rests upon a perception that is contradictory to the whole paradigm of co-operative security, which NATO has adopted since the end of the Cold War most explicitly of course with the New Strategic Concept from Washington 1999. The logic builds on a geo-strategic perception that is largely irrelevant in the 21st century.

And that is where the logic fails. The liberal paradigm underlying co-operative security rejects power-balance as a fundamental prerequisite for stable security. Seen in the co-operative security perspective of the West there can be no real reduction to Russian security with the Baltic Three inside NATO. There is no power in the Baltic Sea area that Russia needs to balance by establishing forward naval bases, or that could use the Baltic rim as a platform for massive land offensives. The actor based security threats of 1915-18 and 1941 or for that matter of the Cold war simply no longer exist. And to the extent that one could argue that an actor based air threat might exist under a new NATO humanitarian intervention doctrine, it certainly does not depend on forward airbases that would be very exposed. Forward deployment of offensive airpower would be a high risk and an unnecessary option just as a notion of a build-up of offensive Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian air capabilities would be preposterous, if only because of the costs involved let alone the meaninglessness of doing it.

At the level of practical politics the NATO members, and certainly the US, cannot logically on the one hand argue for co-operative security and then on the other accept a traditional geo-strategically based argument about a Russian sphere of influence. This contradiction between the Russian geo-strategic perspective and NATO’s co-operative perspective on security strategy is further witnessed in the Russian attempts to substantiate the New Russian Military Doctrine’s implicit threats of military reactions to Baltic membership of NATO such as for example with the likely forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the Kaliningrad region. Such actions might prove counter-productive, as might the escalation in the Russian declamatory advocacy against Baltic membership. It could convince especially the US that Russia effectively dismisses the co-operative strategies of the West and quite simply will not accept being part of the solution rather than part of the problem. This might fuel sentiments in Washington and other NATO capitals to support an early membership of the Baltic States. At the theoretical level the co-operative security concept of the West is only meaningful if the dynamic process of transition and widening of security is kept up. All the notions within the concept rest decisively on their own dynamics, e.g. regimes of weapons control, confidence and security building measures, partnerships or maintaining the security structures open for all actors. If co-operative security is kept static the whole notion of it withers away. NATO would, in other words, destroy
the legitimacy and function of its new role in international security if it were to accept the Russian argument that the Baltic States should be seen as inside a legitimate Russian sphere of influence.

It could be argued that a NATO expansion with the Baltic States would actually be in Russia's best interest even though this is by no means admitted in Moscow. At the more principal level NATO would hereby be effectively rejecting the conceptual notion of areas of influence thereby forcing Russia into accepting the logic of co-operative security policy making. There is quite bluntly little sense in claiming an area of influence to exist if nobody else accepts the claim or even the concept. At the more practical level the region, which is already now considered by Russia to be one of low tension, would be further cemented as part of a European zone of stability and growth. Russia could even dismiss its current worries over the human and political rights of the Russian Diaspora especially in Latvia and Estonia, as NATO by its polity could not invite a member with serious human or political right flaws.

Even given that Russia's geo-strategic worries must be dismissed it is, however, necessary to seriously consider the political worries of the Russian government. The Russian government carries the heavy burden of authoritarian Soviet indoctrination of the whole population to view NATO as an aggressive alliance of ill-intending capitalist members in the pocket of the Big Satan. Therefore NATO has to take into consideration how to make a Baltic dimension to NATO expansion politically and not least psychologically acceptable to Russia. Some 'concessions' to Russia should be considered in order to reassure Russia and its population that stable European security is only being widened and deepened with the Baltic States inside NATO. Such considerations could be made along the line of entry of the Baltic Three into the CFE regime under unchanged total NATO Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) ceilings or on having the Baltic Three accept a Danish/Norwegian type of Russian reassurance, i.e. declaring their territories free of stationing or forward deployment of foreign troops or nuclear weapons in peace time.

**The Baltic BMD worry**

After the new US administration has taken office it has pressed the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence forcefully to the worry of Russia.

Russia is unlikely to accept even a limited BMD unless serious concessions are made to them. The argument is that the new US administration would be so enthusiastic about Ballistic Missile Defence and so unwilling to face a serious confrontation on the issue with Russia, and hence with some of its European allies, that it might sell out Baltic membership of NATO for a Russian de facto accept of BMD. The fear that this is a step being considered in Washington is fuelled by the fact that the new US State Secretary has made an effort of publicly dismissing the possibility. The logic of this has been that if the administration is dismissing it has also been considering it.
This argument is very much in line with the argument above. Whereas the effect of such a “Molotov-Ribbentrop” step would certainly be devastating to the Baltic States in terms of re-establishing an accepted Russian sphere of influence it is also highly unlikely. Obviously such an isolationist and immoral policy on the part of the US is in principle imaginable, but the arguments fall to the same logic as above. The US does not view the world solely in a geo-strategic perspective. In a co-operative security logic, which dismisses security as an overall zero-sum game, such a geo-strategic trade-off would be nonsense and counterproductive. It is furthermore obvious that the US administration over the last decade has been putting still more emphasis on the moral legitimacy of its foreign policy, which would make trade-off considerations such as the suggested very unlikely.

**No Actor Threats**

It is often that argued that with a commonly accepted absence of an actor threat to European security it makes little sense to expand the collective self-defence guarantee under Article 5. This assumption needs further examination. Surely it is widely accepted that there is no credible actor threat against Europe (or NATO) in a short or even medium-term perspective. Only in the longer term is an actor threat imaginable. The dominant security challenges and risks, as the security threats are called with political correctness, are of a more structural nature comprising proliferation, information technology protection, terrorism, sabotage and trans-border organised crime. With China, India, Pakistan and other potentially aggressive major powers concentrating fully on enhancing their regional power projection capabilities and their regional influence only and with Russia constantly demonstrating its lack of military capacity and ability the conclusion appears to be relevant and well-founded. This is true, however, only when the focus is on an actor threat against the US, EU and NATO. It is not necessarily true when the perspective is shifted to the Baltic region.

Russia is still militarily, in spite of all her shortcomings, a regional major power in relative terms, which has been demonstrated clearly by the relative massive force concentration for the Second Chechen War. She is willing it seems to make use of the military instrument, as this is her last available method of identifying herself as a major power. The conventional force deterrent capability of the three Baltic States is still rudimentary. Russia is of course currently preoccupied elsewhere, which makes the Baltic region one of very low tension with the number of Russian troops stationed in the region being the lowest since the liberation from Soviet occupation. With Russia’s dominant emphasis on the military instrument in the overall security policy, though, it is fair to assume that this could change rapidly. There are obviously many reasons for Russia to put so much emphasis on the military component of security but the bottom line is that Russia in her doctrines and concepts puts pressure on and intimidates her neighbours. If Russia wished to build up a military threat against
any or all of the Baltic Three she could do so within weeks or a couple of months, depending on the situation. To conclude bluntly:

Dismissing an actor threat as a realistic potential would seem difficult for three small states with a relatively insignificant military deterrent capacity compared to that of a neighbouring major power with a relatively large offensive military capacity. This is made so much more difficult of course as this neighbour is constantly basing its doctrines and concepts on its apparent ability and willingness to use this military instrument.

**Is Article 5 relevant in the Baltic rim?**

An argument very often heard is that the Three Baltic states are not defensible by conventional means because of their geographic location and their depth of territory for defence, therefore the only substantial security guarantee under Article 5 would be a nuclear guarantee. With NATO's declining emphasis on and the political aversion against considering using the nuclear component as an explicit deterrent in crisis management, article 5 is rendered meaningless if it cannot be substantiated by conventional means.

This line of argument rests on the assumptions:
- That the Baltic rim is not conventionally defensible because of the overwhelming military strength of most likely adversary, because of the lacking strategic depth of territory to the defence of the rim and because of the improbability of the three Baltic States being able to establish robust self-defence structures and
- That the nuclear component can be reduced to a political weapon, which guarantees political involvement only. Nuclear weapons are not considered a meaningful military weapon and an Article 5 guarantee resting solely upon them would be without real strategic content, so the assumption goes.

These assumptions are plainly false. Firstly, the assumption of the strategic irrelevance of a nuclear deterrent is flawed. It is only possible to create a basis for conventional deterrence if a way has been found to balance the nuclear threat undeniably existing. This is exactly one of the driving factors behind the nuclear proliferation that is very much an issue today.

Secondly, the assumption of indefensibility is flawed. The military operational concept of active territorial defence, which all three Baltic States have adopted, builds on the basis of making any territorial aggression costly and time consuming thereby creating sufficient holding time to allow friendly assistance to become effective. The three Baltic States are all committed to and are in the process of building structures sufficiently robust to muster an initial self-defence within this concept. The structures they are building are further at the same time aimed at being fully interoperable with NATO structures. None of the three Baltic States will obviously ever have the military strength to independently resist over time a full-scale military aggression by a major military power. In this they are quite similar to other small states. However, the concept of active territorial defence, although
costly in terms of destruction of parts of own infrastructure, does make a timely assistance of NATO forces possible and plausible thereby rendering political and military strategic substance to an Article 5 security guarantee. And this is exactly the point: There would not be much point in seeking alliance membership if one were confident that the country could defend itself without external assistance. With the recent swing in Russian security strategy back to the traditional emphasis of the cold war on the military instrument as the most vital part of the overall strategy and on threatening the Baltic States with applying military pressure extending Article 5 to the Baltic States would make perfect sense. The Russian strategy creates the need to provide symbolic security for and within the Baltic populations. An Article 5 because of it being credible would fulfil this need just as it has for all other small frontline states throughout NATO's existence by emphasising to a potential aggressor the likely risk of imminent escalation thereby creating the collective deterrent.

**Article 4 is sufficient**

An argument very often aired in line with the argument discussed above is that Article 4, which the three Baltic States already have under their Partnership for Peace Programmes, is perfectly sufficient for achieving the purpose of guaranteeing the involvement of NATO in a crisis. Why extend membership and thereby Article 5 with all the political difficulties this might cause within the Alliance and in its relations with Russia if this is not necessary? It is obviously true that Article 4 under the existing relationship between NATO and the three Baltic States already guarantees them the right to consult NATO should either state be facing an imminent security threat. The problem with article 4 is that it is not a symbolic line in the sand, which guarantees a NATO response of some kind thereby creating a deterrent. Article 4 is aimed at consultations between the internal actors within the NATO structures. It can be a very lengthy process and would likely entail a less than optimal decision-making process in NATO as consensus between NATO members would in principle be required for NATO to be engaged as an actor. This could lead to misunderstandings and potentially flawed diplomatic consultations, as an external actor would constantly be able to play on the latent disagreement always existing between NATO members. History shows us almost too rigid examples to prove the vulnerability of such diplomatic consultation regimes, the appeasement policies of the United Kingdom in the 1938 handling of the Czechoslovakian crisis being one of the prime examples. Article 4 albeit an excellent fair weather instrument for developing security regimes does not serve the purpose of creating a line in the sand towards external actors. Article 5 is a foul weather instrument that establishes a symbolic line in the sand aimed entirely at external actors, which entails much less risk of misunderstandings before and in crisis by underlining the risk of escalation. This is why neither Article 4 nor some loose security commitments pro-
vided by EU membership could be seen as any way near sufficient for the three Baltic States.

Currently, it could be argued, the weather is fair as there is no obvious actor threat, which again creates massive time for response. But this is a poor argument for postponing the establishment of the necessary instruments to deal with more sinister threats than currently witnessed.

On the contrary it is a perfect argument for extending Article 5 to states, which might in future witness an actor-based threat especially at a time when the cost of doing so will be very small.

**No Net Gain for NATO**

Another frequently heard argument is that there is no strategic net gain for NATO in granting membership to the Baltic States as neither of the three states would be able to offer any capabilities for Article 5 operations outside the Baltic area. Strategically therefore an expansion of NATO into the Baltics would only entail an extra burden without adding anything positively in terms of collective capabilities thereby enhancing the security of the current members.

This argument is one deriving from historical ignorance. Throughout NATO's existence there have been very few members with a de facto logistic and combat capability deployable out-of-own-region. In this respect there is and always has been a distinct difference between frontline members and member states positioned in the depth of NATO's territory with a deep buffer of territory between themselves and any forces of a potential aggressor. It would make little sense for frontline states to develop a substantial out-of-region combat capability as it is very difficult to imagine Article 5 scenarios where the main part of their forces would not be needed on their own territories.

During the Cold War the only strategically deployable capabilities were held by the US and the former colonial powers positioned in the depth of NATO's territory. Frontline states like Norway, Denmark and indeed Germany had no such capabilities.Demanding that the three Baltic States should let their force development be guided by a requirement for out-of-region deployment and support of significant forces is ignoring their geographical situation and their very limited resources. The majority of members states in NATO, which have had no strategically deployable capabilities have nonetheless contributed to creating a political strategic deterrent of the Alliance as such as well a military strategic deterrent for the territories of those members. The Baltic States could obviously contribute to the political deterrent, which traditionally has been substantiated by most members offering symbolic contributions to flag-waving structures like for example Allied Commander Europe Mobile Force (LAND). Denmark could serve as an example of how the Baltic States might contribute with very small but highly mobile symbolic forces.

Insisting that the Baltic States should develop a more substantial out-of-region Article 5 capability on a high level of readiness would undermine their attempts to
excuse itself with a Duma largely in opposition to the president the Putin administration certainly cannot. The administration with the support of the Duma is clearly using the now non-existing border issues to maintain pressure on the three states. The rejection to ratify the border agreements serves the exact purpose of maintaining an instrument, which Moscow believes will formally refuse an expansion of the Alliance with the countries in question. It should appear obvious that this is a poor argument against accepting Estonia or Latvia in, if only because Russia has been granted all her territorial claims and because the refusal to ratify is therefore obviously a diplomatic game play. The pending issue should actually serve as a very healthy argument for extending membership to Estonia and Latvia. With Estonia and Latvia as NATO members Russia would loose the interest in and ability to use the tool of non-ratification.

Russia would then have a clear self-interest in cementing a stable regime at the rest of its Western borders. It is duly noted that this is also the current position held by the US administration that a formal diplomatic obstacle of this kind without any substance in reality must be rejected right off.

**One, Two or Three Baltic NATO members**

A further argument often heard is that given Russia's worries over membership of the three Baltic States NATO should not provoke Russia unduly by accepting all three candidates in at the same time. Adding one Baltic member would accomplish a Baltic dimension reassuring all candidates of the sustained validity of Article 10 and demonstrating the point that no external actor has the right of veto over NATO membership. It would on the other hand be a minor provocation than accepting all three Baltic States would be. On the technical side this argument is often followed by the claim that Lithuania would then, because of its location and its superior preparedness be the logical top candidate leaving Estonia and Latvia to wait on for membership. This line of argument has obviously given reason to fear on the part of Estonia and Latvia that they might be uncoupled from the enlargement process and that they might consequently be further subjected to Russian pressure and intimidation. This fear was further substantiated by the statements by the President of NATO's Parliamentary Assembly, Rafael Estrella during the Assembly meeting in Vilnius in May, where he singled out Lithuania as one of the leading candidates.

The problem with the argument is that it is to a large extent contradictory to NATO's ambition of furthering North Eastern European stability by expanding into the Baltics. There is a common and very well founded tendency especially in the US to view the three Baltic States as making up one coherent security region, even if it is accepted that states are indeed very different. An expansion with all three Baltic States would be intended to maintain and secure the stability of this coherent and interdependent security region. If the region were to be clearly split on
the way to NATO this might just not be accomplished. Even if Lithuania has come further in many fields of force development, all three states have made difficult economic and political sacrifices to prepare their militaries for NATO membership, following the advice from member state representatives and experts. A clear difference in treatment could have unwanted negative effects, not giving credits for the considerable progress that has been achieved. The fear that this would further lead to a Russian attempt to break the will to go on seeking NATO membership is not without substance. The fact that a very substantial part of Latvia’s economy is depending on transit of goods between the Baltic Sea and Russia, including the very important transit of Russian oil and gas and was used in 1998 to put pressure on that country, and Russia is regularly threatening the Baltic States with economic warfare to influence their policies. With the increased Russian ambition to finish the oil pipeline to Primorsk and Ust Luga, Latvia could be increasingly exposed to Russian geo-political pressure. The technical argument that Lithuania is the best prepared of the three Baltic aspirants in terms of fulfilling the goals of the Membership Action Plan is a double-edged sword. The new US administration has made it unambiguously clear that performance in fulfilling the goals set out in the MAP will be central when the next steps on enlargement are decided next year and that currently Lithuania seems better prepared than the other two candidates. Hereby the technical argument has been created for accepting only one or two Baltic aspirants into NATO. The states who have achieved the most are rewarded for having shown a political commitment to contribute to the extent the alliance is looking for, which is obviously a relevant and valid consideration. However, the enlargement process has thereby been linked closely to a technical process by which aspirants can rightfully claim that once they are technically ready NATO must be obliged to let them enter. This could undermine the enlargement process by giving the technical arguments to much weight.

The guiding principle behind all NATO activities with NATO MAP partners was initially and must continuously be that all enlargement decisions remain based on a broad political evaluation of each candidate. For NATO it would be a situation less than optimal if it would find it difficult to decline membership to a MAP country that has succeeded in implementing the technical part of the MAP or for that matter to accept an aspirant, who has not yet fulfilled it, but is otherwise a very useful candidate. Both in general and specifically with regard to the three Baltic States NATO must therefore make it perfectly clear that there is no change in the position that any decision on enlargement will be based not only on technical criteria but more decisively on considerations on whether or not an enlargement will contribute to enhancing the overall European security. With this in mind there can be little doubt that clearly splitting the security region by accepting only one or two candidates on technical grounds would entail significant risks for the region.
The fear by some NATO members of overly provoking Russia by accepting three Baltic candidates rather than one seems further based on a twisted logic. If NATO decides to cross the line in the sand drawn by Russia it would probably have no consequence whether this line was crossed a little more or less. It could be compared to pulling out a tooth. Once one has decided to start pulling it there is little sense in prolonging the pain by doing it slowly. And the tooth once out the patient is sure to feel relieved that it is over and resume its life without spending too much time considering what to do with that tooth.

The arguments above are not to say that aspirants for membership should not be judged by their performance in the MAP process. It is clear that those that do the most should have credit for their effort. Neighbours performing weakly in technical or other areas should hold nobody back. Every candidate should perform before gaining full membership. And it must be admitted that there is a danger in accepting members too early in their preparation process as it could result in their slowing down efforts following entry as a member. That is one thing we could learn from the first enlargement round. The suggestion is, however, that the risks involved in accepting only one or two Baltic members are also addressed. This could be accomplished if all three Baltic States got a firm invitation to join - but not necessarily for immediate entry. The length of the path to eventual entry into the alliance could vary, depending on the performance of each invited state in both technical and other areas.

**Conclusion**

Admittedly only some of the most frequently heard arguments have been revisited in the discussion above. However, to the best of our judgement these are some of the most important and substantial arguments. We have intended to revisit these arguments to focus the debate over a Baltic dimension to next year's NATO enlargements, which to our mind is the strategically decisive question of the enlargement both in political and military terms.

The editor of the Baltic Defence Review hereby invites further contributions to this debate.
Section III

Developments in Russia Relevant for Baltic Security

For the three small Baltic States developments in Russia in the fields of security are seen as important and directly impacting on their security. Thus, the attempts of presidents Yeltsin and Putin to reform the Russian military are most interesting from a Baltic point of view, and against this background, the first article in this section is an overview and discussion of Russian military reform from the first attempts in the beginning of the nineties to the current date. This first article is by Mr. Frederic Labarre, MA, Advisor to the Estonian Ministry of Defence.

The Baltic Defence Review has in its earlier issues served as a platform for discussing developments in Russian security policy and has amongst other topics provided analyses of the New Russian Military Doctrine (BDR no. 2 and 4). To widen the perspective of this discussion, Baltic Defence Review has asked the Russian defence attaché to Estonia, Colonel Igor Lelin to provide a Russian view on the new doctrine. In the second article of this section, Colonel Lelin discusses the New Russian Military Doctrine from a Russian point of view.
Russian Military Reform: An Overview

By Frederic Labarre, MA, Advisor to the Estonian Ministry of Defence

Introduction

This paper is designed to be an overview of the status of military reform in Russia, and intended to be a guide in strategic and defence policy, as well as threat assessment.

A number of factors make writing about this subject difficult. First, is definition of the subject, which we will undertake in this introduction. What do we mean by military reform? Most importantly, do the Russians mean the same thing? Another problem of writing about this is the dubious reliability of figures given by Russian officials. This is compounded by lack of competence of actuaries, different methods of calculations from one department to the next, confusion in roles and definitions of branches of the armed services, restructuring of organizations in the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence, and a good dose of mania for secrecy.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the first question that this paper will put it in a Conflict Studies Research Centre paper, "the USSR was not merely a state with an impressive war machine. The state itself was a war machine, with every aspect of its organization geared towards the mobilization of massive economic and military potential to conduct a world war." With a slight nuance, we can certainly admit that the USSR endured a "peace-time war economy" similar to that of pre-World War II Germany. We can determine the status of reforms based on the need to turn the state from a war machine to a civilian economy.

The second part deals with Russian military spending habits, and highlights some aspects of the structure of spending, in addition to giving a brief history of the reform debate in Russia between 1992 and 2000.

The conclusion will therefore deal with the success of that shift in the Russian economy from a war footing to a peaceful one, and if it is shown that reforms
are lagging, we will try to identify for which reasons. Of course, it may appear that Russia has abandoned the idea of reforms altogether and has started concentrating on other priorities.

**What is meant by “reform”?**

Needless to say, a reversal in defence policies from Russia would be welcome in purely political and relational terms. It is clear that international relations with Russia would be greatly facilitated if resort to the military were not so deeply embedded in Russian habits of statecraft. In this respect, we can also measure progress from the deeply subjective perspective of Estonian (and other powers’) wishes to see Russia remodel its military to cater to its own defence, and not to seek to influence its neighbours unduly.

Finally, philosophically speaking, there is a lesser likelihood of war occurring between contiguous democratic states. But democracy, although laudable on paper, must be practiced. No matter how many thousands of servicemen are released from service, a Russian army of 20% of its USSR predecessor is still presenting risks for the adjoining states if Russia is not resolved to “live its democracy”.

We can therefore start to pinpoint with greater accuracy what we mean by “reform”. Reform means switching what the USSR forces and economy stood for in return for an army and economy that can be a reliable and integrated partner in society and internationally. Since the whole state was geared for conflict for 70 years, every aspect of the state must face reforms. This is not simply switching from a Marxist control economy to a liberal market one, something that requires ingenuity and initiative, of which Russians have shown they do not lack. What is required is a separation of the economy (and other factors) from the need of the state to create armed forces that will be used as a proactive tool of policy.

In other words, reform of all sectors simultaneously is needed for the military to implement successful reforms. Military reforms should encompass “not only the armed forces... also the military industrial complex (MIC), policy making and command and control structures, the legal framework of the state and, not least, wider economic and social dimensions.” Reform invariably means the transformation of the military as a capable but reasonably sized tool of national defence, consuming a share of state revenues not so great that it would threaten the social cohesion of the state from within. At the same time, reform means striking a balance between the “teeth and the tail”, and for our purposes, the teeth refer to the offensive edge of the military, but the tail, in addition to logistics, is meant to include living conditions of the servicemen on duty or on pension. Reform also means a change of missions, which itself reflects a change of attitude. New missions are seemingly more responsible for changes in military tradition than any other factor, social, political or economic, according to some analysts.

Russians, consciously or not, make a difference between reform of the military and reform of the armed forces. The result of the confusion between the two and
the necessity of having a fully functioning economy has placed additional strains on reforms. In the end, reforms came to mean simple downsizing, without the vision to implement a decent force structure revision, for want of a strategic concept. The first part of this paper highlights a lot for that passion for downsizing, and demonstrates policy makers' irresponsible and irrational faith in future economic improvements.

However, as this paper shows, policy makers must make room in their minds for the possibility that Russia is turning its back on reforms, having tried it only insofar as relations with Russia made it politically feasible to undertake. This would seem to shift the problem of reform on the mere notion of political will. If this is true, then the whole of Russian political society is acting as an obstacle for meaningful change, indicating that it is not simply a few individuals who persist in their Cold War nostalgia, but a larger group of politicians. The consequence would then be that the absence of reform could gain legitimacy.

PART I: Reform of what?

If we abide by our postulate that the Russian military should redirect its efforts in an attempt to propose a more acceptable face to the rest of the world, and that all sectors of a society that are intertwined with the military should seek conversion simultaneously, then we come to the conclusion that reform means the conversion of attitudes, numbers and direction.

The first term refers to the habits and characteristics of a democracy. Among these habits are civil supremacy over the military, responsibility towards the taxpayers, adequate balance between military and social spending (reflected by a reasonable share of the GDP in defence spending), conversion of the industry and economy to commercial pursuits, respect for human rights and independence of state institutions from one another.

The second term concerns the actual numbers, the tangible aspects of reforms. So far, Russia has only been able to downsize and cut, but has not converted anything or anyone yet. A steady drop in defence spending, procurement and research and development does not demonstrate a change in attitudes. Furthermore, such unbalanced cuts, far from producing security in the neighbouring countries, are a factor of societal concern, because they affect the morale of the troops, making their behaviour less predictable. We will return to this later on.

The third term refers to the broad aspects of conversion that would make reform successful. A military doctrine with clear guidance on threats and force structure, roles and missions of the reforming military, including peacekeeping operations (and the special training they require) would go a long way in setting limits to the degradation of the armed forces, and in identifying gaps and goals to reach to stop the decline.

So when we discuss reforms, we cannot limit our investigation to the mere amounts of money spent, or to the structural reorganization of the agencies involved. We have to look at all these fac-
tors, because each independently or in concert with others matter in the success of the overall endeavour, and each independently or in concert with others affect the security perceptions of neighbouring states.

In any case, we can give a short overview of reforms the Russian way, in the form of illustrating cuts to defence spending. In the following part a table outlines spending between 1992 and 2000 loosely correlated with important events that, as we will see later, have shaped the course of reforms in Russia's military.

**PART 2: Are reforms going the right way?**

The historical comments provided with this table are not meant to insinuate a correlation between spending and events (although there is correlation in some cases), but merely to keep track of the political environment as the decisions over the military were made.

At first glance, it would seem that reforms towards a modern army are well underway and that the Russian government is taking heed of popular necessities as well as of military needs. However, appearances are deceiving. The aggregate GDP has fallen even more dramatically, and the progress made between 1995 and 1997 came undone in the economic crisis of 1997-1998.

As a result, nothing was fixed and the situation actually worsened because of the insistence on a linkage of spending to 5.5% of GDP. This effectively made military reform contingent on the success of economic reform (which, had it been successful, would not necessarily

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Creation of the Russian Armed Forces by a decree of Pres. Yeltsin.</td>
<td>Constitutional crisis requiring the aid of the military for its resolution</td>
<td>First Chechen War</td>
<td>Economic crisis, NATO enlargement invitations</td>
<td>Second Chechen War, NATO in Kosovo, NATO enlarges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p. 252. Note: These percentages represent the real (not budgeted) expenditure on defence. This is why figures for 2001 are not included.
have meant better conditions for the military.

All through these years, the drop in spending and the drop in economic performance was accompanied by troop cuts, aimed originally at reaching President Yeltsin’s goal of a 600 000 strong volunteer army by year 2000, but in the end, made in a desperate attempt to maintain acceptable readiness levels and prevent mutinies. From the some 2.1 million strong armed forces of the late USSR, the numbers dropped to 1.9 million between 1992-1994, then to 1.7 million in 1995-1997, and Jane’s reports that the numbers now stand at some 1.2 million, with further cuts called for by President Putin after the change of the minister of defence in March 2001. The readiness level is estimated at 25% of all units. These are still largely conscript forces. Haltiner has proven (in a Western European concept, to be fair) that there can be no equation between a volunteer army and a non-mass army. European countries have reformed insofar as they don’t use the totality of the pool of men that conscription laws afford them. Russia by contrast, actively seeks out every able bodied man.

Cuts have also been made structurally as well, in the hope that shuffling and deleting organization chart cells would somehow magically achieve results. Dick reports that the number of training establishments is to fall from 103 to 57, and military and industrial agencies, the so-called “design bureaus” of Soviet times, is to be cut from 1700 to 600.

In essence, the notion of reform for Russia has, for the most part, limited itself at massive cutting and downsizing. In very few instances were the savings transferred successfully to needs of the soldiers. There are reasons for this that have little to do with willingness or unwillingness. And this is why lack of reform is a concern for neighbours. Absence of reform has nothing to do with money, but with attitude and perceptions. The following brief “history” of reform of the military in Russia will illustrate what I mean.

The history of reform

In 1992, a presidential decree established the armed forces of independent Russia. This decree in itself severely cut the number of units under Russian aegis, leaving large stores of armaments and troops in former republics. Estonia was no exception to this. Central Asian republics kept these troops and equipment, but Russia agreed to pay for it. All in all, the move resulted in a 55% drop in expenditure from Soviet times. Despite this, Russia’s road to reform was inauspicious. Instead of basing the new forces on his own State Committee for Defence Issues, Yeltsin chose the old Soviet Defence Ministry and installed a military as Minister of Defence. This meant that the choice between reform and experience had been made in favour of the latter, to the obvious dismay of the former. Henceforth, the Soviet legacy took over and shaped the nascent Russian army, whose development increasingly conflicted with reform policies.
For all intents and purposes, the Russian military was free from civilian oversight, and this state of affairs owed directly to Yeltsin's experience as a state apparatus weary of scrutiny and his lack of interest in military matters. The Russian Constitution provides little guidance as to accountability, since any prescription can be overturned by presidential decree. This is the way that Yeltsin made the Minister of Defence accountable directly to him, and not to the Council of Ministers, as the Constitution indicated, or to the Russian people through parliament as democratic common sense would have it. The only reason may have been that Yeltsin associated proximity with the Ministry of Defence with control for personal political reasons, and not for the sake of democratic oversight. By keeping a close association with the military, Yeltsin kept all king making ability under his purview and prevented the rise of challengers to his power. This came in useful in October 1993, when a constitutional coup was narrowly avoided.

The restructuring undertaken by Prime Minister Egor Gaidar initially concentrated on a drop on procurement expenditure of 85%. This cut allowed a diversion of funds to prevent discontent among troops. The other problem owed a lot to the traditions of the military industrial complex, interlinked with new international legal obligations. The mere presence of stocks and continuing production of the defence industry was clearly at odds with new CFE limits. The belated conversion of industry to civilian needs posed a difficult problem for which the only answer was a new law, passed on 20 March 1992, the Law on Conversion of Defence Industries. It was aimed at producing high technology, competitive civilian goods for export. It involved a recycling of facilities and human resources and planned to protect social gains of the existing and recycled personnel. This sent the costs of conversion skyrocketing. The law demanded that social guarantees be kept at the same time that new staff were hired, all while the industries made an about-face in their production, including tooling, market research and procedures. Needless to say the attempt was only partially successful, and thus, another aspect of military reform, defence conversion, went unanswered.

When a crisis erupted in 1993, the military sailed to Yeltsin's and, many believed at the time—Russian democracy's—rescue. But the outcome was that the military's help came at a price of greater political clout. Failing reform at various levels and the increased power of the military, doubled with the nostalgia of great power days signified that Russia would soon stop looking West for answers. Political stability was muddled at the price of authoritarianism. But this is not all. The 26 November 1994 "March to Grozny" resulted in catastrophic losses for Russia, in what experts described as the worst organized Russian assault ever. The war in Chechnya shook the political regime to such an extent that dramatic changes were expected both in the composition of the ruling elite and its political orientation.

The link between the acknowledgement that the Chechen problem was internal
to Russia and the simultaneous international outrage of Russian actions there combined to lead to a radicalisation of the defence establishment and the domestic audience against the West. Without a strategic vision, the defence establishment was moving away from reforms.

Nevertheless, then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin insisted on keeping a fixed percentage of GDP for defence spending, while simultaneously stifling inflation. The results were mere cuts, and no deep reforms. Between 1994 and 1995, lack of political reform and a dubious structure for budgeting added to the difficulties of the military. Failure to agree to a budget left the Ministry of Finance free to decide its own level of State expenditure, thereby vetoing any meaningful reform that might have been planned by the military (there were none).

At that moment, the only hopeful sign of change was that the Duma had become more involved in the budgetary process, while the military had not the luxury of a strong lobby there in 1995. It took 9 months to pass the budget. The government, in face of strong Ministry of Defence pressure, resisted calls to raise expenditure to 8% of GDP, and maintained it at some 5.5%, but the real amount was substantially less for 1995-1996 (4.1-3.8%). Indications that the Ministry of Defence, wittingly or not, was moving away from reform are illustrated by Yeltsin's need to make promises that never materialized. A special fund destined to the military, contingent on a more successful industrial conversion and economic performance, was dead letter from the start. This may have convinced some high-ranking military that Yeltsin was not to be trusted and hardened their future position. Defence Minister Pavel Grachev was at the forefront of the obstructionists: he consistently argued that anything less than a 1.9 million strong standing army would be detrimental to state security. Evidence that Yeltsin was not paying heed to the military's concerns, and that he had no clear idea of the direction of reform was the cancellation of 1000 R&D projects and the non-delivery of 175 types of military hardware.

The government insisted on massive cuts in personnel, and managed to limit the number of servicemen to 1 469 900 by early 1996, but Grachev had nevertheless won a concession from Yeltsin that saw these numbers revised to 1.7 million.

In 1996, military displeasure was evident in the announcement that officers would be running for 123 elected posts in the December elections, a move that would give them a clear shift in policy aimed at setting the Defence establishment in order, but at winning the Chechen campaign. Nothing in the Yeltsin decree to create a volunteer army by 2000 agreed with the new "direction" of reform. The Duma passed the 1997 budget in record time, but failed to satisfy the military, sending the bulk of savings to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) while leaving only 16.5% for procurement. In other words, the structure of spending and the priorities of the Chechen campaign overrode the necessity of a volunteer force that would have cost an extra 7 billion rubles per year.

The financial crisis that Russia experi-
enced in 1997-1998 further took its toll on reforms, and the Duma then seemed to want to settle the economic situation first, and this explains the sudden and dramatic drop in spending. The reorganization of the Defence Ministry and a new military doctrine did nothing to prevent officers and conscripts from complaining about their lot, and with reason. 27

Housing is not the only problem besetting the Russian forces. Attitude was also unchanging. The continuing practice of gruppovshchina and dedovshchina, or bullying and hazing of conscripts undermines any esprit de corps the armed forces may need. Dick points to 2.5-3 deaths a day due to these practices that include beatings, torture and homosexual rape by senior or elder fellow servicemen. As a way to compare the morale and living standards of troops, the USSR allegedly suffered 15 000 casualties in 10 years of way with Afghanistan. Russia lost the same number of soldiers to accidents, suicides, killings and disease between 1990 and 1993. A report by Radio-Canada highlighted the high number of desertions and gave an indication of the brutality endured by the soldiers. So high is the degree of absences without leave (some 80 000 have gone AWOL according to Jane’s World Armies) that a special agency was created to track down and convict deserters and draft dodgers. Apart from that less-than-constructive initiative, very little has been done, except increasingly frequent “surprise visits” by ombudsmen to training facilities.

Corruption of high-ranking officers and their close ties to regional organized crime gangs have given dangerous independence to some military districts. “There is a long, imperial tradition of regional military commanders becoming, in effect, vice-roys.” 28 This is another aspect liable to make meaningful change impossible, as cushy positions bring a wealth of bonus advantages. Incentive for change cannot simply focus on administrative reform. The increased power of the defence establishment, legitimised by political developments at home and abroad, conspires to perpetuate this state of affairs and complicate if not nullify the drive for reforms.

1999 marked the end of the post-Cold War era. NATO intervention in Kosovo provided the grounds for a reversal of position. Since then, Russia has become decidedly inimical to the West, for real or trumped up reasons of US or Western hegemony in Europe. Seemingly recovering from the worst of the 1997 crisis (thanks to massive borrowing and western aid), priorities shifted to make national security the number one priority. Defence spending seemed then at complete odds with reform in a study published by Dr. Aleksei Arbatov, in which he advocated a redirection of funds from O&M to high-technology and R&D. 29 The significance of this study is borne by the fact that he is a member of the moderate Yabloko party.

In a subsequent study, the same Arbatov highlighted Russian feeling after the Kosovo air campaign; “Today Yugoslavia-Tomorrow Russia”. 1999 also coincided with the second Chechen campaign, and both events account for a rise in military spending.

A serious reassessment of Russian reform became essential... In reality, how-
ever, development and deployment of sophisticated military capabilities, analogous to that of NATO’s massive, precision-guided, conventional air and naval potential, would for a long time be beyond Russia’s financial capacity. Therefore, the most probable response, a response that is already taking shape, would be to place even greater emphasis on a robust nuclear deterrence, relying on enhanced strategic and tactical nuclear forces and their C3I systems.

A decree by Yeltsin of 3 August 1998 entitled “Fundamental concept of state policy in military development of Russia for the period until 2005” seemed to put the spirit of reform back on track, advocating geographic changes to military districts, cuts in the number of departments, increase in relative responsibilities, enhanced coordination within the security agencies, and the transformation of a four to three service army by 2001. This was undone by the 18 March 1999 law on Financing the Defence Contract for Strategic Nuclear Forces, which redirects yet again funding to R&D and procurement at a 40% level of the total defence budget. Other decrees came to put the finishing nails in the military reform’s coffin.

If Dick cites the lack of a strong legal background on which to rest reform, Arbatov claims that it is the same shoddy legal underpinnings that allow Russian intervention in Chechnya. Arbatov asks rhetorically if it is better to lose a whole region, or to create new precedents by adopting a new law. Obviously, Russians are not shy of adopting new laws when it suits them, leading to believe that military reform cannot occur before democratic transition is completed.

In April 2000, Arbatov got his wish, and President Vladimir Putin decreed a new doctrine. The final argument that can be invoked to demonstrate that Russia has deliberately turned its back on reforms can be found in section 2 of the document. Section 2.2 describes the nature of modern wars as determined by their goals, and characterized by their justice or injustice, the measuring stick being international law. Such a sophisticated understanding of modern war and its relationship with international norms is at odds with the way the Chechen campaign was conducted. The rhetoric that has evolved since 1992 proves that there is a cognitive dissonance between the aims of reform and the actual decisions taken by the leadership in Russia. This leads to believe that reform has stopped; a change of mission would have indicated a change of attitude and perception. But this is absent. For example, peacekeeping, the bulk of Western armies’ missions, is absent from the Russian National Security Concept, and appears only once, as low priority, in the Russian Military Doctrine.

In 2000, the question of the Soviet (and other) debts arose, and plans were made to cover the $100 billion owed to various creditors. Officials believed they would be able to repay some 35-40% of the total (amounting to what was owed to the Paris Club) while rescheduling the remainder over the next 30 years. This has not happened busy as Russia was to spend more than the previous 10 years’ average on
military procurement. The whole promise was postponed for early 2001. Prime Minister Kasyanov has said on 18 February’s airing of “Zerkalo” on Russian TV that there was no question of defaulting on the foreign debt. The Paris Club has already said that no restructuring of the debt was possible, and President Putin has multiplied efforts to exchange jets for debt in Austria, stressing how reliance on military tooling prevailed. It also served to show the lagging of industry conversion.

The day before the Kursk tragedy, the Security Council, with the blessing of the President, had decided to cut armed forces personnel by 350,000 by the end of 2003. That particular cut reflected political infighting in the top ranks of the military, and, as Jane’s Intelligence Review points out, is meaningless insofar as cuts are camouflaged by various administrative practices and rehirings under contract. It is also meaningless in view of the fact that President Putin seemed to be back paddling in front of opposition to reform.

Conclusion

As it is obvious also from the discussion above, reform cannot be entertained in the absence of deep economic and societal changes. Despite Russia’s ephemeral opening to the West between 1991-1994, and since its reversal in 1999, reforms have gone nowhere.

Morale is low, desertsions high, because high ranking officers are often corrupt brutes, and because the whole institution of the army had no direction for most of the last ten years. When it did receive direction in the middle of 2000 with a new doctrine, it appears that the thinking behind it went away from reforms and democratic principles.

The limited conversion of the military industrial complex has denied the “design bureaux” numerous international outlets that would have triggered tax revenues that could have absorbed some of the contraction costs. Jane’s Defence Weekly highlighted President Putin’s priorities in that field: introduction of a single state customer for arms, completion of the defence industry roster, military equipment disposal mechanism, prevention of leakage of know-how, improvement of mobilisation readiness of enterprises, creation of personnel renewal, more efficient use of industry earnings, quality control, and introduction of legislation preventing the MIC from coming under the control of “unfair structures”. Russian society is not experiencing deep technological advances and market penetration. As a result, the process of individualization, normative pluralization and decreasing importance of traditional (military) values essential to trigger reforms is not reflected in the direction of industrial output.

Administrative and structural reform has achieved nothing, as was predictable. Cutting numbers has not achieved savings. Even the notion of achieving a volunteer army (who will volunteer if you’re to serve under brutes?) has been put on hold not for morale and loyalty reasons, but because that endeavour would cost more than it would reap.
The biggest problem, as described, was distraction provided by international affairs that deflected original reformers from their aims, or converted them from their original leanings, and power-hungry military careerists. Their disputes and their internal struggles, inherited from the perverse “separation of powers” under Yeltsin have managed to stall reforms, and the question of Kosovo and Chechnya has impressed public and political opinion so much as to warrant a doctrine that basically nullifies reform.

Even the “progress” made in cuts seems wishful thinking. In early October 2000, the Security Council announced the number of people active in the service of the Russian defence. 2001360 military and 966000 civilians completed the roster, for a grand total of some 3 000 000. Despite definitional wrangling that would make comparison with earlier figures meaningless, it is clear that 10 years of reform were a sham. Some specialized units were omitted from the list, making real the possibility that the number could be even higher. With this new information, it is difficult to believe that the Russian army will see better days soon, especially with new foreign policy priorities such as debt servicing looming.

A good deal of legislation has gone in the direction of ensuring that Russia has the legal underpinnings to be a great power again, albeit in the belief that this can be achieved with a strong, but compact force. Whether the force is big or small, whether Russia is a great power or not is immaterial for neighbours’ security if democratic and economic transition has bogged down, because this is the real issue, the hinge that can make true reform possible.

Indications are that the debate over reform is dead. It has been replaced by talks about what kind of armed forces should be developed in order to match the threat produced by the West. Soldiers’ needs have been evacuated from the discussion, and bickering is focusing on which of the three branches should receive a bigger part of the dwindling defence spending pie, on whether spending should concentrate on conventional modernization, as some generals want, or on strategic capability, as the decreed military doctrine prescribes.

For the future, the direction of that debate, which cannot be called the reform debate, will indicate if there is a consensus over the value of the new military doctrine and on the acknowledgement of the threat presented by the West. It is fair to say that parochialism will have triumphed in Russian politics if a gap develops between the prescriptions of the doctrine (by all accounts a sensible one if we step in Russians’ shoes), and the direction of spending and procurement.

In terms of security for neighbouring states, the future is not rosy if regional commanders cannot keep ever-disgruntled troops in check. Hopefully, parochialism will not degenerate into warlordism which would see some of these commanders take matters into their own hands and initiate action that would destabilize Russia or the region. So far as attitudes don’t change, conditions will not improve for the average soldier, and that is the true measure
of reforms in Russia, more than the quality or quantity of equipment.

"The mass army indebted to national ideology... militarily efficient but economically inefficient... is out of date" says Haltiner. Unfortunately, reforms in Russia have stalled for lack of changing outlook. This persistence is emphasized by Russia's search for a new ideology that fragments the world in multiple poles, and the political revisionism that has seen attacks on independent mass media in Russia.

Lately, the nomination of Sergei Ivanov as replacement to Gen. Sergeyev has been a step in the direction of reforms, easily implementing civilian leadership of the military. But Russia is militarized to the core, labeling "top secret" the very plans for reform. As a result, any plans that Ivanov may come up with will collide with the differing wills of the military brass that keeps "feeding Putin fables" about the direction of the army.

---

4 Karl W. HALTINER: "The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?", Armed Forces and Society, Rutgers University, Vol. 25, #1, Fall 1998, p. 33.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.

33 Ibid., p. 17.
34 Ibid., p. 23.
36 Ibid., p. 39.


38 Interfax: "Paris Club not considering re-structuring Soviet debt in 2002", Moscow, 21 February 2001, via BNS.

39 www.russiatoday.com


43 Pavel FELGENHAUER: "Defence dossier: True numbers, no reform" Moscow Times, October 5 2000.
44 Ibid.


Some Points about the New Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

By Colonel Igor Lelin

The Russian President’s Decree No. 706 of 21 April 2000 approved the new edition of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The Need for Adjustments of the Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine

Generally, when the ideology of the Doctrine was determined, it was important to keep the continuity of the principal doctrinal provisions that had been checked and justified by time. These provisions included compliance of the doctrine with the country’s vital interests and with international and national law; the priority of non-military methods in ensuring military security; adequacy to actual military threats; economic possibilities and a number of others. Uncertainty about the trends in the further development of international relations (the fact that new arrangements in the world had not been completed, a lack of clarity about the political and strategic distribution of forces, the emergence of new military technologies and types and systems of arms capable of changing traditional ideas of the nature of armed struggle, etc.) was also taken into account.

Nevertheless, significant changes in threat’s scenarios affecting Russia’s vital interests has taken place, such as the persisting threat of military conflicts on the borders of the Russian state, and the profound changes in the economic, demographic and in other areas of the country have brought about the need for major alterations in ensuring Russia’s military security and therefore a need for some adjustments in the Doctrine.

We will not touch upon rather complicated tendencies in the military-political situation, which would result in a quite tedious analysis. Rather we will consider the requirements to and methods of working out the Doctrine, its structure and content.
The Requirements of the Military Doctrine

Considering the existing situation, it seems that the Doctrine should meet the following requirements: be an open political document and a part of the Russian national security concept that is adapted to the world situation and has the aim to protect Russia’s vital interests. It should regulate general attitudes towards ensuring national defence and military security and be based on a complex approach. The Doctrine should give priority to the national interests of Russian legislation while observing universally accepted international norms and principles. It is important that the Doctrine does not personify the enemy as a particular country, and that it determines the sources, degree and scale of the military threat. The overall approaches to neutralising the threats must take into account the country’s diplomatic possibilities and dialectically combining peaceful and military methods.

Therefore the central idea of the Doctrine is to work out a common national policy on the complexity of military security tasks, primarily by efficiently using non-military measures (preventive diplomacy, international law, information, economic measures, etc.). These measures should be aimed at preventing wars and armed conflicts and defending the vital interests of society, the state and citizens by using any available means including military force. The military force of the state and its overall power are becoming the most important factor in controlling power pressure. The high military readiness and efficiency of the Armed Forces as well as their strong determination to defend our vital interests are an important supplement to diplomacy and other non-military strategies. This is the qualitative difference of the methods used in new Military Doctrine compared to traditional ones.

The Military Threats towards Russia

The three chapters of the New Military Doctrine accumulate and structurally present the state’s conceptual attitudes of the military policy, military strategy and the principles of their funding. This structure can be explained by objective and natural interconnection between politics, military strategy and the country’s economy.

Part 1 of the New Military Doctrine ("Military-Political Basis") stresses that under the present conditions the threat of a direct military aggression in the traditional scene against Russia and its allies has been reduced due to the country’s consistent and active foreign policy as well as the fact that nuclear control is maintained at an appropriate level.

The following major factors are considered by Russia as a foreign military threat:
- Territorial claims;
- An increase in number of military personnel near the borders of Russia, its allies and on the adjacent seas will disturb the balance of forces;
- The expansion of military blocs undermines the military security of Russia and its allies;
- Intervention by foreign troops (without any sanctions and mandate given by the UN Security Council) in countries bordering Russian or countries that is friendly towards Russia;
- International terrorism as well as the preparation of armed groupings in other countries and their deployment to the Russian territories and the territory of its allies;
- Other countries’ activities that hampers the functioning of Russian systems ensuring the strategic nuclear forces and the national government;
- Attacking Russian objects and facilities based in foreign countries;
- Threatening the life of Russian citizens;
- Conducting information actions (technical and psychological) that is hostile to and undermining the military security of Russia and its allies.

The present situation in Russia, which significantly affected the working process of the Doctrine, is characterized by internal military threats caused by:

- Unstable economic and socio-political situation in some of Russia’s regions;
- The activities of some extremely nationalist organizations using for instance ethnic or religious and other controversies to destabilize the situation in the country, infringe upon Russia’s territorial integrity and undermine its constitutional order;
- The setting up of illegal armed units;
- The illegal dissemination of arms, ammunition, explosives, and the likes on Russian territory.

**Russia seeks International Security Co-operation**

The Doctrine emphasizes that Russia seeks to ensure its military security in the context of building a democratic state, ensuring the principles of equal partnership, good-neighbourly relations and mutually beneficial international co-operation, creating a comprehensive international security system and enhancing universal peace. Russia therefore follows the universally recognized norms of international relations: it unfailingly observes the provisions of the UN Charter, Helsinki Agreements and other international agreements to which it is a party; it gives preference to political, diplomatic and other non-military strategies of preventing military threats; it considers all countries whose actions do not undermine its national interests or contradict the UN Charter as partners; it gives priority to enhancing the collective security system within the Commonwealth of Independent States on the basis of the Collective Security Agreement; it aids the expansion of confidence-building measures in military affairs including the exchange of military information and approval of military doctrines; it advocates the universal nature of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery and supports the termination of nuclear tests.

While giving priority to the peaceful means of ensuring military security, the military-political leadership of the country is aware that such means are not always helpful in achieving the goals. There-
fore the new Doctrine clearly and unambiguously says that using the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation is justified for:
- Repulsing and stopping aggression against Russia or its allies;
- Localizing and neutralizing anti-constitutional activities and unlawful armed violence endangering Russia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity;
- Fulfilling the tasks of keeping or restoring peace and stability (in accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council and Russia's international duties).

The Nuclear Policy

Special attention is paid to describing the basis of the nuclear policy. The doctrine says that Russia's nuclear policy is based on recognizing and preserving the role of the strategic nuclear forces as a means of controlling aggression, ensuring the military security of Russia and its allies and maintaining international stability and peace. In particular, it implies that in the situation of reforming the whole military organization and with a certain decline in the military power of the Armed Forces the role of nuclear control is increasing. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and against a large-scale aggression against Russia or its allies.

The control of Russia's nuclear assets should be complex, which requires an increase in the military power of the general forces in order to ensure efficient and timely response to possible threats. In this connection, the Doctrine emphasizes that the main purpose of military enhancement is the creation of a national military organization complying with the modern strategic, political, economic, military and technical reality and capable of guaranteeing Russia's military security.

The priorities of military enhancement have been set. The first task is to conduct a military reform due to the radical changes in the military-political situation. The reformation must include coordination between the Armed Forces, other services, the defence industry and the state's military management system.

The Strategic Nature of Military Conflicts

Having analysed the military-political situation, the chapter "Military-Strategic Basis" gives a conclusion on the strategic nature of military conflicts. It considers the main features such as: the coalition nature of wars; the shift in the main efforts to the air and space; the emergence and active use of a new sphere of struggle - information; the parties' attempts to disorganize the system of national and military leadership; wide use of indirect and untraditional means of military action, long-range fire and radio electronic destruction; military manoeuvres in different directions with a wide use of air mobile forces, landing units and special task forces.

In the foreseeable future the real threat for Russia is that of local wars and armed conflicts which may be used as a starting point of an armed intervention in Russia's internal affairs.
The Doctrine has set rather rigid limits for determining the image of the Armed Forces and other services as well as their tasks. The Russian Federation's Armed Forces should with their peace-time complement be able to ensure strategic control and defend the country from air attacks. The Armed forces must together with other services repulse aggression in local wars or armed conflicts and be able to deploy military units and forces in a regional war. At the same time they should ensure Russia's engagement in peacekeeping activities both independently and in international organizations. The document says that the Armed Forces and other services should be ready for both defensive and offensive military action in any war or armed conflict also in conditions of a massive use of modern destructive weapons including all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

The Russian Armed Forces and other services can be involved in rendering assistance to state authorities, local government and the population during the liquidation of the consequences of accidents, disasters and acts of God. This principle of a joint and coordinated approach to the whole range of tasks aimed at ensuring security by the Armed Forces and other troops will allow for optimised solutions.

The Doctrine gives an extensive description of the structure of political and strategic leadership in the military. It lays down the main principle for the national government and the military leadership to comply with the new geopolitical, strategic and economic situation in the country. The President of Russia unites of the politico-administrative leadership of the entire military organisation and the strategic management of the Armed Forces and other services.

The Doctrine bears in mind that Russia's military policy can be formed in a crisis situation causing a need for efficient use of all available resources. These circumstances are reflected in the military-economic foundations of the Doctrine, which determines the main purpose of the military-economic policy of the Russian Federation as well as the economic priorities during a military reform.

The most important doctrinal requirement is to prevent dispersion of resources and to develop all kinds of weapons and equipment that other armies have or might have. The task is to focus on working out the systems that will be of decisive significance in neutralising or foiling other countries' long-term programmes for gaining military superiority. It is proposed to put the main emphasis on multi-purpose systems rather than individual types of weapons. In the present situation the possibilities of even the most perfect weapons and best-equipped troops can only be realised to the full when they are integrated in combat systems with highly developed functional properties: intelligence, good organisation, controllability, manageability and secret military use.

The Doctrine pays a lot of attention to international military and military-technical co-operation, which should be based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and good-neighbourly relations and aimed at maintaining international stability and ensuring national, regional and
global security. Priority is given to the development of co-operation with the participant countries of the CIS Collective Security Agreement in order to consolidate efforts for creating a common defence space.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation complies with the norms of international law and national legislation. It answers to the vital interests of the country as well as the purposes of the state’s current internal and foreign policy and our possibilities. Still, the document is quite flexible and can be adjusted to a changing situation by correcting individual provisions in the case of its evolitional changes.

P.S. This article has been prepared by the Military Attaché office at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Estonia with the use of research works by the military historians of the Russian Armed Forces.
Section IV

Defence Structure and Doctrine

The following section of the Baltic Defence Review is permanent as it is intended to further a much-needed debate over the development of Baltic defence concepts and structures.

In the first article Lt. Col. Andrew Parrott, directing staff member at the Baltic Defence College, discusses the factors relevant to reach decisions on long-term force structure goals and their implementation. The article is a general discussion but with a specific view on the Baltic States.

The second article by Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, outlines how maritime defence could be integrated with the territorial land defence of the Baltic States.

The third article by Cpt. (N) Tor Egil Walter, the Norwegian Defence Attaché to the Baltic States, provides a theoretical discussion of future naval development in the Baltic States.

The last article in this section is a theoretical discussion of the dangers and difficulties in the development and implementation of military doctrine. This article is by Lt. (N) Richard Moller of the Canadian Navy and it was originally published as Maritime Security Working Papers Number 5.
Defence Structure Planning and Implementation in the Baltic States – A Discussion Paper

By Andrew Parrott

Introduction

By the end of the year 2001 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (the Baltic States) will all have celebrated ten years of renewed independence. For all three countries the past ten years have not been easy. In each the elements of a society based on the soviet command economy, of which they were small parts, have, to a greater or lesser degree, been dismantled. In each a new society, based on a capitalist market economy, is being developed in accordance with their national priorities and objectives. The transition to date has been marked by initial economic decline and hardship and more recently recovery and, for many if not all, a new sense of stability and well being. The transition of the economy and society in all three Baltic States is far from complete but the initial phase of the transition might be regarded as complete. Decline has been arrested, recovery has taken place and a degree of stability has been achieved. The next ten years might be thought of as a period of growth rather than recovery, a period of reducing vulnerability rather than seeking stability. The fire fighting is over and reconstruction has begun.

In all of the Baltic States renewed independence brought with it a requirement to rebuild the institutions of the state. Much has already been achieved since independence against a background of economic hardship and difficulty. Much remains to be done, though, and in the next period of years resources are unlikely to be plentiful. However as the economies develop in all of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania it is likely that it will be possible for resources to be allocated to projects with some degree of certainty in more stable and less vulnerable economies. In
order that the limited resources that will be available are spent well and not squandered it becomes ever more important that long term spending programmes are developed in accordance with planning priorities in all areas of government.

Nowhere is the requirement for planning priorities and matching spending programmes more important than in the area of defence spending. It can be argued that in this area of government spending the issues are more complex than in all other areas and the risk of limited resources being less than optimally used is correspondingly higher. It can also be argued that in this area of government spending there is also more to be done than in all other areas. While all the former Soviet Socialist Republics had, for example, health and education infrastructures that must now be improved none had any form of defence infrastructure at all.

The creation of a defence infrastructure though is inevitably a long-term process and it is essential that this process be based on firm planning. This planning must in turn be based on carefully considered requirements agreed by the appropriate political decision-makers advised by properly informed military staff. It is not the intent of this paper to destructively criticise anything that has been achieved in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the area of defence in the last ten years. However, there is a view that at present the path from planning and advice to implementation is too long. It is felt that this surfeit of planning arises from the lack of any agreed long term outline goals. This undermines the production of the very important, more detailed, medium term development targets and the fully developed implementation milestones for the short term to facilitate progress towards those goals. In respect of advice many states are offering their assistance to the Baltic States. While all of this advice is well meant, taken as a whole it can prove confusing and contradictory for the small and relatively inexperienced staffs dealing with it. The problem is that there are no agreed long term goals and therefore no plans for the first phases of their implementation. Without implementation plans there is nothing to guide and direct short-term implementation actions. Such actions as are implemented are nothing more than the survivors of a chaotic short-term planning process fuelled by well meant but often uncoordinated advice; survivors only because they have managed to attract a proportion of the limited funding available.

Having long term agreed goals and a plan for their implementation does not mean that there is a risk that in twenty five years time the by then fully developed structures might be found to be the wrong ones. The goals and the plan can always be changed with a system of ongoing or periodic review. The vital point though is that there is a goal and plans there to be changed. Any change can be debated and quantified in comparison with an already agreed course of action. Without a goal and plans there is no reference point for the consideration of change and every change is a new plan rather than an agreed modification of the existing one.

It is not the aim of this paper to rec-
ommend a force structure as a long-term goal for any or all of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Others must make those decisions. Instead this paper will consider some if not all of the factors that are relevant to reaching decisions on long term force structure goals and their development. It is hoped that this discussion might provoke some of the long term planning that it is felt is needed.

**Aim**

The aim of this paper is to consider the component factors for any discussion concerning a force structure plan and the programme for its development, draw conclusions with regard to the approach to be adopted for the establishment of a force structure plan and a force development programme and make outline recommendations for the implementation of both.

**Outline**

A number of factors are relevant to any discussion concerning the development of a force structure plan. This section of the paper will outline the areas that it is intended to discuss. The sections that follow will look at each area in detail.

---

**Why have a Force Structure Plan?**

It is considered that a politically agreed long-term vision linked to a force structure framework plan is fundamental to the coherent development of the Armed Forces of all of the Baltic States. There are those who argue against such planning and in a part of the world where the "planned state economy" has in the recent past proved to be such an abject failure it is perhaps easy to understand why. The detractors argue that over the time scale of the plan it is impossible to accurately forecast at the start what the requirement will actually be at the end of the time scale. They argue that resources are so limited that there is no merit in or requirement for such long term planning.

It is suggested that the detractors are wrong. A prerequisite to the adoption of a plan is thorough consideration of the foreseen requirements. Once a plan is adopted it provides direction and imposes a necessary discipline on future consideration. It does not matter that the foreseen requirement may change for, if there are arguments for changes to the requirement, the discussion can take place in the informed context of the existing plan rather than in the vacuum inherent in the absence of a plan. Changes can be made to the plan but the existence of the plan and the discussion preceding its adoption impose a framework and structure on the ongoing debate.

As far as resources are concerned it is argued that the lack of resources means that the development of any force structure is going to be a lengthy process and the existence of a plan helps to ensure that such resources as exist are spent wisely. It is suggested also that the existence of a thoroughly debated outline plan will engender confidence in government that resources allocated to defence are being spent well. In turn this will make it less likely that arbitrary cuts are made in defence spending when times are hard and
more likely that extra funds will be allocated when times are good.

Consideration should also be given to making the plan a rolling one. At reasonable intervals the plan should formally be extended further into the future. Of course these extensions to the plan should be based on reappraisal and revision of the forecast requirement. Of course if the situation changes dramatically and obviously reappraisal and revision of the forecast requirement can be initiated at any time.

**Possible Tasks**

Quite fundamentally the tasks that the Armed Forces have or are given will have a major impact on the force structure that is adopted. However the tasks of the Armed Forces are not the only factor in determining the force structure and nor are the tasks of the Armed Forces necessarily self evident or obvious. Territorial defence, security within society and the support of national foreign policy by contributing, with allies, to extra territorial operations are more obvious examples of tasks for the Armed Forces but they are by no means the only ones. It is right and proper that any force structure plan must be derived from a clear statement or understanding of all of the actual or contingent tasks of the Armed Forces derived from national security policy and from national defence policy.

**Personnel Constraints**

Most states will only employ their own citizens in their Armed Forces and this restriction immediately imposes a theoretical constraint on the size of the Armed Forces by limiting the pool of individuals from which service personnel can be drawn. More practically the tasks of the Armed Forces will drive the requirement for personnel. If the tasks of the Armed Forces are limited the availability of personnel may not be a limiting factor. However if the tasks of the Armed Forces are greater the availability of personnel may be a constraint that influences to some degree the size, structure and organisation of the Armed Forces. Geography may be a factor here too influencing the size, scope and complexity of a task and so influencing the personnel requirement for that task. Cultural attitudes may also affect the availability of personnel for the Armed Forces. One ready example is attitudes towards the employment of women in the Armed Forces. Unwillingness to employ women in the Armed Forces immediately reduces the pool of personnel available for service by about half. In one way or another personnel are an expensive resource. They are expensive perhaps because they must be paid for their service or because their employment in the Armed Forces prevents them from being employed elsewhere in the national economy.

**Resource Constraints**

The spending of money by states for defence purposes has been compared with the spending of money by individuals for insurance policies. It is very difficult to decide and justify what is the correct price or premium to pay and when the costs of
policies and programmes in other spending areas are easier to decide and justify it becomes all the more difficult to secure funds for defence spending. The longer the defence forces remain unused for their main tasks the more difficult it becomes to argue that the price paid for the defence forces remains a price worth paying. It follows then that in the absence of clear, stark threats funding for defence will always be difficult to justify and will act as a constraint on the development and maintenance of any given force size, structure and organisation.

**Existing Assets**

Any plan for the development of a particular force structure must take into account the impact of existing assets. What exists now must be the starting point for the transition to any new structure. Changes to the personnel structure may involve costs associated with the present structure particularly if personnel have to be discharged or retrained. There are costs associated with the disposal of equipment in service that becomes surplus to requirements and there are costs associated with the disposal of infrastructure and facilities that are no longer required. Any plans for the development of a new force structure must seek to make best and most cost effective use of existing assets. In order that this can be done properly it must be possible to identify the costs associated with existing assets. Failure to “secure the start line” for a plan may jeopardise the implementation of the plan at any stage of the process.

**A Programme for Development**

In the context of the Baltic States where the aspirations for the future structures of the Armed Forces probably, both in terms of quantity and quality, involve considerable enhancement to existing assets it is obvious that the implementation of any future force structure plan will be a lengthy process. It is important therefore that the plan remains flexible and makes allowance for change, to meet changing circumstances, during its implementation. The plan must be implemented in a balanced fashion. There is no point in training personnel to man units for which neither the infrastructure nor the equipment yet exists. There is no point in raising formation headquarters to command units that will not be raised until much later in the plan. The plan must be implemented in a sustainable way. Equipment that has been procured must thereafter be properly maintained. Personnel that have been recruited must thereafter be employed gainfully and paid for their service.

**Foundations**

As will become obvious in the discussion that follows any force structure plan must be soundly based if it is to have any credibility. A hierarchy of documents should provide that base. At the top is a widely based national security policy. This document should be broadly based drawing on analysis in a number of areas and with several departments of government contributing to its final form. National
defence policy, based on national security policy, will be a more narrowly based document but if it is to be comprehensive will probably contain inputs from outside the defence ministry. National security policy and national defence policy represent grand or political strategy. Below this level lies military strategy. Military strategy will be based firmly on national defence policy and should contain all the building blocks from which a force structure plan can be developed.

**Possible Tasks**

What are or might be the tasks of the Armed Forces? It might be thought that the answer to this question is obvious but this is not necessarily so. The Armed Forces of some states are organised primarily for the territorial defence of the state. The armed forces of other states are organised mainly for internal security operations and yet others are structured mainly for extra territorial or expeditionary operations. The armed forces of many states also have additional tasks that reflect the way the society they belong to is organised. What is clear though is that any force structure plan must be based on the firmest understanding and definition of the tasks that the Armed Forces are required to be able to perform if it is to be successfully implemented.

What is also clear is that, in a democratic society, it is the government, parliament and society that must decide what the tasks of the Armed Forces will be. The Armed Forces staffs must provide government ministers and elected representatives with expert advice concerning tasks, in any debate about the tasks to be given to the Armed Forces, but it is not appropriate for the Armed Forces themselves to decide what tasks they are to be established for. While the Armed Forces of larger states may have the resources at their disposal to adapt quickly to carry out unforeseen tasks this is less likely to be true of the Armed Forces of smaller states or those where resources are limited. It is therefore probably all the more important that in a small state the debate regarding the tasks of the Armed Forces is very thorough and leads to clear decisions in respect of the tasks to be given to the Armed Forces.

In any society security is provided by freedom from fear and freedom from want. It is the task of the national security policy to clearly state the objectives and priorities in each of these areas. Providing freedom from want will be primarily the task of the government departments responsible for matters such as social security, health and education. Most areas of government activity though will at some stage, if only peripherally, be involved in providing freedom from want.

Providing freedom from fear will probably be more directly related to the government departments responsible for defence and law and order. It should be the task of the national defence policy to clearly state the objectives and priorities for the use of the resources allocated to defence. It is this document that should reflect the decisions about defence tasks referred to earlier. In providing freedom from fear the boundary between defence responsibilities and law and order respon-
sibilities should be clearly defined. In defining this boundary provision should be made for the management of issues where co-operation between defence and law and order is required. Equally, arrangements should be made between defence and other government departments where co-operation on other issues related to security is required.

It is quite clear that with many government departments involved in the business of national security there will be competition between departments for the allocation of resources. It may not be possible for the national security policy to be specific about resource allocations but those in government must be prepared collectively to make and stick to hard decisions concerning resource allocations that are in keeping with the national security policy that they have adopted.

**Allied or Neutral?**

The defence debate in the Baltic States is presently dominated by discussion of the prospects for joining NATO. Defence development is dominated by the desire to enhance the prospects for joining NATO. Since the desire is to join NATO as soon as possible defence development is dominated by short-term planning to the detriment of longer term planning. There is more than a touch of “not being able to see the wood for the trees”. To secure NATO membership, membership must be seen in terms of enhancing security and not in terms of reducing costs. Membership of NATO may alter the security environment but, if NATO membership is a well-judged move, it should make little difference to the resource requirements for security. If anything allowances must be made for NATO membership imposing costs in terms of participating in alliance structures and achieving enhanced levels of interoperability. Therefore long term planning must seek to identify the resource impact of joining NATO at any juncture. The long term planning of force structures to meet demonstrated security and defence policy requirements must not be sacrificed on the altar of short term planning that seeks the defence equivalent of “instant gratification”. NATO membership is after all a means to an end not an end in itself.

**Home Defence**

Defence of the national territory and the upholding of national sovereignty, which might be called home defence, probably provides the fundamental reason for the existence of the Armed Forces of all states. However, the magnitude of home defence as a task must relate to the perception of the threats the state faces. In a small state where the threat is assessed to be at any level above minimal home defence is likely to be the major preoccupation of the Armed Forces. Home defence may or may not be the largest task for a state’s armed forces. Whether the existing force structure relates to present perceptions of the threat or not the resources allocated to home defence in any force structure plan for some future point in time must be related to the perception of the threat at the same future point in time.
A comprehensive threat assessment must be the foundation for the planning of any force structures for home defence. In making any assessment of the threat it is important to consider both the capability and intent of any possible adversary. In essence it takes time to develop capability but intent can change very quickly. A change of intent linked to a lack of capability may not alter the threat very much or at all so the possibility of a change of intent is more relevant where a capability is perceived to exist already or be developing. Stable institutions and government in a state are also normally indicative of clear policies and objectives that change incrementally through time so the possibility of a radical change of intent is more likely where it is perceived that the institutions and government of a potential adversary lack stability. Responsibility for providing input to threat assessments might lie with more than one agency. This of itself is not important but what is vital is that a structured system exists whereby government ministers can be presented with a coherent assessment of the threat as a basis for making decisions with regard to the requirements for home defence.

National defence policy can be expected therefore to give firm direction with regard to the requirements for national territorial defence and the upholding of sovereignty. Acting on the national defence policy the military strategy adopted for home defence could be thought of as an internal matter solely the responsibility of the planning staffs within the defence department. However it is very likely that other considerations relevant to the planning of home defence will be matters for inclusion in the national defence policy so to some degree the military strategy of home defence will be dictated by the national defence policy. By way of example the national defence policy might make stipulations for the personnel establishment of the armed forces and this will impact on force structures and in turn on the military strategy of home defence.

Where the perceived threat is such that the home defence task is a substantial one it is likely that resources will be made available for this task in ways that considerably exceed the provision made for other defence tasks. The home defence task may well require the general mobilisation of personnel, the requisition from the economy of vehicles, logistic stocks and infrastructure and the imposition on society of emergency and restrictive legislation and regulations. No other defence task is likely to attract such measures.

Security within Society

Security within society is often thought of simply in the context of law and order but the subject is broader than that. Of course law and order is a significant component of security within society but there are security considerations also in the context of what might be termed economic emergencies and natural disasters. If the foregoing are examples of where the Armed Forces are reactive to security requirements there may be cases where the Armed Forces are tasked with playing a more proactive role within society in ways
which contribute, loosely perhaps, to the security of society.

In most democratic states law and order is, in normal circumstances, a matter for the civil police responsible to the interior ministry, although most states have constitutional or legal provision for the use of the armed forces to assist in the preservation or restoration of law and order in certain circumstances. The employment of the British Armed Forces in Northern Ireland is a protracted example of military support to the civil police. In most states the use of the armed forces for this type of purpose is an extremely sensitive issue. If national defence policy, based on constitutional arrangements, makes provision for the use of the Armed Forces in law and order situations, other documents must state clearly in what circumstances the Armed Forces will become involved and what powers they will have at their disposal. Special consideration should be given to crisis situations that might be described as national emergencies or might involve mobilisation of the Armed Forces. In such situations it must be clear what authority retains overall responsibility for law and order issues. Once the precise nature of the Armed Forces responsibilities towards law and order have been established provision for the task can be made in the force structure plan. At one extreme the task may require no special provision to be made; at the other it may require units to be maintained with personnel with appropriate specialist training.

The smooth functioning of an advanced industrial economy depends to a very great extent on all elements of society and all parts of the economic infrastructure continuing to play their part or go on functioning. When employees in dispute with their employers withdraw their labour or industrial accidents take place the interconnected nature of modern society is such that the security or wellbeing of society can begin to collapse quite quickly. In these circumstances the Armed Forces often have skills that can be put to use to help maintain the security or wellbeing of society. Two examples of this are the use of the Soviet Armed Forces for damage limitation in the aftermath of the Chernobyl power station disaster and the use of the British Armed Forces to act as fire fighters during a lengthy industrial dispute involving firemen. If the use of the Armed Forces for this type of task is envisaged then the national defence policy should detail the nature of the task. Will armed forces personnel be called on to assist only in cases where skills those personnel have for military purposes are involved? Or will the armed forces be required to train and retain personnel with skills other than those required for strictly military purposes? If the former is the case then there may be no impact on the structure plan for the Armed Forces. If the latter is the case then there may be a requirement to incorporate certain detachments of specialists into the structure of the Armed Forces. In either case where the Armed Forces are formally tasked with this type of task there may be a requirement to maintain on a permanent basis some form of civil-military co-operation staff.

The Baltic States are perhaps fortunate to be located in a part of the world where
the environment is seen as relatively benign. However even in Europe there is scope for the weather to cause natural disasters or emergencies that the civilian emergency services are hard pressed to cope with. Most states have provision for the Armed Forces to be used to alleviate the effects of such disasters or emergencies, although from state to state the circumstances in which the Armed Forces may be used and the regulations for their use vary. An example is Switzerland where the Armed Forces have been used recently to assist in coping with the effects of serious flooding. As with other threats to security within society the policy and regulations for the use of the Armed Forces must be clear so that the structure of the Armed Forces can properly take account of their responsibilities.

Consideration of the use of the Armed Forces for security within society has looked so far only at examples of reactive responsibilities. In some states the Armed Forces have proactive responsibilities that might broadly be considered to fall under the heading of security. An example of this is the American Corps of Engineers, which historically had and today has the responsibility for certain major engineering infrastructure projects in the United States. The work of the American Corps of Engineers has contributed greatly over time to the building of the infrastructure on which American society relies. If it is intended that the Armed Forces should have any tasks of this nature these responsibilities must be reflected in the national defence policy and the structure of the Armed Forces must take proper account of the requirements of the task.

**Extra-territorial Operations**

Since the resumption of independence all three of the Baltic States have demonstrated a desire to become active members of the international community. Most notably this desire has been manifested through applications to join both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Already all three of the Baltic States have deployed military forces to take part in peacekeeping operations alongside the forces of states that are now coalition partners if not yet formal allies. Participation in international operations though cannot take place in a policy vacuum. The motive for participating in international operations may in part be the selfless one of simply wishing to help; it may in part also be the desire to indirectly contribute to one's own security by helping to build security in more troubled parts of the world. In either case the decision to participate is a foreign policy decision led probably by the foreign affairs ministry but the means deployed are subject to the defence ministry. There is a clear need for policy in this area to be co-ordinated and for the policy on participation in extra-territorial or international operations to be reflected in national security and defence policy documents. This policy guidance is necessary if the correct force structures are to be established in accordance with policy.

Consideration must be given as to where in the world forces might be de-
ployed. What areas are of foreign policy interest to the Baltic States? Of course exceptions can always be made, particularly if only small numbers of personnel are involved, but it is an area where there should be policy. The Baltic States may not have a global interest but are they prepared to deploy forces anywhere in the NATO area of interest? Are they prepared to take part in any operation sponsored by the European Union? What other operations might a Baltic State choose to take part in? Even if it cannot be precise the policy should provide guidelines with regard to the geography of possible involvement.

As important as answers to the question of where in the world are answers to the question when. International deployments have the potential to span the entire spectrum of conflict from war fighting operations backed by a UN mandate to peace keeping duties in support of an agreement between the parties to a conflict. In addition the situation in an area is not necessarily stable, it can deteriorate or it can improve. Conflict at the higher intensity end of the spectrum will probably generate higher costs in terms of both casualties and finance. What costs are the Baltic States prepared to bear in choosing to participate in international operations. Again, in advance of the event, policy should give direction in this area so that force structures that take account of policy on when and for how long forces will be deployed can be developed.

Finally in this area thought should be given to what forces might deploy on international operations and what tasks they might undertake. With limited national and defence resources the Baltic States must develop policy with regard to the size of the force they will consider deploying at any one time. Thought should also be given to what capabilities might be deployed. Will military capabilities be developed specifically for the task of taking part in international operations or will deployed capabilities draw on skills the Armed Forces require anyway for other tasks? Will any of the Baltic States choose to develop particular expertise in any specific field and concentrate their effort in this area for their contribution to international operations? It would be logical to assume that not only will the Baltic States only take part in operations where other states are playing greater roles but, by virtue of their size, the contribution made by a Baltic State might normally expect to work closely with the forces of another state. In order to assist force structure planning defence policy should give direction as to what degree of reliance it is intended to place on national resources for deploying and maintaining a force on operations. Can decisions be taken in advance as to which other nations might be the normal partners for close cooperation on an international deployment? Such decisions might also help force structure planning by influencing the organisation of units, choices in equipment procurement and by sponsoring measures to enhance interoperability.

**Other Tasks**

There are certain areas of defence activity that cannot be neatly categorised as
being components of home defence, security within society or international operations yet within the structure of the society of which they are a part they are clearly defence tasks. In the United Kingdom for example the Royal Air Force have specialist responsibilities, developed from the wish to rescue the crew of aircraft whenever possible, in respect of maritime and mountain search and rescue. In Luxembourg the Army have responsibility, it is understood, for the management of national forests. In certain states in a division of responsibilities Border Guard forces are responsible to the interior ministry in peacetime but in crisis and war are subordinated to the defence ministry.

It is for each state to decide exactly in what way their society is structured, what are responsibilities of government, what responsibilities lie with different areas of government and, in the context of this paper, what in particular are defence ministry responsibilities. There can be no doubt that the business of force structure planning is assisted if national defence policy and supporting legislation and regulations make quite clear the extent and nature of these additional responsibilities and to what degree and in what way they must be co-ordinated with other departments of government.

**National Identity**

In most states the Armed Forces play a formal role in the pageantry and ceremony of state occasions. In this day and age it is perhaps unclear to some why this should be so. However as representatives of those charged with defending the territory of the state and upholding the sovereignty of the institutions of the state there are links with history, tradition and former necessity providing logical reasons why members of the Armed Forces should perform these tasks and symbolise the national identity.

For historical and other reasons some states possess a stronger sense of national identity than others do and in some states conscripted service in the Armed Forces is seen not just as a way of generating military capability but as a way also of promoting national identity. In any armed force that employs conscripted personnel consideration must be given to the reasons for this. Is conscription solely a means of generating military capability or is the generation of national identity also a purpose? If the latter is the case the training given, organisations used and ways in which personnel are employed might be substantially different than in a system devoted solely to generating military capability. The underlying reasons for conscription might also impact on who is conscripted. In addition to, or instead of, the promotion of national identity conscription may also serve a purpose in the promotion of certain values in society or as a way of fostering training or education in certain fields.

It is considered that national defence policy should clearly state the aims and objectives of conscripted service. Only if this is done can a coherent force structure plan make best use of conscripted personnel in accordance with the policy laid down. While it may not be a matter
for national defence policy the place and role of the Armed Forces in the fabric of society with respect to national ceremonies and pageantry must be defined so that these responsibilities can be discharged with the dignity that is proper on state occasions.

**Personnel Constraints**

It is often said that, while a navy and air force man equipment, an army equips men. Given the modern technology of the age in which we live this saying may have less truth than previously but it is still true that in any rudimentary assessment of capability ships, aircraft and men will be counted. In the Navy and the Air Force the requirement for personnel will be derived from the necessity of crewing and supporting the equipment that represents the capability of those services. The same equation is not quite true in the Army. Tanks and artillery pieces need to be crewed and supported but the tasks of the Army will more normally be considered in terms of the number of battalions or brigades that are required. The foundations of these units and formations are provided by their personnel; personnel equipped so as to give the units and formations they fill the capabilities that they require. The tasks identified for the Army will to a great degree dictate the number of personnel required to serve in the Army. However the availability of personnel, the nature of the tasks and the immediacy of the threat will all influence the nature of service for personnel in the Army. In most armed forces personnel constraints will impact more on the Army than on the other services.

There is little point in deciding a force structure that ignores demographic and economic realities. By way of example the United Kingdom with a reasonably successful economy now finds it difficult, even offering attractive remuneration packages, to recruit full time personnel for the Armed Forces equivalent to just one person in every three hundred. On the same basis the Lithuanian Armed Forces might expect to be able to recruit some twelve thousand personnel. Switzerland, with universal conscription, reckons that each one million people in the population will generate about five thousand male conscripts each year. On the same basis Latvia could plan on training a maximum of some twelve thousand conscripts each year. Finland on mobilisation aims to deploy some ten percent of the population bearing arms. This figure suggests that each member of the male population has a commitment to the Armed Forces for, on average, fifteen years of his life. On the same basis Estonia might be able to deploy some one hundred and forty thousand personnel. "Rules of thumb" for part time volunteer forces might be harder to establish. Even in the recent cold war era volunteer reserves in the United Kingdom never accounted for more than one person in six hundred in the population. However in Estonia now it is estimated that one person in each hundred belongs to the Kaitseliit. Any force structure must be based on reasonable assumptions of how many personnel are available for different types of service and the requirement for personnel may
dictate the nature of service in the Armed Forces and particularly the Army.

Most societies have, traditionally, limited the role of women or excluded them from the ranks of the Armed Forces. The tendency in recent years to open up the Armed Forces to the employment of women at least in “European” society considerably expands the pool of personnel from whom the Armed Forces can be recruited. Other factors may serve to limit the size of the personnel pool. A declining birth rate and a higher take up rate for tertiary education act both to reduce the size of the personnel pool in future years and possibly delay the time when individuals enter the pool. Differing requirements in terms of health and fitness, limitations with regard to certain professions or occupations and attitudes towards the employment in the Armed Forces of those with criminal records or social welfare problems also impact on the numbers of personnel available for service. Policy towards service by non-citizen residents should be considered and service in the armed forces, on a voluntary basis, by non-citizen residents might be seen as a vehicle for integration and a route to citizenship. Society cannot impose severe limitations on who can or might serve and then impose tasks on the Armed Forces that demand the use of all potentially available personnel. Equally some restrictions are probably in the interests of both the cost effective and efficient management of both the Armed Forces and the economy and society at large.

An Army based on conscript training and reserve service may adequately be able to fulfil the requirements of home defence. However most societies demanding conscript and reserve service limit that service to home defence so an Army entirely reliant on such service may be unable to take part in extra territorial missions. For such missions full time personnel might be obliged to deploy as they are in the United Kingdom or constitutional arrangements might demand that extra territorial missions must be undertaken by volunteers drawn from across the ranks of the armed forces as is the case in Sweden. Certain ceremonial tasks might be best left in the hands of volunteers specifically employed on a part time basis for those duties. Where full time personnel are employed on ceremonial duty consideration must be given to whether they are employed on such duties all the time. Units so employed have a tendency to become “Court” units with only a very limited ability to deploy on operational tasks if called upon. Where the number of full time personnel is limited their role in training conscripts and reserves must be balanced against any requirement to provide personnel for “standing force” units. With part time volunteer personnel their willingness to serve must be properly used but the limitations in their training must be recognised in the operational tasks they are given. In all force structure planning it must be recognised that tasks almost certainly influence force structures but force structures also impact on availability for tasks.

The immediacy of any threat will also impact on force structures. The Israelis have amply demonstrated that a high short warning time threat does not necessarily
demand the retention of large conscript standing forces. They have demonstrated that such a threat can be met with reserve forces as long as those forces can be mobilised very quickly without the requirement for refresher training on mobilisation. The large conscript standing force might be regarded as a cheap option in military terms but society pays a high economic price for the non-availability of productive labour. Relying on high readiness reserves reduces the cost for society overall but substantially increases the organisational burden on the armed forces if the risks of such a policy are to be made acceptable. This organisational burden will include a heavy programme of refresher training for reservists and the maintenance of a highly effective and practised mobilisation system. Force structure planning must take account of the wider costs of personnel and willingness to accept risk in the context of the nature of the threat. Where the threat is perceived to be at or above a certain level then the risks and costs are probably such that they impact on security or defence policy and are no longer simply matters of military strategy.

Resource Constraints

In a democracy the Armed Forces should always think they are short of money! The funding for the Armed Forces, as for all areas of government spending, is derived from taxes paid by the population and by business. The government is accountable to the taxpayers and the taxpayers, even if they do not actually resent paying taxes, do not want to pay more tax than is necessary. Any responsible government will seek to ensure, through audit and control systems, that all areas of government activity are adequately but not extravagantly funded for the tasks that they have been given.

Adequate funding is, of course, hard to define. It might be defined as that level of spending which is most cost effective. For any particular activity an unnecessarily high level of spending may result in extravagance that contributes no additional capability. Equally a very low level of spending may not be cost effective because resources are left idle because there is no funding for their operation or resources may be left unrepaird because there is no funding for their maintenance. Adequate funding must be that level of funding that pays full time personnel sufficient to retain and recruit the numbers required and pays conscripted personnel the amount society considers fair. Adequate funding must maintain and, in a timely fashion, replace equipment, must provide training that enables authorised training standards and levels to be met and must maintain the defence infrastructure in an adequate condition for its purpose. There is a balance to be achieved and this should always be sought. Provision of resources need not always depend on funding and adequate resourcing might include recourse to the requisition of vehicles, logistic stocks and infrastructure for home defence.

Different areas of government are in competition for limited funds in an environment where government revenue and the flow of funds may not be en-
tirely stable. Of course the priorities for government spending should be policy decisions that transcend inter-departmental competition and lobbying and with a vibrant economy most if not all spending aspirations might be met. With a developing and less robust economy it is more likely that resources will be limited, will be allocated strictly in accordance with priorities and will sometimes not be available even though allocated earlier. It is therefore important that within all departments, not least the Defence Ministry, spending programmes are firmly managed and prioritised.

In order that coherent budget planning can take place in the Defence Ministry there must be good indications of long term financial allocations, clear commitments to medium term funding and extreme reluctance to tinker with budgeted spending for the current financial year. Coherent budget planning facilitates force structure planning and, particularly, force development planning by creating a more stable framework for the implementation of those plans. However the Defence Ministry must be able to respond flexibly to short notice funding difficulties or opportunities and medium and long term changes to economic or security projections that impact in funding terms on security and defence policy. In order to do this there must be clarity with regard to the various components of the Defence Ministry budget. Clarity in this area can be more easily achieved if responsibility for different areas of the budget or programme is delegated to appropriate departments for detailed management.

There is little flexibility with personnel costs. Personnel must receive their pay and allowances and care must be taken to ensure that any increase to the cost base implied in any increase in the size of the force structure is properly sustainable, particularly since there are normally costs associated with reducing personnel numbers. In respect of equipment a whole life approach should be taken. Beyond the acquisition costs, running costs, maintenance costs and disposal costs should be considered from the start for an equipment project. While short term savings can be made to running and maintenance costs these will invariably reduce cost effectiveness. The opportunity offered by extra funding can sometimes be used to bring forward equipment purchases but again care must be taken to ensure that such purchases are sustainable. Many of the cost considerations with regard to infrastructure are similar to those concerning equipment. Planning for operations will require the preparation of logistic stockpiles. Purchase costs will be a major component but unavoidable storage and maintenance costs must be taken into account. In the short term costs can be cut by reducing training and activity levels but such cuts invariably have longer-term penalties. Training standards and morale can easily be damaged and the cost effectiveness of equipment used in training is reduced if it is not used as planned. Systems must be in place for building, managing and prioritising budget programmes.

The requisition of resources such as vehicles, logistic stocks and infrastructure can reduce costs. Essentially, assets required to support the mobilised structure of the
armed forces but not the peacetime training structure are taken from society and the economy when needed and not provided through funding in peacetime. Reliance on requisition demands that the necessary assets are available within society and the economy, that the necessary legislation is enacted and regulations prepared and that mobilisation plans allow for the timely requisition of the required assets.

Consideration must be given to and agreement reached on exactly what costs are covered with the funds allocated to the Defence Ministry. It is of course reasonable that the Defence Ministry uses its allocated funds for all aspects of the maintenance, training, preparation and development of the defence forces. Where, however, should costs fall for the deployment or use of the armed forces? In the event of general mobilisation for home defence cost considerations are likely to be a secondary consideration. However other actual deployment or use of elements of the armed forces, probably for international operations, is likely to happen at relatively short notice, even if the commitment is then retained for an extended period, in pursuit of foreign policy objectives authorised by the government. It is suggested that, at least initially, the costs of any force deployment be not met from Defence Ministry funding. Requiring the Defence Ministry to cover the costs of a deployment at short notice from allocated funds is likely to impact in a damaging way on other aspects of defence spending. In due course if a deployment becomes routine or is sustained additional funds can be allocated to the Defence Ministry to meet the running costs of the deployment. It is suggested as a principle, though, that the costs of using the armed forces should always be kept separate from other defence costs. In this way the costs of a commitment can always be identified and the use of the armed forces will not impact negatively on the ongoing preparation of the armed forces.

Existing Assets

Quite obviously the starting point for any force structure plan is what exists now. However while this is easily stated it is often less easily established with any degree of certainty what actually does exist. And beyond what does exist what are the costs associated with existing assets, what potential do they have to accommodate change and what opportunities do they offer. If the force structure plan represents the currently desired endstate and the endstate implies change from the present structure it is important to be fully acquainted with the start state, what exists now, and the costs, latent potential and inherent opportunities of the start state.

It is vital to understand and have full details of the cost structure of existing assets as a basis for managing change. With this information it will be possible to assess accurately the financial impact of taking different courses of action such as ceasing certain activities or closing certain facilities. It will be possible to make predictions, with some accuracy, based on existing data of the costs associated with employing additional personnel or starting new activities. It
will be possible to extrapolate with some accuracy the running costs associated with different force structure models and it will be possible to estimate the funding required over and above running costs and replacement costs to generate additional capability.

It is important to establish and understand the potential of existing assets. In respect of personnel detailed knowledge of training standards, skills levels and rank and age structures will help inform any plans for reroling personnel or expanding structures. For example “overtraining” of individuals will be indicative of greater scope for quick expansion than where individuals are only basically trained for their duties. A more youthful age profile may be indicative of more opportunities for reroling within existing structures. Existing force structures may limit plans for expansion, at least initially, by virtue of a structural inability to cope with the training of the personnel needed to expand structures. For example there may only be a limited number of posts where junior officers can gain initial command experience. In respect of equipment detailed knowledge of age and condition will help inform any plans for extending equipment service life or justify mid-life refurbishment or upgrading. For example a vehicle fleet that is not being used as intensively as planned might have its planned service life extended thus delaying replacement costs. Upgrading a vehicle fleet with a high residual life may negate the requirement to make certain acquisitions.

An imaginative attitude must be taken with regard to the opportunities inherent in the existing situation. There are always alternative possible uses for existing buildings and facilities. There are often possibilities to convert or modify vehicles and other equipment. Adapting what exists might, and here an understanding of the costs is important, be cheaper and more cost effective than new provision. By way of example knowledge of an alternative use for an asset might prevent its disposal shortly before the introduction of a capability that could have exploited the asset.

A Programme for Development

A force structure plan, once decided, will outline what is to be achieved. It will not necessarily set out the time frame for the implementation of the plan nor will it set out the programme for achieving the desired force structure. Once the force structure plan is decided a force development programme must be adopted. One of the key factors in the force development programme will be its duration. How long is it going to take to implement the planned force structure? The duration of the development programme will depend to some degree on the magnitude of the provisions and changes contained in the force structure plan. It will also depend to a large degree on the availability of resources to fund the development programme. Early implementation of certain measures will provide the basis for “learning from experience” for the review and better management of the plan in its later stages. If the force structure plan involves the expansion of the armed
forces the annual defence budget must ultimately cover the sustainment and renewal of the force structure. Over the duration of the force development programme the annual defence budget must not only sustain existing structures but must also fund the current phase of the development programme. Starting from a low base of existing assets within the framework of developing economies with limited resources it is likely that the force development programme, involving considerable expansion, in any of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania will cover a considerable number of years. Much of the work involved in preparing the force structure plan will establish the costs associated with the planned structures and the existing ones and contribute to the planning for the time scale of the force development programme.

It has been made clear above that the long term force structure plan is not "set in concrete". It is a framework linked to a vision. It is a firm base for change and should be reviewed periodically to ensure that the structure it provides is still appropriate to meet the requirement. It will probably have to be adjusted as the organisation gains in experience as implementation proceeds and exercises are held. Such revision of the force structure plan will obviously impact on the force development programme. In a similar fashion the force development programme should not be seen as "set in concrete". It must be revised if the force structure plan is revised but it can also be revised by shortening or lengthening its duration. Economic circumstances may allow additional funding for defence and so enable the development programme to be speeded up and shortened. Equally economic circumstances may demand savings be made and require the development programme to be slowed down and lengthened. Whatever, if the development programme is modified in any way it must be carefully checked to ensure that it still provides a coherent framework for force structure development. One concept that might be adopted is that of the "rolling programme". As each year is completed another year is added to the far end of the development programme. Every time a year is added the opportunity can be taken to revise the desired force structure plan and follow that up with revision, where needed, to the force development programme. In this way, as the years proceed, the force development plan will change in nature as it is gradually implemented to more resemble a plan for the sustainment of the force and a seamless transition will be achieved.

With any development programme it is obviously impractical, if not impossible, to plan from the start the last year of the programme in the same detail as the first. Almost inevitably changes to the force structure plan with knock on effects for the development programme and revision of the available resources will mean that any early detailed work on the later years of the development programme will prove nugatory long before it is due to be implemented. What is needed instead is a division of the development programme into phases with more detailed work being carried out on the earlier phases of the programme. These phases
should perhaps be aligned with any budget forecasting system that seeks to identify resource allocations. By way of example a twenty-year development programme might include the first three years in the first “short term” phase, the next seven in the second “medium term” phase and the final ten in the last “long term” phase. As the programme proceeds years progressively move from phase to phase and, if the programme is a rolling programme, each year another year is added to the last phase.

The short-term phase might be thought of as the implementation phase. For this phase of the programme’s firm commitments to funding are required. For the current year active management of allocated budgets is required. For the next year at least budget management plans and detailed priorities and objectives need to be set. Staffs at all levels are involved in this phase of the plan. For infrastructure and equipment projects this phase of the programme will involve contracting of work, construction of facilities and delivery and integration of equipment. This phase of the programme will see implementation teams being established to assume responsibility for facilities, take delivery of equipment and, with the allocation of personnel, generate the establishments and units within the force structure plan of the Armed Forces.

The medium term phase might be thought of as the preparation phase. For this phase of the programme clear indications of if not commitments to funding are required. In accordance with funding projections preparatory work for the implementation of elements of the force development programme is undertaken. Some of this work will require current year funding and will probably involve single service and specialist planning staffs. For infrastructure projects the groundwork of determining locations, securing land and obtaining such permissions as are required will be undertaken. For equipment projects, including stockpile generation, the requirements will be defined and procurement or donation options clarified. For the creation of units work will be done to ensure that the correct levels of trained personnel are being generated to enable the command structures of these units to be filled.

The long-term phase might be thought of as the planning phase. For this phase of the programme it is sufficient to use predictions or estimates of likely funding levels and match these to funding requirements for sustaining the force structure and developing new elements of the force. This phase of the programme probably exists entirely on paper within the offices of the plans and policy department of the Defence Ministry.

Depending on the detail included in it a force structure plan need not necessarily include within its contents the intended locations for all the establishments and units of the armed forces. As the force development programme unfolds, however, it becomes necessary, if these have not been taken already, to take decisions with regard to the locations of units and establishments of the Armed Forces. It is here that strict military logic can collide with political interest. It is the duty of military commanders and staffs to present
options based only on military logic and realities. However politicians when taking decisions will, and are entitled to, consider matters from a broader perspective of the national interest. Being elected representatives it is inevitable perhaps also that on occasions the decisions of politicians will be coloured by local and sectional interests. This is nothing other than the nature of politics, particularly when government is of a coalition nature and decisions must often reconcile different and varying interests. Commanders and staffs must therefore be ready to accept and work with solutions or decisions that are not, from a strictly military point of view, the best or most ideal. While accepting such solutions and decisions commanders and staffs must be ready to make clear to politicians the costs, implications and effects associated with them.

Conclusions

The starting point for force structure planning is thorough debate with regard to the tasks of the Armed Forces leading to clear firm decisions reflected in national defence policy. Resource allocations to defence must broadly reflect the tasks given and the priority afforded to defence in national security policy alongside other areas of government policy. The creation of a force structure plan imposes discipline on future planning and, by demonstration of clarity of purpose, helps to assure funds for defence spending. Arrangements for co-operation between departments must be in place.

The requirement for home defence must be clearly stated in national defence policy and based on a coherent threat assessment agreed by government. The policy and regulations for the reactive use of the Armed Forces for security within society must be clear and must be reflected in the Armed Forces structure. The Armed Forces structure must take account of any proactive responsibilities for security within society. Security and defence policy documents can usefully define the parameters for national involvement in international operations so aiding force structure development. The nature and extent of other tasks given to the Armed Forces must be clear to defence force structure planners as must the role of the armed forces in promoting national identity and the place of conscripted service if this is a task and not a tool.

With regard to the constraints on force structures imposed by personnel considerations all planning must take proper account of carefully analysed demographic realities. In addition further limitations on personnel availability imposed by tradition and values in society must be recognised but here society must be prepared to adapt where the situation demands it and staffs must be prepared to make the case for change. In any country where home defence is a major constituent of the task of the Army the personnel structure of the Army will probably be task driven. Force structure planning must, however, properly account for those instances where the tasks drive the personnel structures or provide opportunity for more cost-effective personnel structures to be adopted. Finally the immediacy of the threat may be of such considerable im-
pact in economic costs that personnel policy and constraints may be driven not by military strategy but by defence or security policy itself.

With regard to the constraints on force structures imposed by resource considerations sound audit and control systems should be welcomed so that proper expenditure can be well demonstrated. Both overfunding and underfunding of programmes reduce cost effectiveness and adequate funding for activities should always be sought. Limited and uncertain funding levels demand the most careful management and prioritisation of spending and the careful identification of areas where flexibility exists to adjust programmes both in the short term if necessary and in the longer term. Efforts should be made to exclude unplanned spending from the programme and the areas to be covered with the funds allocated must not be a source of doubt.

Existing assets must be recognised as the starting point for the development of and transition to a new force structure. It is important that the costs associated with existing assets are properly identified both to help assess the costs associated with new structures but also to provide a firm basis for the process of change. In order to make best and most cost effective use of existing assets in the planned force structure it is vital that both the potential of existing assets and the opportunities provided by existing assets are fully recognised.

The force development programme links existing assets with the force structure plan by providing the framework for the transition over time to the adoption of the structures in the force structure plan. The force development programme must respond flexibly to periodic revision of the force structure plan and the time scale for development. Consideration should be given to the adoption of a rolling programme. The force development programme should be structured in parallel with budget planning systems and allow for a smooth progression from planning to implementation for all components of the programme. Allowance should be made for the realities of politics impacting on the armed forces. Politics is the art of the possible and the most logical solutions are not necessarily possible particularly when government is in the hands of a coalition of different parties.

**Recommendations**

The introduction to this paper alludes to a surfeit of planning and a lack of implementation and so an endless planning process will not be recommended. However implementation must be soundly based and this demands planning in the widest sense. It is recommended though that all planning activity should be sharply focussed (where does this fit into the overall scheme of things), results orientated (what decisions are required), and timetabled (to drive progress). In order to achieve this there must be clarity with regard to the responsibilities, boundaries and linkages between any agencies involved in the planning process.

It is vital that national security and defence policy documents are written in
a way that quite clearly details the place of defence in national security and details the nature and scope of the roles and tasks of the defence forces. Without such detail it is difficult to justify the structures that might be proposed.

It is vital that comprehensive laws and regulations pertaining to the employment of all personnel in the armed forces are prepared and promulgated. Without certain direction in this area it will be impossible to fully address the personnel aspects of any force structure plan. In particular the costs associated with personnel must be fully detailed.

With regard to resources it is essential that effective systems be in place for allocating funding in the short, medium and long terms. It is essential that effective systems be in place for managing funds that have been allocated. In the context of understanding the costs of the armed forces it is essential that existing asset costs be properly understood so that force development can be costed as accurately as possible. It is vital that comprehensive laws and regulations pertaining to the requisition of resources are prepared and promulgated.

It is suggested that clarity in the above areas will permit the development of a comprehensive and soundly based force structure plan. This will allocate appropriate types and numbers of personnel to establishments and units that are fully justified by policy and that are underpinned with the planned resources that are needed to cover their equipment and running costs.

On the basis of a firm understanding of all aspects of existing assets and the detail of the force structure plan a detailed force development programme can be drawn up.

It is recommended thereafter that a formal timetabled process that reviews and revises the force structure plan be put into place. The results of this process will enable adjustments to be made to the force development programme. It is recommended that this process be linked to the budgetary process so that adjustments to the force development programme arising from resourcing constraints or opportunities are made in a linked way.

With all of the above measures firmly in place it is to be hoped that the force development programme can then begin to deliver implementation. In many ways the agreed force development programme is the culmination of planning progress in many areas. This focussed planning progress will take time and so the earliest parts of any development programme can only deliver a little in the way of implementation. Thereafter, however, if the development programme is adhered to and revised only systematically when necessary the pace of implementation will increase and real progress in the development of the defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will be made.
Teaching in the Baltic Defence College has until now focused on active territorial defence against an overland invasion supplemented with air assault/ airborne operations. The College Operations Manual does cover coastal defence within the framework of defensive operations as well as maritime operations, but only in a general sense.

This is now in the process of changing, partly as a result of the changing composition of the student group. Where the land forces students dominated the first two staff courses, both the future Senior Staff Courses and the new Colonel’s Courses will have a more significant number of air force and naval students.

The College has still not had the time and resources to analyse maritime and air defence problems within the framework of territorial defence to any great depth or come to any common understanding or agreement. However, the changing student group is highlighting the requirement for quick progress, as is the fact that all three Baltic states are working to develop effective active territorial defence doctrines and structures. In order to be complete, these doctrines must integrate the efforts of all the armed services.

The following text just provides initial thoughts about how maritime defence could be integrated with the territorial land defence of the Baltic states. The thoughts are built on some basic observations about the framework of maritime defence in the three states:

- Two of the Baltic states’ capital cities and several other important towns are major seaports. Therefore it is important that there is a realistic plan for the defence of the ports and coastal areas.

- Effective reinforcement of the national defence forces in case of crisis or war depends to a very high extent on being able to use the key seaports of the three states. Thus it is important that the defence effort retains the facilities (by temporarily blocking rather than destroying) and that the capacity to operate them is protected from against enemy action.
The forces

1. Any barrier minefields together with long range gun and missile coastal artillery protection and fast patrol boat units will add depth to the coastal defence and protect friendly use of the ports.

2. The coastal defence of a major port that must be available for reinforcements should have the following type of assets available:
   - Sea-surveillance radar units supplemented by organised home guard or coastal observers and by reporting from harbour authorities and police as well as fishermen and other local civilians.
   - Defence force, border guard, and other state navies’ patrol vessels for the marking and policing of the territorial waters and access to seaports in crises and for reconnaissance in war.
   - Equipment for anti-invasion mining and - most important - for mining the approaches to the seaports. The latter should, if possible, include controlled mines.
   - Ships prepared for blocking quays and piers and access to these.
   - Coastal artillery - or other direct fire weapons (e.g. tanks) - for supporting/protecting the minefields, especially those in the approaches to the ports.
   - Point air defence - and if possible area air defence - systems protecting the harbour facilities and any airports at the harbour city against airborne and air assault forces.
   - Home guard sub-units for the protection of the harbour (and airport) facilities and their defences.
   - Territorial infantry unit or sub-unit groups trained and equipped for combat in built-up areas as a reserve.

3. Even with these forces available, the invader may succeed in establishing a bridgehead including the port. It may take place by accepting very high losses or by landing elsewhere and by taking the port from the land side. In order to counter that eventuality, the defender has to have mobile combined arms formations (brigades) available to break through the bridgehead by early attack, before the bridgehead defences are fully developed, and before
the enemy can use the port facilities freely. If the mobile forces are too weak for offensive operations, they must contain the landing forces until other forces can intervene.

4. When the major port is about to be used for reinforcements, it should have the following additional types of assets available:

- Mine Counter Measures units/equipment suited to clear any minefield established during the coastal defence phase.
- Army engineer units to clear obstacles form quays, piers, etc.
- Additional air defence units.
- Logistic host nation support, also using the normal civilian port logistic organisation (e.g. for container handling).

Most of these assets should not be in place during a coastal defence phase, but should be deployed or re-deployed when required from elsewhere (from assembly areas in the Military Region and - MCM units - from places at sea out of harms way).

5. Defence of minor ports and ports not geographically well placed for the reception of reinforcements will be organised according to the general land defence plan. That means that the destruction of facilities that may be used by an invader will happen, as elsewhere in the defence planning, taking total defence requirements into consideration, e.g. the needs of any civilian population not evacuated.

The Command and Control arrangement

It is a key guiding principle in the teaching of the Baltic Defence College that there should be one Commander for all surface (including local air defence) operations in an area. That commander will be the officer with the dominant force contribution or the one with the clearest interest in and understanding of the mission of the forces involved.

Guided by this principle, the most suitable way to arrange the command of all coastal defence forces in an area where there is a major port of relevance for later use by friendly reinforcement (e.g. Klaipeda, Liepaja, Ventspils, and Tallinn-Paldiski) would be to establish a special coastal defence district organisation. It would cover the area of the local military district plus (in a phase where the potential invader has to establish effective sea control off the coast) territorial waters bordering the district.

The most suitable commander would be a naval officer due to his better professional understanding of the operational context. He would have operational command of all units permanently in the district (listed in point 2 above), and he would be given tactical control of the additional units (listed in point 3) in a reinforcement phase. However, the deputy commander should be an army officer responsible for the tactical integration of the different land force and coastal artillery units.

The subordinate units will often be task organised, and have an independent AOR, e.g. the units deployed for airport defence. Thus a closely integrated use of all means would be guided by the maritime requirements in both the defensive and later friendly use phase.
A similar command arrangement may be the most suitable for the Estonian Islands area.

In order to ensure proper effective naval expertise and influence in Military Regions like Western Lithuania, Kurzeme (Kurland), and North Estonia, the region should probably have a naval deputy commander, maybe even naval and army officers alternating as commander and deputy.

In other coastal areas with smaller harbours (mentioned in point 5), the military districts will have an army commander. They will have operational command of all units permanently in the district, including smaller naval (often border guard navy) vessels for mining and access control.

In situations where a field army brigade is employed in attack or defence in a coastal defence district to destroy or contain an enemy landing, the district comes under operational control of the brigade commander.

Naval units (listed in point 1) may initially operate under tactical control of the coastal defence district, but they will have to depart from the area as the enemy succeeds in gaining the sea control necessary to conduct the sea landing operations. They may have to deploy to coastal areas more suitable for survival (e.g. the Estonian Baltic Sea coast or elsewhere in the region). They will revert to direct operational control of the Joint Operational Commander and should come under operational control of the combined naval commander at the earliest suitable moment.
Future Naval Development in the Baltic Republics – An Attempt at a Theoretical Approach

By Tor Egil Walter

The Baltic Defence Problem

A glance at the map – combined with the knowledge of the size of the population, the GNP and the transportation infrastructure gives only one conclusion – the three Baltic Republics are rimstates1, and the most important problem to be solved in this perspective is their relations to the inland – i.e. Russia. A parallel illustration can be the relationship between Germany and Denmark – although the historical experiences are different in this case.

The normalisation process is best undertaken by Baltic integration in Western – and all European security networks and in my opinion it is irrelevant if the main contributor to this is NATO or EU. An important step in this process is to prove that the Baltic States can co-operate with each other, this is perhaps the most important signal effect of the projects BALTRON, BALTBAT, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL.

There always has to be a link between the overall security problem, and a relevant defence structure that in one way or another will contribute to at least a partial solution to that problem. Defence structures are very central to the state – for instance could the state itself be defined as a legal contributor of power, internal (police), and external (military forces)?

To get further into this logical chain, we have to realise that today’s challenge is not peace or high intensive war, it is more that of peace and war at the same time. That is, it is not good economy to create “silver bullets” only useful in Cold War type of conflict, and not available to the more likely crisis management scenario, or as support to the commitments of the state in peacetime.
Another glance at the map will show that all three countries border the Baltic Sea. This fact can in one way or another be used as an excuse to create some kind of naval forces.

Military aid to the Baltic republics could be looked upon from different perspectives. My opinion is that what has been contributed so far is not very expressive. One explanation may be that the attitude so far has been that if you start from scratch - it is without importance what you get - obsolete cars, bicycles etc. This view is obviously false - the military component of new states has to be designed to fit both the new state, and the new international development - and handing over military “waste” can in my opinion be characterised as the opposite of help.

Military “waste” can be divided into two categories - obsolete material and obsolete thinking. To be frank - in my opinion intellectual contributions like arguments for general conscription and the total defence concept should not be bought uncritically by the receiver. That does not necessarily mean that the mentioned phenomena are bad solutions, but defence concepts have to be tailored to the actual state’s legislation, internal policy agendas, historical experiences and so on. Never forget that the Versailles peace treaty made it possible for Germany to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. The main reason for that is the fact that “Reichswehr” was not allowed to keep very many of the old structures - just military competence without the devastating tail of old, inadequate military hardware which, as a general rule, undefended defense forces bring with them into the future. Another point to be stressed is that the Baltic states are to be considered as small states, which obviously indicates other solutions than those for great- and medium powers.

Like modern telecommunication companies - who are introducing new technology - for instance cellular telephone networks at once - without starting with inductor telephones (with handles) once again - the military development in new states has to be based upon the latest “software” developments. That means that foreign and security policy have to be linked to relevant structures through a logical chain of strategy and doctrine. They also have to be driven by a search for the most cost-effective solutions - not procuring the most spectacular military equipment, or even more common, sub-optimised obsolete structures. It is military relevant capacity that counts - not the military structure in itself. In other words - there has to be a discussion on ends, ways and means.

This process has to be dynamic - and can be illustrated by this picture (on next page), representing “The Doctrinal Loop”.

It has to be emphasised that naval forces can only be a part of an overall defence structure. In my opinion it is important to state that there should not be any naval structure at all if this structure is not the best and cheapest way to get the wanted effect. This leads to the conclusion that there has to be an identifiable link between the overall goal and the naval part of the defence forces.
much of the same position as the Persian Gulf of today – tar, linen, rye and timber were strategic merchandise comparable to oil today, and of extreme importance to the growing trading states Holland and Great Britain. During the two world wars and the first period of the cold war – it had the function of a fort moat, dividing political systems. Lastly, in the terminal phase of the Cold War, creating the central front along the internal German border the strategically most vulnerable interface between NATO and WP.

The development of military technology is another parameter of great importance to a sea of limited size like the Baltic. In 1939, the two Soviet battleships “Marat” and “October Revolution” represented the “State of the Art” of power projection, capable of firing heavy shells over 35 km against Finnish coastal defences. At the same time, Soviet bombers were not capable of attacking Sweden from the southern shores of the Baltic Sea and returning to their bases.

This is not the situation today. Limited seas like the Baltic are not a suitable
environment for naval surface combatants in high intensive warfare. The development of missiles and air-based systems has made deployment of high valuable targets unsuitable, and not necessary in an “over the horizon” targeting perspective. In the naval context, The Baltic is more or less a lake, not a sea. That does not mean that naval forces are irrelevant in the Baltic, but rather that it is not suitable to design surface vessels for a specific role in this type of waters.

The Baltic has, however, taken back its function as a medium for travel and commerce, which is linking together the different states, and not dividing them as the situation was during the Cold War. The conclusion is that the main naval tasks of all navies operating in this sea today are more peace-orientated than traditionally war- or anti-invasion orientated.

*A Symmetric versus an Asymmetric Perspective*

A symmetric perspective can be defined as a fight between combatants at the same organisational, military and technological level. The struggles between the Great Powers in the two world wars are good examples of a symmetric approach.

A symmetric battle can be fought as a war of attrition or as a war of manoeuvre. Attrition is normally the strategy of great powers, giving a certain result with the sacrifice of great losses. A weaker part can win if he is well skilled in a manoeuvre-oriented pattern of operation preferably within a strategy of “Indirect Approach”, for instance as taught by the British military – historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart.

A weaker power could also choose an asymmetric doctrine, thus making his opponent’s military forces irrelevant. The Vietnam War could be an example of this way of fighting, the Soviet/Russian wars in Afghanistan and in Caucasus others. The Baltic historical experiences of Kaiselit, Zemessardze and Skat as well as “The Forest Brothers” are together with the Norwegian and Danish resistance movement the best examples in a Nordic/Baltic context. An interesting reflection on this matter is that The Peace Treaty of Paris forbids Finland to contribute these kinds of forces. The demander of this was the Soviet Union, not Great Britain.

It may be argued that in the geostrategical context of the Baltic countries, a high intensive, regular war has to be fought as an asymmetric war. This will obviously give a higher threshold than what is possible with a small scale, symmetrically designed military structure based upon the doctrine of the great power way of thinking. In my opinion this matter is so interesting that it deserves further consideration. Maybe it is a good idea to establish a common “Asymmetric Warfare Centre” with contribution from all members in the “BALTSEA³-group” – maybe connected to BALDEFCOL².

Whatever, there ought to be a symmetric component as well, to provide a “flag-waving” effect which is good for the self-consciousness of young states. Another reason is the need to produce personnel with a certain amount of military knowledge and units designed for use in the new security environment of the post Cold War period.
Another argument concerns the economising of a state’s resources. It is obvious that co-operation between different agencies within the state is necessary to meet the new threats against the state as an institution in a post Cold War scenario. This is especially valid within an area, with relatively weak, or at least not fully matured new state structures (the Baltic Republics), in combination with the sad effects of a Russia not capable of controlling criminal elements of different types.

**What are the Characteristics of Maritime Forces?**

First of all, what makes sea power interesting is the value it is contributing to military commanders and politicians as a cost-effective tool in obtaining a political or military goal. Maritime forces possess the following characteristics:

- **Readiness.** One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies. Many peacetime functions, such as presence, logistics and health service support, are closely paralleled to wartime operations. By maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services in support of peacetime operations.

- **Flexibility.** The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus, reconfigure and realign forces quickly to handle a variety of contingencies by providing a wide range of weapon systems, military options, and logistic/administrative skills. Maritime forces, in tasks ranging from forcible entry, strike operations to NEO, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, can control seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or in time of crisis. The strategic, operational and tactical C2IS capabilities of naval forces provide for a uniquely controllable force to complement diplomatic efforts.

- **Self-Sustainment.** The degree of self-sustainment achieved by maritime forces will be determined by the nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the participants. NATO navies, with their ability to conduct replenishment at sea, are capable of operating in forward areas without significant land-based supply structure almost indefinitely.

- **Mobility.** Maritime forces, with their strategic and tactical mobility, have the ability to monitor a situation passively, remain poised on station for a sustained period, respond to a crisis rapidly and manoeuvre in combat with authority. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries, as needed. If diplomatic, political or economic measures succeed in stabilising a situation, maritime forces can quickly be withdrawn without further action afloat. Maritime forces can also respond to indications of pending crises by repositioning rapidly from one end of a theatre to another or from one theatre to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to manoeuvre maritime forces quickly provides maritime commanders with a significant tactical and operational advantage.

- **Poise.** The ability to poise in international waters avoids the political complications and military risks of deploying military forces on land....”

**The Model of Seapower**

Maritime Forces represent the tool to gain different variants of “Sea-power.”
This picture illustrates a model, which can be suitable to use as a background for a discussion about the expression “Sea-Power”, and not in the least, establish a link between this great-power related term and small-state realities as demonstrated in the Baltic Republic perspective.

**Command of the Sea.** This function gives the freedom of using the sea for one’s own purposes and to deny its use to the opponents. Total command of the sea is not possible to be carried out in maritime operations, it can only be achieved by destruction or elimination of the adversaries’ total naval capacities. An operation at this level has to be joint, and combined in a context including great power capacities.  

Another approach to this function can be “…Being ‘in command of the sea’ simply means that a navy in that happy situation can exert more control over the use of the sea than another. The degree of command varies greatly and is for one’s own purposes and prevents the enemy using it for his…”  

Sea control is a high level of ambition, including the denial of enemy impact in all dimensions, i.e. in the air, on the surface, and under the surface. This ambition will always be restricted in time and space.

A lower ambition is sea-denial, which means that we don’t want to use the sea ourselves, and at the same time deny the enemy in one dimension, for instance by use of sea-mines, in a restricted timeframe.

*From a Baltic Republic perspective, in my opinion little effort should be made to develop a capacity in the function of sea control. The reason for that is the earlier mentioned decreasing value of the Baltic Sea as a suitable environment for high-intensive warfare.*

One sea-denial function to be further developed is mine-countermeasures. The main reason for that is more the benign use of ordnance disposal, but when that
skill is established, it can be utilised as a component in international operations, giving an important “flag-waving” effect at a relatively low cost.

**Projection of interests.** This function can be divided in two. The first is to support the civilian society, which can also be characterised as Benign Use. Benign tasks are those such as disaster relief, search and rescue or ordnance disposal. The tasks are benign because violence has no part to play in the execution.

Another function of support to the society can be characterised as Constabulary Use (Policing). Coast Guard functions are an example of that, where force is employed to enforce law, and a limited use of force can be necessary. A national example of this is the Norwegian and Danish Coast Guard, where all the state’s maritime resources are under naval command, indicating an ideal way of economising with limited resources.

Benign Use and Constabulary Use normally form the main part of international operations with naval forces as well, including humanitarian aid or implementing some regime established by international mandate. Normally, violence is only employed for self-defence or as a last resort.

On the other hand, naval peace operations can include every level of violence. One of the main advantages of naval forces is the flexibility to react with a suitable portion of violence, including everything from nuclear deterrence, to the just-mentioned policing.

Projection of interests includes the naval instruments in the state’s toolbox for demonstration of power. It includes all types of means from showing the flag, naval visits, preventive deployment, with a “gliding” transference to real power projection.

An illustrative example is “Gunboat Diplomacy”. The British diplomat James Cable describes this as: “...Gunboat diplomacy is the use of threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state....”

Another illustrative example is the phrase “Fleet in Being”. British Maritime Doctrine describes that as: “...A nation deprived of maritime superiority might choose to adopt a strategy of fleet in being. By avoiding confrontation with a superior enemy, a nation can preserve its own maritime forces while continuing to threaten those of the enemy. The risk of attack complicates the enemy’s choice of options. The threat from a fleet in being can prevent superior opposing forces from establishing their desired levels of sea control by diverting forces to other tasks, such as blockade or containment, and such is a method of sea denial. A fleet in being can compel the enemy to concentrate his forces in a valuable area, or around valuable units, cause him to route his passage to his disadvantage or to amend his operational plans....”

In a Baltic Republic perspective focus has to be kept on developing capacities within these functions. The most important areas are those of Benign and Constabulary, which are essential to strengthening the primary state functions.

**Power projection.** According to the picture this function can be divided into
two categories, Power Projection (from the sea), and Inverse Power Projection (towards the sea). The later variant, represented by the "Coastal Artillery" used to be relatively common, but has only survived in Nordic variants until now.

These variants are in my opinion now to be considered as obsolete, because technology and operational science have developed to the level of today. Great Britain abandoned the concept after the Second World War. The following type of arguments are typical: "...Coast defences did not present very much trouble; heavy air and naval bombardment disrupted communications and shook up crew to such an extent that their effectiveness was almost negligible..." 14

The parallel of the US took place a few years later: "...The technology of amphibious invasion, as it was demonstrated during WWII, had advanced to the point where large bodies of men and materiel could be landed under supporting air cover without the benefit of port facilities..." 15

The other function, real power projection, can vary in level from small-scale bombardment, via amphibious assaults of all varieties, to carrier-based strike operations.

From a Baltic Republic perspective, in my opinion, very little effort should be spent in this area. Establishing a Nordic style Coastal Artillery should be avoided, but a small scale establishment of a naval-infantry force can be considered, thus creating another tool for international cooperation (USMC, UK/NL Landing Force).

---

An Ideal Development of Baltic Seapower

What has been established so far, in my opinion is a good beginning. The biggest problem today (as in other countries of the region) is that there are too many authorities "in the game". The main military challenge in future will be to get the best mix of land, naval and air forces, as well as a functional balance between symmetric and asymmetric forces. As mentioned earlier in this article, this is a question of common interest to all states of this region. This requires further investigation, perhaps in a research-centre connected to the university and staff-college in Tartu?

In a post-Cold War context, it is important to economise the resources, that means a well-defined co-operation between civilian and military resources within the state. No duplication must be accepted. Possible solutions to be discussed further, regarding this burden sharing are:

- Coast-Guard functions to be established similar to the Norwegian example (Sea-borne border guard, surveillance, fishery-and environmental guard/protection under Naval Control)
- Naval control with all vessels operated by the different state-authorities (to be co-ordinated with the coast guard as firmly as possible.) That means for instance that the Navy may operate police- and customs vessels, but that of course representatives from police and customs have to be present in operations according to legislation
- The embryo established with BALTRON is in my opinion a good start for symmetric naval force development.
Naval platforms are expensive to build and sustain in service, one solution could be leasing ships from other countries. (There should for instance be some mine-countermeasure vessels available for that purpose in the near future.) In a little longer time perspective, a goal can be to participate in STANAVFORCHAN, or at least participate in western-structure training and exercise, for instance the British JMC\textsuperscript{16}. That will secure a development of skill and knowledge, which are necessary for co-operation, and getting effect from, for instance, coalition type reinforcements. Thresholds to be torn down are weaknesses in national legislation to get a combined force like BALTRON to function, but this problem is well known within all kinds of multinational force structures.

- Development of other types of symmetric platforms is in my opinion unnecessary. The reason for that is the earlier described development of the Baltic Sea as a medium for high-intensive naval warfare. One exception can be a limited establishment of Naval Infantry. This development can perfectly well start at platoon or company level, and can develop through closer contacts with the established Amphibious forces which are main contributions to both NATO and WEU reaction forces.

- With respect to the asymmetric force-development, an embryo of naval Special Forces can be established. A model for this structure can be the Swedish Amphibious Battalion, but on a smaller scale. Suitable armament may be the “Stridsbåt 90” vessels, and the RBS 17\textsuperscript{17} missile system. Forces like these can be closely linked to the National Guard structures, and can get important tasks, both in times of peace (according to the first “bullet”), Counter-Insurgency tasks in times of tension, and a strong asymmetric component in wartime.

Another idea can be to establish a related “Sea Home Guard” with civilian vessels, with the main effort of surveillance tasks in times of tension.


\textsuperscript{2} An ideal-type definition of the state is: “An organisation composed of numerous agencies led and co-ordinated by the state’s leadership (exclusive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.” Barry Buzan: \textit{People States and Fear – Second Edition}” Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 1991 page 57.

\textsuperscript{3} Developed from Gunnar Wieslander: \textit{Försvars utveckling – statsmakternas krav} in Tidskrift i Sjövänendet, 4/98, Stockholm 1998

\textsuperscript{4} “Home guard/National Guard” forces, which in this case was ”The Lotta-movement” and ”Hemskyddskåren”.

\textsuperscript{5} BALTic SEcurity Assistance Group


\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Maritime forces}, Forces whose primary purpose is to conduct military operations at and from the sea. The expression includes
warships and submarines, auxiliaries, Ships Taken Up From Trade, organic aircraft, fixed seabed installations, fixed shore installations (such as batteries) for the defence of seaways, shore based maritime aircraft and other shore based aircraft permanently assigned to maritime tasks. 7 BR 1806:The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, Directorate of Naval Staff Duties, London 1995, hereafter British Maritime Doctrine, page 223.

8 Quoted from para 0507, page 5-2,3 in Allied Joint Operations Doctrine AJP - 1 (A) , Brussels, September 1997. Hereafter: AJP-1 (A)

9 Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

10 AJP-1(A) page 5-1


12 British Maritime Doctrine page 34.


in the Chair (Discussing “Operation Overlord”).


16 “Joint Maritime Course”.

17 A Swedish derivate from the Rockwell “Hellfire MK 1” missile with a special “sea target” warhead.
The Dangers of Doctrine

By Richard Moller

From the Trojan Horse until the present, history is littered with examples of how military leaders, who broke free from the conventional wisdom of their time, triumphed over those who were bound by the limitations of their training and traditions; triumphed over those who troubled with the problem of indoctrination. This problem of indoctrination seems greater now than ever before because we have had staff schools developing and indoctrinating our officers in the “proper” doctrine for the past 232 years. Thus, the military’s evolution away from leadership and excellence began when the Marquis de Bourcet opened the first staff college in Grenoble in 1764.

Bourcet’s “...administrative school was far more than the first staff college. It was the first modern administrative school of any sort.” To be fair, this first staff school as well as the others that followed shortly afterwards were developed with the idea of creating a professional officer corps that would make the successful undertaking of war technically and materially possible. This, in theory, freed the commanders to fight the war.

Napoleon, however, changed all that. The lesson learned from the Napoleonic era, “...was the combination of professionalism with genius created dangerous men. Genius suddenly appeared to be the enemy of stability, even though the central justification for creating an army based upon the principles of reason was precisely to harness that genius in the service of the nation. Abruptly the authorities inverted the purpose of professionalism and used it as a structure designed to eliminate genius. That is, they removed professionalism’s very reason for existence - the creation of soldiers who can win - and reduced it to a talent for bureaucratic organization.”

Add to this the separation and subordination of military leaders to civil authority and it meant that the battles most important to the generals were no longer on the battlefield, but in the offices. Backroom victories became the only way for generals to increase their prestige or assure themselves of a civil service position after retirement. This meant that the civil staffs did not have any interest in encouraging the skills of the military staffs.

Guibert in his “General Essay on Tactics” best stated this: If by chance, there appears in a nation a good general, the politics of
the ministers and the intrigues of the bureaucrats will take care to keep him away from the soldiers in peacetime. They prefer entrusting their soldiers to mediocre men, who are incapable of training them, but rather are passive and docile before all of their whims and beneath all of their systems. Once war begins, only disaster can force them to turn back to the good general.3

This created a staff system with an evolution pattern that did not lead to greater professionalism but to a dangerously limiting form of bureaucratic logic. The staff schools developed a shared vocabulary among themselves and their students, and this vocabulary has had the effect of reinforcing errors by providing a collective means of action while eliminating both singular and collective questioning of the status quo. Thus, the "bureaucracy, safely repeating today what it did yesterday, rolls on as ineluctably as some vast computer, which once penetrated by error, duplicates it forever"4 - or, until the program is rewritten. These schools, like many of their civilian equivalents, have also developed defence systems to protect their - and their students' - reputations. Although, most have stopped short of revisionist history, many have actively encouraged the selective recording of history as it occurred.

The staff schools gave the technocrats the intellectual tools - shared method; shared, self-serving vocabulary; pre-digested arguments and the attitude of a person educated in a superior profession - to prove, even when surrounded by self-generated disaster, that they are right. The standard defence being that it was the circumstances that were at fault, not them or the system. It is not surprising that the military is so much more advanced in this culture than the rest of government or business. We have been training technocrats in our staff schools for almost a century longer than government administrators and 150 years longer than business.

A large part of what our staff schools have been teaching has come to be called Doctrine. Military doctrine serves a useful purpose in that it provides a framework for the initial education of neophyte military thinkers, but it may make it difficult to change our organization. After the initial introduction, doctrine hinders the building of an intellectually strong, powerful and creative officer corps. Although, as we have examined, this was intentional we must examine the current system and decide if it really operates in the best interests of our country, our subordinates, and ourselves. To do this, we may have to turn to people other than our current or past professional officer corps.

It will be very difficult for people born of, or adopted by, the system to reengineer themselves or the system, because they are products of this system. They will be likely to find it hard to break out of the use of the common method and vocabulary that has been inculcated in them from the day they joined. What Winston Churchill noted about buildings extends also to our staff schools and doctrine - "we first shape them, then they shape us."5 The elements that make up our doctrine are manifestations of past ideas, and they help the past ideas to quietly endure. Our rigid rank struc-
ture and steadfast determination to maintain it at all cost, and without exceptions, supports the idea that seniority is of primary importance and makes the length of one’s tenure visible. This abets the tendency of the chain of command to dismiss the opinions and ideas of “fresh blood” - this, even in an organization that has recently seen a more adaptive corporate culture as beneficial. The best way to reengineer the system is to find people who have a close familiarity with the system, but have not been subjugated by it, and by becoming aware of the Dangers of Doctrine.

The dangers of doctrine lie in the stifling effect it can have on the minds of our officers. Our officer corps - and our entire defence structure - should be focused on preparing combat capable, forward thinking, intellectually powerful, flexible and creative individuals not hindered by the traditions, doctrine, institutions, and educational norms of the past. But our doctrines, and the assumed requirement for them, are embedded in the organizational structure and activities that we are exposed to on a continuous basis, and this has made the underlying assumptions all but invisible.

The key to counteracting this tendency is to build the capacity of our officer corps to think creatively and independently. That is, to help them build a more powerful intellect. This process is twofold: First, you need to gain control of the raw material - that pinkish-gray matter inside your head on which so much of your life depends. Second, you need to widen your viewpoint to include all perspectives. In short, you need to stop seeing through your eyes alone and begin to see through universal eyes. The first will make you intellectually strong, the second, intellectually powerful.6

When Pope Alexander VI warned us about the dangers a Pope can encounter he gave us valuable advice to heed as we rise through the rank structure, “The most grievous danger for any Pope lies in the fact that encompassed as he is by flatterers, he never hears the truth about his own person, and ends by not wishing to hear it”. In order to know how to build a system to encourage the foundation of an environment that encourages intellectual power we need to have at least a cursory answer to that question.

---

**How Do We Learn?**

The structure of how we learn throughout our lives is outlined in the following steps:

*We wonder about something* and try to make sense of it. What we wonder about is related to our current goals or concerns (i.e. if we are confronted by a person with a pistol we may wonder about what they want).

*We find a stereotype* from our experiences that relates as closely as possible to what we are wondering about. From our stereotype we begin to construct a more realistic description or explanation of what we were wondering about.

*Ask questions and look for answers.* We then modify our stereotype by confirming the parts of it that turn out to be true and abandoning those parts, we find to be in error.
Develop a Knowledge Structure and fill in the blanks around it. We either find the answers from our questions, or make them up. That is, we start filling in the slots. This slot filling is critical to understanding as understanding means being able to predict what will happen next. The better we are able to predict what will go into the next slot the more we understand.

Remember past data and apply it to the current situation, thereby allowing us to make new generalizations. Hence, remembering past data is the basis of learning as it occurs when odd things happen that make us start wondering. We structure past data using pictures of our experiences as our own experiences are much more real than pictures we have tried to learn and as such have more impact on how we fill the slots in our knowledge structure.

Develop or alter scripts that combine our stereotypes and knowledge structures into sets of expectations. These scripts help us to structure our expectations and reach conclusions about how certain situations will develop.

Let us now take a closer look at how all this relates to our education by examining expectations, scripts, learning and remembering.

**Expectations, Scripts, Learning and Remembering**

We learn from expectation failure - that is, when the situation does not follow the script we thought it would follow, we start wondering about why not. But if these failures are not small and digestible, we go into script overload or script failure, and we will not be able to learn from them.

One way to avoid script failure is to develop a large number of scripts, hence increasing the probability that we will have one similar to the situation we face. Another is to cultivate a creative mind. Both a large number of scripts and a creative mind can be developed by exposing yourself to as many different types of situations as you can, but this takes time and dedication to do. In short, “You have to care about what you are going to learn in order to learn anything at all.”

The real challenge to the learning process is that we come to rely on situations where we know the script and often feel uncomfortable going into situations where we are not familiar with the new script. The ability to learn depends upon whether we are flexible enough to abandon scripts that are failing and acquire new ones in stead. This process becomes more difficult as one becomes more comfortable and dependent on current scripts. We may even ignore or skew information so that we can stay with the script we feel comfortable with - a situation, of which there are numerous examples in military history, with catastrophic results.

We do two things with the experiences that we gain. First, we store it as a memory. Our mind breaks it into segments that fit into existing, or newly created, generalizations or expectations (i.e. stereotypes, knowledge structures or scripts). Second, we compare it to other memories so as to expand our expectations. This gives us an index of our experiences so that when our expectations are not met in the future, we can re-evaluate, refine or correct our scripts.
From this we can see that if our experience does not cause us to change our generalizations we will not have learned anything and hence will have little chance of remembering the experience. Once again this leads us to the conclusion that, “to teach students, we need to teach about the cases that might violate their expectations. This is how learning naturally occurs.” If the script failure is too great, however, we find it too difficult to alter our scripts and we are more likely to simply ignore the facts that do not fit our scripts.

An example of massive script failure is *Operation Market-Garden*, which was Montgomery’s plan to capture and hold a bridgehead across the Rhine in northern Holland. From the start, it was a high-risk plan that, if it had paid off, might have shortened WWII by several months. It was a two-stage operation. First, a massive airborne drop on northern Holland timed to coincide with the invasion of southern Holland by land forces; second, the paratroops and glider-borne forces were to capture and hold the road bridge at Arnhem while the tanks raced across Holland to consolidate their gains. Success depended on:

- An absence of serious enemy resistance in the Arnhem area;
- The capture of the bridge before the Germans could blow it up or bring in reinforcements;
- Successive waves of airborne reinforcements to back up the initial drop; and
- The arrival at Arnhem of the tank Corps within 48 hours of the drop.

When information was received from the Dutch underground that two SS Panzer divisions had been moved to a position alongside the drop zone - information supported by British aerial photographs of German tanks in the Arnhem area - Montgomery described the reports as ridiculous and his staff were quick to jump on the band wagon.

When one of his intelligence officers showed him the aerial photographs of German armor, General Browning, at First British Airborne HQ, reported: “I wouldn’t trouble myself about these if I were you ... they’re probably not serviceable at any rate”. The intelligence officer was then visited by the Corps medical officer that suggested he should take some leave because he was obviously exhausted. At First Allied Army HQ the Chief Intelligence Officer, a British lieutenant colonel, decided there was no direct evidence that the Arnhem area contained “much more than the considerable flak defences already known to exist”. As Ryan puts it: “All down the Allied line of command the evaluation of intelligence on the Panzers in the Arnhem area was magnificently bungled”.

Finally, just in case there were any residual doubts, the intelligence staff of 2nd Army came up with the reassuring opinion that any German forces in the Arnhem area were “weak, demoralized, and likely to collapse entirely if confronted with a large airborne attack”.

*Operation Market-Garden* went ahead, and defeat was absolute and terrible. Short on everything but courage, the airborne troops held on until their number had dropped from 10,005 to less than a quarter of that. Total allied losses (in killed, wounded and missing) exceeded 17,000,
some 5,000 more than those who became casualties on D-Day.\textsuperscript{11}

This example of massive script failure also demonstrates why it is much more important for the military than for the civilian community around us to avoid such a situation. If an executive at The Bank of Canada has massive script failure, thousands of people may lose their life savings. If a military leader has massive script failure, thousands of people may lose their lives.

Now that we have seen how we learn and what can happen when we fail to learn, we will examine, which way we ought to teach.

\textbf{How Should We Teach?}

People who need to reason (and military officers are certainly in this category) are not very good at trying out new scripts. They reason from old scripts, specifically the doctrine they have spent their careers trying to memorize for the next test. “They reason, as the Harvard law and business schools will happily tell you, from cases. In order to reason from cases, you must have some to reason from”.\textsuperscript{17} However, we must ensure that each case is not looked at in isolation. That is, we must use cases to build up our library of scripts, not just to test the old ones. If the case study does not challenge the students to rewrite their scripts then there is no memory, and “in the absence of memory there is no long-term reflection on results. Instead, one moves rapidly to the next case. The interference of any ‘unprofessional’ outsider in the application of [the] system presents the only great danger, because he might insist upon the use of memory.”\textsuperscript{13}

During our search for better ways to teach we must remember that: “Education does not consist of discovering new methods useful in the arid transfusion of knowledge”.\textsuperscript{14} Teaching is much more than providing facts for people to memorize. To teach people, we must do at least two things: first, expose them to enough relevant expectation-conflicting experiences; and second, provide some guidance to maximize the outcome of these experiences. The proof that our students have learned from their experiences is that they have increased their store of scripts when they proved to be inadequate. Of course, such things are hard to measure, but as it is our job to manage violence and attain victory on the battlefield, surely a small problem like this should not be outside our grasp.

The more doctrinal our organization becomes the more we seem to rely on standardized test to decide who will be regarded as well qualified and promoted or posted. Instead of teaching the complexities of problem solving or inferring in other person’s goals and plans and thereby expand the creativity of our students, we teach doctrine and then test the students in order to compare a given student’s reaction with the examiner’s own reaction. We need to share the vision of Maria Montessori which she stated as: “My vision of the future is no longer of people taking exams and proceeding on that certification from the secondary school to the university, but of individuals passing from one stage of independence to a
higher, by means of their own activity, through their own effort of will, which constitutes the inner evolution of the individual.”

Since our expectations of how people will react are based on what plan we think they are working from, we need to expose our officers to as many different plans, and value and belief systems, as possible. Our recognition of the other person’s plan is predicated on our having seen it before. So the role of the teacher is to expose us to new experiences. We learn by doing, by trying things out, by formulating hypotheses and testing them. But we cannot do this in a vacuum. The teacher should be there to guide us to the right experiences and to answer our questions, or at least to listen to our questions and perhaps suggest ways that we could discover the answers ourselves. While we are teaching our people and exposing them to various scripts and cases we also need to increase their intellectual power and creativity. This will make script recognition and altering faster and make them more adaptable in situations that they encounter outside of the training system.

**Creative Brain Building**

When accepting that our goal is developing intellectual capacity and creativity, rather than knowledge acquisition, we can see that the actual content of our courses is not the issue at all. We should really try to impart the idea that one can deal with new areas of knowledge if one knows how to learn, how to find out about what is known, how to abandon old ideas when they are worn out, and how to predict what will develop in the future. This means teaching ways of developing good questions rather than memorizing known answers. It also means instilling in the individuals the feeling of responsibility towards their own development and the development of the organization.

The output from our training systems should be people who have improved their ability to understand and predict their opponents’ actions. So we need to start teaching the students how to find out about their opponents, their plans, values, and beliefs. By concentrating on teaching doctrine, or worse still, teaching to the exam, we force our students into the thought processes of the past and thereby limit their ability to conceive new ones in the future. By presenting our officers again and again throughout their careers with essentially the same enemy with the same weapons capabilities, we are wasting the opportunity to have them develop new generalizations about new enemies with new goals, values and plans. Couple with this the military’s “tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capabilities of [it’s] own side,” and we place ourselves in the position of intellectually crippling our officer corps.

If we teach our officers skills or knowledge, we have simply given them something to forget. But if we run programs that encourage them to learn the skills or knowledge required to overcome a problem we will have expanded their minds, and they will never go back to their original dimensions. “Previously established behaviour manifests itself in new situa-
tions in new yet orderly ways. Novel behaviour is truly new, but the particular novel behaviour that emerges in a new situation depends on the particular behaviours that were established previously - that is, on prior knowledge. Creativity, in short, is not something mystical; it's an extension of what you already know. To be more specific, new behaviours (or "ideas") emerge as old behaviours interact, and the process by which behaviours interact is orderly. So what we need to do is expose them to situations that they are never likely to encounter so as to expand their prior knowledge base.

Even a cursory look at scientific developments demonstrates that great breakthroughs usually come from people working outside the field, because they bring a new way of looking at the problem with them (see James Burk's series Connections, Connections and The day the Universe changed for a plentitude of examples).

Now let us look specifically at how we can stretch people's minds and increase their intellectual power. In their book, "Brain Building: In Just 12 Weeks", Marilyn Vos Savant and Leonore Fleischer outline ten areas that should be developed to increase your intellectual capacity and flexibility. The ten areas are:

- **Calculating.** Developing our capacity to calculate - or increasing our mathematical (as opposed to arithmetical) capacity - is the basis of problem solving and pattern recognition.

- **Logic.** One of the most common situations in everyday life is people hanging on tightly to what they "know" instead of opening their minds and letting in the fresh air of simple logic. This is a four step process defined as follows:

  1. Become aware of the problem,
  2. Define and analyze it,
  3. Approach it rationally from different angles, considering various options and working hypotheses for its solution, and
  4. Select a solution and verify its effectiveness.

- **Vocabulary.** Building a stronger vocabulary is important to allow clearer communication. With precision of language, thoughts gain clarity as well as ease of expression, and communication with others improves.

- **Insight and Intuition.** These are two different, but related, topics. Our intuition is the split second reasoning done by our sub-conscience brains that helps us to make the correct evaluations of many everyday situations. Insight is what happens after we have evaluated the situation that our intuition gave us an answer for and we discover why the situation happened and how we can improve dealing with it in the future.

- **Orientation.** Physical orientation entails awareness of your own position as compared to your surroundings. Mental orientation is more difficult. It requires attention to more than what your eyes can see. It requires orientation to phenomena such as days and dates. Intellectual orientation is a combination of these things producing Situational Orientation. With this kind of orientation, you are aware of both the seen and the unseen environment, which gives you the capacity to act with as much power as needed for the current situation.

- **Attention Span.** Before we can increase our intellectual horizons we must...
increase our attention span and expand the perceptions of our senses.

- Communication. Clarity of communication requires clarity of thought, concise vocabulary, and an ability to bring the two to work together in interactions with other people.

- Information and Memory. This is more than simply transferring data from the page to our brains. It is a process of gathering information, evaluating it, and storing that, which is of value.

- Comprehension. The act of comprehension means, quite literally, to take hold of something mentally. In this case, however, the idea itself is more important than the sum of its parts; it’s the big picture you’re going for, and the details can be sketched in later.

- Perspective. Perspective is what gives you a vantage point on the world as it is, not as you or others hope it will be. It is very closely tied in with objectivity. A strong sense of perspective allows you to mentally step back, step forward, or to one side to view the circumstances and assess the facts. Only a realistic perspective, or set of perspectives, will give your intellect the tools it needs to form correct judgments.

Increasing our capabilities in the above areas will increase our intellectual capacity. These areas will affect our convergent thinking. “Convergent thinking is measured by IQ tests, and it involves solving well-defined, rational problems that have one correct answer. Divergent thinking leads to no agreed-upon solution [i.e. results rather than process driven]. It [convergent thinking] involves fluency, or the ability to generate a great quantity of ideas; flexibility, or the ability to switch from one perspective to another; and originality in picking unusual associations of ideas. These are the dimensions of thinking that most creativity tests measure and that most workshops try to enhance.”20 In looking back through the history of conflict it is strikingly that the most successful military leaders were the ones who did the unexpected at a critical point of the battle. In developing more creative people we will be developing a defence structure more capable of dealing with future conflicts rather than one that continually prepares to fight the last war.

“Creative individuals are remarkable for their ability to adapt to almost any situation and to make do with whatever is at hand to reach their goals.”21 These are certainly the characteristics we need our officer corps to have.

Once we have accepted that building stronger, more creative intellects, is one of the main goals of our training and education system, we can see that relying on doctrine and bureaucratic systems can have a crippling effect on our efforts. At this point you may be starting to feel that the author has no use for doctrine and that it is viewed as some demonic presence that should be exorcised from the entire military culture. Be assured, this is not the case. Like all other things, doctrine has its purpose, and its negative influences occur only when it is used outside of these purposes.

---

What Purpose Does Doctrine Serve?

As stated above, the learning system will have to include some case studies to allow
people to create a plenitude of scripts to draw on. It makes sense then to expose them to their most likely opponents early in their career. This would mean that in courses dealing with introduction to the military arts our doctrine would serve a useful purpose. This introduction to military thinking is not limited to our officer corps.

Our political leaders have to have a foundation in military thought to be able to do their job, however most do not when they take office. It is incumbent on us, as military leaders, to ensure they understand the basics of what we do so that they will continue to provide us with the funding we need to continue achieving our missions. By having a simple, clear doctrine to work with we will be able to communicate with politicians and still allow ourselves the flexibility required to deal with situations that we did not, and cannot, predict.

Doctrine also provides us with a framework to conduct professional conversations with the militaries of other nations. This will not only help us understand them better, but also give us the opportunity to expand our capacity to recognize their assumptions, values, and goals in a practical application. The independent evaluation of the world situation that will be done will also allow us to exercise our capacity to see events from a different perspective.

In short, we should use doctrine for the first contact training of our people. This will provide them with a tool to use in their overall military education. The majority of the rest of the time they are in the training system - the rest of their careers - we should be encouraging the development of their intellectual power. Specifically, how this can be developed (and how the various exercises could be applied to the military training system) is a discussion far larger than could be handled in this paper. An important thing to note in this process, however, is that it will mean scrapping our current training systems. Therefore, the next chapter will deal with how we can take on this task.

How Do We Get There From Here?

That’s right, scrapping our current training systems. Mere amendment will not accomplish the goal of preparing combat-capable, forward thinking, intellectually powerful and flexible individuals not hindered by traditions, doctrine, institutions, and educational norms of the past. It is only by rebuilding the system from the foundation that we can start rebuilding ourselves. Currently, we have no place for this rebuilding to start. Unlike most other militaries there is no sponsored military publication for the open interchange of conflicting ideas. Without this open interchange of ideas among our people we, as an organization, will be unable to build a strong structure.

If we abandon the idea of achievement being easily measured, we can begin to talk about exciting people with open-ended problems, and we can begin to establish educational goals such as learning our officer corps to think independently (something at least tacitly discouraged in
the military.) As leaders and managers of change we must look to the future, not the past, when deciding our destiny. It is true that there are important lessons to be learned from history, however Samuel Coleridge was accurate in saying that if we could learn from history there are great lessons it could teach us, but passion and doctrine, “blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern on the stern which shines only on the waves behind us.”²²

There are many who will disagree with the need to change. We will hear people quoting catch phrases like, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, and “If it was good enough for (insert historic figure of your choice here) then its good enough for us.” While these phrases may sound realistic they will be mouthed by people who have been shaped by the system and hence may not be able to see the reality of the situation - they are in fact a few examples of those pre-digested arguments that we examined earlier, and until we challenge them we are destined to continue in the ever increasing downward spiral. We may need to remind them of the words of von Clausewitz, “This is the way the matter must be viewed, and it is to no purpose, it is even against one’s better interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance.”²³

The thought of having an officer corps that is filled with independent thinkers may strike fear in the hearts of many. There will be statements that the military cannot survive without obedience, and that we can’t have a system where every order that is given may be questioned. Our system, being built on loyalty rather than obedience will create individuals that will be striving towards the same goal (a strong, viable defence for our country) and will see the wisdom in following the chain of command. A more likely problem will be reining in the enthusiasm of our officers, rather than trying to get them motivated to action. It brings to mind the words of General Moshe Dayane, “It is better to struggle with a stallion when the problem is how to hold it back, than to urge on a bull which refuses to budge.”²⁴

---

**Endnotes**

² Saul, p. 193.
³ Comte de Guibert, Écrits Militaires 1772-1790, préface et notes du Général Ménard (Paris:Editions Copernic, 1976), p. 192. Às par hasard il s’élève dans une nation un bon général, la politique des ministres et les intrigues des courtisans ont soin de le tenir éloigné des troupes pendant la paix. On aime mieux confier ces troupes à des hommes médiocres, incapables de les former, mais passifs, dociles à toutes les volontés et à tous les systèmes... La guerre arrive, les malheurs seuls peuvent ramener le choix sur le général habile.

⁷ Tuchman, p. 85.

9 Schank, p. 250.


12 Schank, p. 138.

13 Saul, p. 121.


15 Montessori, p. xii.

16 Schank, p. 252.

Note that this is training *systems* not training *institutions*. Every person in the fleet should be as actively increasing their professional knowledge as the students in our schools. Captains should be as (if not more) involved in the training of their subordinates than commanders of fleet schools. One only has to look back as far as WWII to truly understand what an important role commanding officers play in the education of a navy. If they did their training job well a convoy would make it. If they did not, people died. Some of our captains may have lost some of that sense of urgency and responsibility that was so quickly gained when one saw a ship go down for the first time.


21 Csikszentmihalyi, p.36.

22 Tuchman, p. 383.


24 Dixon, p. 149.
Section V

Military History

This permanent section of the Baltic Defence Review nests writing and discussion on the military history of relevance to the Baltic Three.

The first article in this section by Colonel Friedhelm Klein, MA discusses the development of the Prusso-German general staff, the heritage of which is still very relevant to the concepts of the establishing and using of general staffs today. In this respect, it also heavily influences the doctrinal teaching at the Baltic Defence College.

On the 13th of January 1991, Russian military troops were inserted against the civilian population of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, to make sure that the Baltic States would remain inside the crumbling Soviet Union. Ten years later, the Baltic Defence College held an Occupation Memorial Seminar to commemorate these events and to honour the veterans from the struggle against the Soviet occupation. One of the presentations at this seminar was made by Mr. Trivimi Velliste, Vice Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Estonian Parliament, whose manuscript is now published as the second article in this section.
The Myth of the Prusso-German General Staff

By Colonel Friedhelm Klein M.A.

1. Introduction

A "properly instructed, theoretically and practically trained and practiced general staff has become in modern times an absolutely necessary requirement for the army of each and every Power."

This realization was made in a time of rapid change, almost 200 years ago. The Scharnhorst School of Reformers implemented it and thereby took a far reaching step towards modernization of the Prussian army even though the "almost meteoric rise" of the Prussian and later Prusso-German general staff did not come before the second half of the 19th century. The staff system developed turned out to be of great importance and is the foundation of most current army staff systems. Despite the collapses of 1918 and 1945, a "general staff myth" remains even today.

German and foreign authors occupying themselves with the Prusso-German general staff have usually concentrated mostly on the political history. They have analyzed the role of leading general staff officers and their relationship with politics and strategy at the time, their contribution to the phenomenon of Prusso-German militarism in the post-1870 German Empire, their rejection of the Weimar Republic, their entanglements with the crimes of the Nazis or their resistance against them. Serious study of the general staff itself, of the so-called Prusso-German general staff system, has for the most part been incidental. Therefore, in this article I will try to do justice to the importance of the Prusso-German general staff system and give an account of the historical developments that are the foundation, which armies are built on today.

2. Historical Development

2.1. From Frederick the Great to the Prussian Army Reforms

Prior to 1806, general staffs existed in several of the armies of the Holy Roman
Empire, e.g. in Austria, Bavaria and Prussia, which were the largest of the Empire's component states. I will be concentrating my remarks to developments in Prussia, though.

The first traces of "a general staff" can been seen in the army of Electoral Brandenburg. Thus, under King Frederick II, the Great, during the War of the Austrian Succession the general staff service of the Prussian army took on a new dimension. Until that time, army commanders were their own staff officers, from time to time seeking advice from those generals who happened to be present at headquarters and using their quartermaster general only for tactical or logistical tasks. But King Frederick II began to assign his adjutant generals not only the supervision of headquarters personnel but strategic and operational matters as well. As his closest advisors on what would later become general staff matters, the adjutant generals became the King's primary assistants in war and peacetime. Several of Frederick's writings deal with these matters, such as, for instance, his "General Principles of War - their Use for the Tactics and Discipline of Prussian Troops", written in 1748, or his "Thoughts and General Rules for War" written in 1755.

Under Frederick's successor, Frederick William II, the high command began to disintegrate. The terms "general staff" and "quartermaster-general staff" became synonymous, while at the same time the quartermaster general staff for the first time received a distinctive uniform and became a corps in its own right. In 1793, this staff consisted of 15 officers and 15 topographic engineers.

According to an instruction from the year 1800, the quartermaster general was responsible for the following tasks: surveying the army's campsite, reconnaissance routes of march, assigning units to their places in camp, scouting out positions, service support, reconnaissance enemy positions and, in battle, acting as aides to the commanding general. The officers of the quartermaster general staff were permitted to advise him when called upon to do so. Other duties included leading columns or detachments in battle, engineering duties during sieges when engineer officers were unavailable, directing field fortification works, intelligence work and espionage as well as keeping the war diary.

In 1801, Württemberg-born colonel Baron Christian von Massenbach wrote a memorandum called "Concerning a New Organization for the general staff", which he submitted to King Frederick William III in January 1802. He proposed the creation of a military committee to advise the King on all political-military matters and to conduct peacetime planning for possible war scenarios. Its members were to be the quartermaster general and his three lieutenant quartermaster generals. In addition, he recommended awarding the chief of the quartermaster general staff the right of direct access to the King. With the demand that a quartermaster general staff officer subordinate his individuality to the cause as a whole, he postulated qualities both of anonymity and self-sacrifice, which later would become hallmark general-staff officer values. It was almost the same terms Schlieffen used more than
one hundred years later in the time leading up to the First World War: “Work hard, stay inconspicuous, be more than you seem”.

The term “general staff” was already coming to replace that of “quartermaster-general staff” under von Massenbach. Even though his concepts had created the crucial institutional conditions for standardizing staff assistants, Prussia’s defeat against Napoleon in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 proved that the military leadership did not yet know how to use the command tool it had in its possession and thereby setting the stage for the rise of the general staff. Among those who experienced this was the chief of the quartermaster general staff to the Duke of Brunswick, colonel von Scharnhorst. He incorporated his observations into a plan for a new high command that was developed by a military organization commission set up after the Peace of Tilsit, with himself as chairman.

After Scharnhorst’s death in 1813, his fellow reformer, later Field Marshal Count August Neidhard von Gneisenau, was appointed quartermaster general. Gneisenau was the first of the “Great Chiefs” in the history of the Prusso-German general staff. His fame had its origins in the independent, bold and crucial decision, which made possible the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo on 18 June 1815. On the evening of 16 June, Blücher had lost the Battle of Ligny against Napoleon’s marshall Emmanuel de Grouchy. Blücher, the army commander, was temporarily incapacitated due to a fall from his horse. Gneisenau seized the initiative, ordering the beaten Prussian army to link up with the British commander-in-chief, Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, at Wavre, 17 miles north of Ligny. The Duke later called Gneisenau’s decision “the decisive moment of the century” because it gave him the forces he needed for victory over Napoleon. Gneisenau gained great prestige through his actions and through his outstanding abilities; charisma and luck. He was able to expand his role to become Blücher’s principal advisor in all planning and troop command issues. And his bold decision on 16 June 1815 can be said to be the moment when the Prusso-German general staff system was born.

Gneisenau allowed the general staff officers of German formations the right to communicate with him directly on all matters within their area of responsibility and when there were disagreements with their commanders - the general staff channel was born. From here on, general staff officers could bypass commanders and report directly to the chief of the general staff. This right, which continued to exist in peacetime, of course strengthened the position of general staff officers within the structure of the Prussian army.

As Blücher’s chief of staff, Gneisenau made the first use of elements of mission-based command. He introduced the method of issuing directives couched in general terms leaving room for subordinate commanders to exercise initiative and act independently within the framework of the mission. Later, Moltke elaborated Gneisenau’s concept. The method of indirect command using directives demanded a uniformly trained corps of gen-
eral staff officers acting according to well-established principles. Introducing this, Gneisenau laid down another cornerstone towards his goal.

2.2. The Development from 1815 to World War I

During the period between Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 and the appointment of major general count Helmuth von Moltke as chief of the general staff in 1857, the following milestone is of special interest: In 1821, the quartermaster general staff was renamed general staff and removed from the War Ministry. The chief of the general staff remained, however, still subordinate to the War Minister in matters of operational planning and command. But the removal of the general staff from the War Ministry was a first step towards the emancipation of the general staff as an independent organization alongside the Military Cabinet and the War Ministry.

Since 1817, 17 general staff officers had been serving in the Prussian War Ministry and six others at Prussian embassies. Each army corps had a chief of staff and two other general staff officers. The chief of the general staff was the immediate superior officer of all general staff officers of the Prussian army. General staff officers serving at the War Ministry belonged to the “great general staff”, general staff officers with troops (three at each corps, 1 for each division) made up as a whole the “troop general staff”. In 1821, general staff officers (GSOs) received distinctive insignia for their uniform, which have remained basically unchanged up to the present day.

After Napoleon’s defeat, general staff routines settled down in an atmosphere of political calm during the long decades of peace without excitement. Introduced under von Grolman, duty alternation between troops and the general staff provided a certain amount of variety, as did the introduction of staff rides as a part of the systematic general staff officer training under von Grolman’s successor, Müffling. The program of instruction at the War Academy, where future GSOs were trained, still did not show any signs of adaptation to the possibilities that the dawning industrial age were to offer in the fields of armament or transportation. Social and political problems remained untouched upon. The focus lay on formal disciplines; mathematics and geography dominated. The modern technique of war was not taught there, so it was not a coincidence that up until the 1860s the general staff had no influence on weapons or equipment. Indeed, the general staff hardly made notice of itself even during the army reforms of King Wilhelm I and War Minister Roon.

The general staff’s rise to be the Prussian army’s dominating military agency is synonymous with the naming of Helmuth von Moltke as chief of the general staff. During the 30 years he held office, Moltke not only decisively changed the status of the chief of staff, he also transformed the staff itself. According to the historian Hans Delbrück Moltke transformed the staff from “a kind of academic institute, headed by the most learned general” into an efficient instrument of com-
mand, which also became the commander-in-chief's primary body of advisors. Thus, under Moltke the general staff work and the development of the institution itself were reflecting strategic concepts that emphasized mobility, speed and precision. The general staff's new role cannot, however, be explained as Moltke's achievement. Particularly after 1866, it can be understood only in the context of the Prussian-German political situation, the warlike solution of "the German Question", and Germany's entry into the industrial age.

Moltke's understanding of the importance of new technologies, namely rifled weapons and, above all, the railroad for tactics and battlefield control first became apparent during operations to seize Jutland and Als in the German-Danish War of 1864. Moltke was appointed chief of staff at the request of Prince Friedrich Karl, who had been appointed commander-in-chief during the first armistice. His personal excellence soon brought him to the attention of King Wilhelm I, and on the initiative of War Minister Roon the chief of staff from that point forward attended all meetings of the Council of Ministers where general staff matters were discussed. His influence grew during the German War when a Cabinet Order of 2 June 1866 gave him the authority to issue orders independently with an information copy to the War Minister. For the first time in Prusso-German history, the chief of the general staff had become the de facto chief of the high command. The ultimate manifestation of the general staff's preeminent stature finally came with the decisive Battle of Königgrätz in 1866. This was the first implementation of Moltke's principle: "March separately, strike together." He based this on the realization of the difficulty of attacking frontally in the face of modern weaponry and the immobility of large amounts of troops. Success won for him the Order of the Black Eagle, which otherwise was only awarded to victorious commanders. This made it clear to his contemporaries that a chief of staff's contribution to achieving victory was equal to those of a commander. From that point onward, the position as chief of staff was unassailable.

Hereafter, Moltke fought the Franco-Prussian War in which he once again was practically the commander-in-chief, according to the same principles. The struggle with France had always had a prominent place in Moltke's thinking, and even after the Peace of Frankfurt of 1871 he still did not believe it to be over. And in spite of the fact that he had pleaded twice for preventative war, first in 1875 during the so-called "War in Sight Crisis" and again during the crisis of 1887/88, and despite his disagreements with Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian War over strategic issues, he always recognized the primacy of political leadership and subordinated himself to it. The fact that Moltke was able to achieve the supreme position among the highest military authorities for the general staff was due to his personal achievements and his great trust in Wilhelm I.

Moltke installed some basic maxims into the officers of the general staff, namely:
- the small degree to which military operations can be planned. Thus, plan-
ning must restrict itself to the initial engagement.
- the independence of command in war, which is manifested in the division between command and advice.
- the mission oriented command principle.

It was obvious that Moltke would give close attention to the training of general staff officers. The War Academy was subordinated directly to the chief of staff in 1872, becoming its preparatory school. The War Academy, trying to be open-minded, concentrated on mastering modern elements of war-making (such as railways, modern methods of communication, improved weapons). It's training, however, for a while remained stuck in the narrow bonds of subject-matter expertise. Nonetheless, it was here that the foundation was laid for the dispassionate, “a-political” general staff mindset, which later came to be decisive for its self-image.

The methods used by Moltke to lead the staff in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the procedures developed in the war along with the division of duties among the general staff officers became the model for the major unit headquarters of the German Army up to the First World War and long after. The decision-making process on the background of an assessment of the situation and the course of action upon which the commander has to decide personally, the preeminent position of the chief of staff, the issuing of orders with a maximum degree of freedom for the subordinate commanders to carry out their missions within the commander's intent as well as the attempt to control operations with the smallest possible staff are still basic maxims of staff work.

By 1883, the general staff was emancipated fully from the War Ministry. A Cabinet Order of 24 May 1883 placed the chief of staff alongside the War Ministry and the Military Cabinet. He formally received the right of direct access to the sovereign. Moltke himself had never personally sought this elevated status for the general staff. His successors showed a tendency up to the First World War to give up his self-restraint towards the political realm as well as the War Ministry and other Army institutions on questions of training, equipment and use of military manpower. This lead to friction, but also to a very fruitful cooperation between the general staff and the War Ministry raising the operational readiness of the ever-growing Imperial army.

General of Cavalry, count Georg von Waldersee, succeeded Moltke as chief of the general staff. Von Waldersee held office for only three years before he had to resign because of differences with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Lieutenant general count Alfred von Schlieffen was appointed as his successor. When he took up his duties on 7 February 1891 it was during a period of international insecurity, which forced him to subject his predecessors’ plans and concepts to a thorough revision and to rethink them in light of the new situation. Moreover, the growing size of the army and more modern equipment were posing problems for military leaders. Just mobilizing the masses would no longer be enough; they would have to be
equipped, kept in supply and placed according to one unified will. This meant that new techniques, command and control methods would have to be developed.

In general, one can say that Schlieffen’s opinions, thoughts and teachings despite variations in details all showed his obsession with the German Empire’s primary threat: a two-front war against France and Russia. His principle goal, therefore, was to prepare the German army for this potential risk and to train it for the difficult task posed by this scenario. This meant an overriding need for training a uniform method of operational thinking and action. If general staff and subordinate commanders were to act in accordance with the whole, they would have to be impelled as though by one common will.

Although Schlieffen’s preference was strategic and operational planning, he also involved himself much more than his predecessors in questions of tactic, equipment and technology. Thus, he among other things encouraged the introduction of field-gray uniforms and pressured for the expansion of the Germany railway net for military use. Against stubborn resistance by the field and foot artillery, he also managed to push through the creation of heavy artillery for the field army on the battlefield on equal footing with the field artillery. His voice was decisive in the introduction of quick-firing cannons. Also, he was responsible for the introduction of 1:200,000-scale maps printed in color. He showed great interest in the work of the two military history branches within the great general staff and he initiated the “Quarterly for Troop-Leading and Army Affairs”, which was intended to stimulate and encourage interest in all areas of military science. In his retirement, Schlieffen continued to occupy himself with military history studies and with operational issues. His counsel was much sought, and his influence remained great even after retiring.

Schlieffen’s successor, general of infantry Helmuth von Moltke, the field marshal’s nephew, together with the War Ministry continued up to the First World War to make the army ready. He created more modern training materials: most parts of the new infantry regulation of 1906 took account of modern weaponry. The principles of command using mission orders were revised with greater precision and rules for the employment of machine guns, which had been introduced in 1899, were included. The field artillery, foot artillery and cavalry arms received new field service regulations, and Moltke also issued new instructions for fortress warfare. In 1908, the field service regulation updated the techniques for communication between headquarters and troops.

The work of the two Moltkes and von Schlieffen established the important tradition among modern general staff officers that operational and tactical thinking must take into account technological developments. Otherwise, they might work in theory, but in reality turn out to be impractical and cost lives in combat. Also today, in the time of an information technology revolution, general and naval staff officers need to be able to understand the interdependence between operational and tactical issues and technological developments and be able to apply this knowl-
edge to the areas of military materiel and command.

2.3. From the First World War to the End of the Second World War

When studying the development of the Prusso-German general staff system in the time from World War I to the end of the Second World War, following development stands out: With the outbreak of World War I the peacetime general staff became the general staff of the field army within the army high command.

From the outset, the general staff was the most important department even though its original role merely was as one of several advisors to the Kaiser and executor of his commands. During the course of the war however, the general staff grew to be the most powerful instrument forming together with the other parts of the grand headquarters the so-called “Oberste Heeresleitung” or army high command. Under the second chief of the army high command from late 1914 to 1916, general of infantry Erich von Falkenhayn, the general staff began to intrude into other areas of government and increasingly began to dominate other government departments. Under the third chief taking office in 1916, field marshal Paul von Hindenburg, and his quartermaster general and deputy in all things, general of infantry Erich Ludendorff, the general staff came to dominate every sector of the state. The imperial chancellors of the war period lacked the power or the will to prevent this process.

Despite justifiable criticism on these perversions of the general staff system during the First World War, Schlieffen and Moltke’s training of the general staff in the years prior to 1914 proved its worth in the areas of operational and tactical command. During the revolutionary convulsions of autumn 1918, the general staff and the Prussian War Ministry remained the only organizations able to bring the field army back from the front and reestablish government control of Germany. On 9 November 1918 Friedrich Ebert, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of People’s Deputies, called on the general staff to repress Bolshevik forces and bring the army home. This alliance between Social Democrats led by Friedrich Ebert and the general staff resulted in that the prestige of the general staff for the most part remained intact despite the German defeat in World War I.

At the request of the victorious Allies and submitted to the terms of the Peace of Versailles, the great general staff was disbanded on 1 October 1919. The War Academy suffered the same fate. Troop general staffs were, however, still permitted. The new constitution granted the President of the Reich supreme command of the armed forces. Under him, a defense minister, who was responsible to Parliament, exercised command authority. Thus, the Defense Ministry exercised both supreme command and administrative authority over the German armed forces.

The troop office, now under general von Seeckt, continued the operational planning and command functions of the now-forbidden great general staff. Seeckt was chief of the troop office from 1919 to 1920 until he was appointed chief of
the army command. In both of these positions, Seekt undertook great efforts to preserve the general staff in the aftermath of defeat. For him, the main problem was providing a sufficient supply of qualified young general staff officers. This problem showed to be representative for the general staff in the period between 1919 and 1935.

After taking office, Seekt issued three directives to the general staff officer corps. He demanded that each and every one of the officers should serve Germany and act according to the best interest of the country no matter his personal feelings. Seekt wrote: "Forms change, the spirit remains. It is the spirit of mute, selfless duty fulfillment in the service of the Army. General staff officers have no names". Thus, he concentrated his expectations of the general staff officers of the reduced army in these few words.

For the troop office, the great general staff was not just a role model in spirit and purpose, but also regarding methods. Even though the troop office was not the dominating central military authority that the great general staff had been, the principles of the great general staff remained the foundation of the intensive training of general staff officers. By keeping the principle of alternation between staff and troop duty, general staff officers remained familiar with the practical aspects of troop leading as had been the case during the ruling of the Empire.

Lessons were drawn from war experience and they were applied and tested as thoroughly as possible considering the available resources. Particular emphasis was placed on maximum mobility, agility and synchronization of combat power. These were the only tools available in order to overcome treaty limitations on German armaments and thereby try to counter the heavily armed neighboring states. Prerequisite for reaching these goals were the understanding of tactical fundamentals and of the decision-making process as well as thorough training of leaders in all kinds of combat. Dispassionate assessment of the situation, alacrity and decisiveness in decision-making, the ability to give clear and concise orders and execute these precisely and correctly - these were basic rules for a general staff officer. Achievement of this goal was the reason behind staff rides of every kind, e.g. transportation-, supply-, organization-, railway-, air defense-, engineer- and command-post exercises as well as the major staff rides hosted annually by the chief of the army command and with the participation of his senior commanders, the chiefs of the troop office and other higher military bureaus as well senior general staff officers. There were also war games and map exercises where solutions to tactical and operational missions were demanded of junior GSOs and generals alike. Regulations regarding command fundamentals contained only general guidelines and were free of confining doctrines. Personal initiative was limited solely by the constraints of the limits set by the mission, and freedom of execution thus remained important fundamentals of general staff training. The preamble to the new field manual ""Troop Command"" issued in 1933 states: ""War is an art, a freely creative activity based on scientific principles."" The ideal of uniform-
From the very beginning of his work as army chief of staff, Beck had to deal with demands for “politically aware soldiers” from enthusiastic, Nazi-influenced officers. The later chief of the Wehrmacht staff, general of artillery Alfred Jodl, called for the abolishing of the general staff’s advisory function. Along with other high ranking officers, he held the opinion that in the modern “leader state”, the general staff should only be assigned the role of planning and peacetime training agency. It should not have status as an instrument of command in wartime. In war, the so-called “leader principles” would apply and the work of the general staff officer should be limited to assisting in preparing and executing operations. Any kind of independent thinking should be abolished.

On the 125th anniversary of the creation of Scharnhorst’s General School of War on 15 October 1935, the War Academy reopened. General Beck’s remarks summarized the academy’s role, which also is the role of the general staff itself:

“We need mentally disciplined officers who can follow the path of logical conclusion systematically, whose character and nerves are strong enough to do what their minds dictate. . .” And later: “I view the mental and spiritual training of our young leaders to think clearly and logically and to act decisively as the War Academy’s highest and most important task... It takes a clear head to separate the important from the unimportant, and from among the flood of new ideas and thoughts to form a dispassionate, detached opinion and a healthy faculty of imagination.”

In 1938, Beck resigned in protest over Hitler’s aggressive policy towards Czechoslovakia. He later figured as one of the leading figures in the revolt against the Dictator on 20 July 1944. Beck took his own life on the evening of the failed coup d’etat. In the long series of outstanding German general staff officers, he embodies the type of educated officer who obeyed his conscience and was willing to give his life in the revolt against Hitler for the sake of his country.

During the Second World War, Hitler gradually reduced the general staff’s responsibility. Because of a couple of accurate assessments that had proven true
against the views of the general staff, Hitler’s faith in his own military talents had grown to be boundless. Overwhelmed by his political successes and his initial major successive victories won by his wellequipped and well-trained Wehrmacht over a series of opponents, he lost all sense of scale. His views increasingly came to be colored by delusions, in which he lost himself in the end. Even in the beginning, Hitler had often made decisions against the advice of the general staff, but he became even more stubborn and inflexible as the war turned against him. He rarely could be brought to change his mind, and if it did happen it often happened too late. Tangled in a web of military necessity, political considerations and economic issues, to which were added questions of prestige and the enemy’s growing superiority, he no longer was able to make decisions competently or reasonably. His leadership exhausted itself more or less in order to avoid retreat. He fired three general staff chiefs who, because of the professional values of their old institution, were unwilling to accept his decisions. The irresponsible and, finally, monomaniac dictator was doing no more than playing for time. That the collapse did not come sooner, considering the inequality of the contest in terms of materiel and personnel was principally due to the achievements of higher and intermediate-level leaders, the valor of the soldiers and an overestimation of German powers of resistance.

3. Conclusion

In Control Commission Statute No. 34 of 20 August 1946, the victorious allies decreed the complete disbandment of the German Wehrmacht. This constituted a break without precedent in German military history. The Wehrmacht High Command (Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht – OKW) and the general staff were tried collectively before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg. This culminated in the plea to condemn both as “criminal organizations” as the prosecution found that “their tradition and existence constitute a permanent threat to world peace.” The OKW and general staff, however, were acquitted of the accusation of being criminal organizations. However, the acquittal cannot and must not be translated into a “general absolution” in view of the undeniable fact that from the very beginning and even more in wartime, the Nazi regime negated humanity and legality. Under these circumstances it is understandable that the universal condemnation of this unjust system also had to include the military and especially its military elite.

Ten years passed between the end of the Second World War and the creation of a new German armed force as an army in a liberal democracy, embedded in an alliance pledged to preserve a democratic set of values. A glance at the new military’s early history is enough to show that there was never any idea of recreating a national general staff along historical lines. The reason for this is quite simple. From the very beginning the complete integration of the Bundeswehr into the structure of the NATO alliance was a matter of implementing a stringent policy and
therefore there was no longer a need for the kind of planning or decision-making that the earlier general staff had provided. The training of qualified staff assistants, in other words general staff officers, for duties in the new German armed forces was a different matter. The Bundeswehr's first chief of staff, general Heusinger, developed very resolute concepts about this early on and these concepts flowed into the Bundeswehr staff college's self-image and training plans. But to go into this will require an article of its own.
Fulfillment of a Daydream: Estonia’s Path to Independence

By Trivimi Velliste

There will be a Lithuania but without Lithuanians!” This notorious claim was made by the long-standing leading Soviet ideologist M.A. Suslov. If that was in the minds of the Soviet Politburo members concerning Lithuania, which was the least russified of the three Soviet-occupied Baltic nations, then a similar goal must certainly have been in their minds concerning Latvia and Estonia.

Ten years ago in January 1991 I was sitting together with a Swedish consul Hakan Damm in the lobby of the Tallinn Palace Hotel watching the events of the Gulf War on the CNN. This war far away had offered the Kremlin an admirable Opportunity to take action in the Baltic capitals against the peaceful freedom movements. In mid-June 1940, the fall of Paris to Nazi-Germany had likewise allowed Stalin to move quickly into Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as provided by the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

By January 1991 glasnost and perestroika in the eyes of Moscow had progressed too far in the Baltic States. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, on the other hand, had become ever more impatient. Every preparatory step towards independence had been taken, but the primary object of their aspirations was still lacking – independence.

In the hotel lobby I received a phone call from the Prime Minister’s office inviting me to the Toompea Castle. Mr. Boris Yeltsin was expected to arrive on a surprise visit. Mr. Jüri Luik who was at that hour entertaining Western diplomats in the same building has later recalled that all of his guests refused to believe the Russian leader was only a few steps from them without their knowing anything about it.

But what then were the explanation and the purpose of Mr. Yeltsin’s visit to Estonia?

Mr. Arnold Rüütel and Mr. Edgar Savisaar, the Estonian leaders during the transition period, had visited Moscow the previous day signing bilateral agreements promoting mutual understanding of each
other's aspirations. However, it is beyond any doubt that Estonia's independence was not a primary, noble goal for Mr. Yeltsin. It was a marriage of convenience between him and the Baltic countries. Rocking Mr. Gorbachev's boat helped Mr. Yeltsin to further his own cause - progress towards the Kremlin.

This is why Yeltsin rushed into Tallinn publicly admonishing Russian soldiers to refrain from following any orders from the Kremlin if such orders were directed at shedding civilian blood. The events at the Vilnius TV tower fresh in the memory of all were too shocking. The mood in Riga and Tallinn was extremely pessimistic. To many it would appear that the independence of the three nations had been put off for several years if not for decades.

Mr. Andres Raid, a well-known Estonian TV reporter, interviewed me in the White Hall immediately after the prominent Russian guest had departed. His most striking question to me was "when will Estonia be independent?" My answer was, "By the end of this year at the latest." I still remember the smile or, perhaps, the grin of the reporter. The interview was broadcasted of course but no one paid attention.

What was the Estonian course to independence? Was it a clear and straightforward path? Yes and no. A year prior to Mr. Yeltsin's visit to Tallinn large numbers of Estonians were excessively busy with the final preparations for the election of the Congress of Estonia. There were two parallel ways to move towards independence. One was within the existing Soviet legal and political system, which had been gradually liberalized by Mr. Gorbachev and his administration. There was a growing degree of democracy developing as a result. That option could have lead to a break away from the Soviet Union as a result of "the will of the people".

However, there were many Estonians who questioned this: as a result of the will of which people? The will of whom would be to determine Estonia's future? That of all inhabitants of the Soviet-occupied Estonia, including the families of the Soviet armed forces, the KGB, the Moscow-introduced military industry and party apparatchiks? Were they scheduled to be among those determining the will of the Estonian people?

Or was it perhaps up to the legitimate citizens of the Republic of Estonia to decide their own future albeit their country was temporarily occupied by a neighbouring superpower? Occupied unlawfully at that. Estonians, both at home and in exile, were perfectly well aware that the forcible takeover in 1940 was in complete contradiction to international law and had therefore never been recognized by the vast majority of the world's democracies.

That being the case it was also self-evident that the 1938 Constitution of Estonia would still be legally binding, at least to the extent it could be implemented. At the beginning of 1989 there was a growing feeling that time was ripe to try to implement the Constitution in one very important sphere - expression of the will of the people in order to determine the future of the nation. The people in the
sense of the Constitution was obviously to be understood on the background of citizenship.

So, Estonia was faced with a dilemma whether to move on within the physically existing Soviet legal space or to revert to her own old legal system, which had never ceased to exist, but which was physically not so easily tangible. The former option seemed much more comfortable to many because, formally speaking, it was not “anti-Soviet” and therefore less likely to provoke physical counter measures. But the appalling side of the first option was that Estonia would become a breakaway republic of the Soviet Union, its successor state with all the legal consequences in every walk of life, including citizenship, territory of the country, property rights, etc. For five decades Estonians had refused to acknowledge and accept foreign occupations, including the Nazi rule from 1941 to 1944. How could they now, just before final victory, yield themselves to a legally improper and politically extremely dangerous compromise?

In April 1988 Mr. Savisaar launched a nationwide Popular Front movement in support of perestroika. At the same time a nationwide heritage protection movement that had been initiated more than a year before, took the banned blue-black-and-white flags out into the streets of Tartu. Whereas the mainstream of the Popular Front was cautiously looking for a compromise with Moscow, most people in the large Estonian Heritage Society but also in the Estonian National Independence Party as well as the Estonian Christian Union, argued in favour of the restitution of the pre-war statehood. The latter two were the first, newly born independent political parties in post-war Estonia.

On February 24, 1989 while the National Independence Day was for the first time in almost half a century freely celebrated in Estonia, I had the privilege and the honour, on behalf of the three organizations just mentioned, to solemnly proclaim the citizens committees movement with the aim of locally establishing committees to draw up lists of legitimate citizens of the Republic of Estonia. And thereafter elect a transitional representative body later named the Congress of Estonia.

Who was a legitimate citizen of the Republic of Estonia? The answer to that question was simple: everyone who had been an Estonian citizen on June 16, 1940 and all his or her legal descendants, i.e. in practical terms children and grandchildren and so on. Whereas everybody living in Estonia could vote in the pending election to the Supreme Soviet (renamed into the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia), only citizens could elect the Congress of Estonia.

There was a clash between the two legal approaches and between the two, potentially very different political solutions. The fight was bitter and the emotions ran very high. The stakes were high too. However, there was never violence amongst the Estonians. Nor was there any violence between the Estonians and the Russians.

One could say that the philosophy and the policy based on the principle of legal continuity of the Estonian statehood pre-
vailed. And go on to say that this philosophy and policy had also been cherished by the Estonian diplomats who had survived in the West as well as by the Estonian communities in exile, most notably in the U.S.A., Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia and elsewhere.

The election to the Congress of Estonia on February 24 1990 and during the following week had a huge turnout, which gave it a strong mandate. The new and "democratic" Supreme Soviet (Supreme Council) was elected a few weeks afterwards. A fair number of people decided to run for both bodies, many got elected in both. This helped to ease the unavoidable tension between the two.

Finally, during the coup in Moscow in August 1991, the two could merge. On August 20 the Supreme Council proclaimed the de facto independence. The de jure independence had always been there and so the representatives of the Supreme Council and the Congress decided to jointly elect the Constituent Assembly consisting of thirty members from each body.

The sole task of the Assembly was to draft a new Constitution based on the preceding Constitution from 1938. The citizens who had elected the Congress were scheduled likewise to approve the new Constitution in a popular ballot in June 1992. A few months later, in September, the citizens of Estonia under the new Constitution consequently elected the first post-war Estonian parliament, the seventh Riigikogu.

At the first session of the new Riigikogu, after I had read the declaration proclaiming termination of the transition to full independence, my colleague Jüri Adams, one of the fathers of the modern Estonian Constitution, said to me privately, "Only rarely do generations have the privilege of witnessing the fulfilment of their most sacred day-dreams."