

## ERC Advanced Grant

# Bordering Europe: Boundary Formation in European Integration

### Project outline

#### State-of-the-art and objectives

EUROBORD starts from the observation of a major gap between the political relevance of the European Union's for its current crises and transformations, on the one hand, and its theoretical and empirical neglect in theories of European integration, on the other. Whereas the configuration of the external boundaries of the EU and the control of cross-boundary transactions have arguably become major challenges of EU politics, theory-guided research on European integration fails to engage with external border-making systematically. This neglect severely hampers our understanding of the outcomes and dynamics of European integration. It is therefore the core objective of EUROBORD to develop and test a 'bordering theory' of European integration and to analyse the EU's boundary policies and their effects based on novel data and methods.

#### *The political relevance of external bordering*

European integration is undergoing a period of *political crisis and transformation*. When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, the EU finally appeared to have reached institutional consolidation. Yet the enduring global recession and mounting Greek balance-of-payment problem signalled the start of the Euro crisis. As soon as the Eurozone narrowly averted 'Grexit' in dramatic negotiations in July 2015, migration flows across the Aegean Sea spiralled out of control and brought the Schengen/Dublin free-movement and asylum regimes to the brink of collapse. Both the financial and migration crises gave a boost to Eurosceptic public opinion and parties. When the number of migrants reaching the shores of the EU had receded, the 'Brexit' referendum of June 2016 triggered the first exit of a member state as well as difficult negotiations on the UK's access to the EU market and the reach of EU rules. A few months later, the election of Donald Trump as US president spelt uncertainty about the future of the Western international order and transatlantic relationship, in which European integration is embedded. In the same period, autocratization in the EU's east and south, together with Russian and Turkish military assertiveness, has curbed the EU post-Cold War project of gradually integrating neighbouring countries. It has turned the European neighbourhood from the envisaged 'ring of friends' (former Commission President Romano Prodi) into a 'ring of fire'. The global Covid-19 pandemic accelerated and reinforced these geopolitical faults and the EU's internal disparities and tensions.

Evidently, all these developments have in one way or another originated outside the EU. Yet, only their interaction with the EU's boundary configuration turned them into challenges and crises of European integration. The EU has experienced a pervasive *debordering* – the rapid expansion and opening of its boundaries – in the post-Cold War period. The EU not only increased its membership from 12 to 28, but also cast a net of graded association arrangements over European non-members (Schimmelfennig 2003; 2016). Moreover, it not only removed internal boundaries by establishing the single market, a common currency and the Schengen free-travel zone, but also lowered external barriers to global trade and cross-border capital mobility. This debordering has moved European integration into contested spheres of influence (especially with Russia). It also increased the EU's exposure to external developments such as the US mortgage crisis and cross-border capital flows, which sparked the Eurozone crisis, and the repression and civil wars in Northern Africa and the Middle East, which triggered the migration crisis. And EU debordering weakened traditional competencies of the nation-state (such as physical border controls, capital controls or currency devaluation) without establishing supranational organizations with the capacity to compensate the loss of national control (Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter 2016; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014; Scipioni 2018; Trauner 2016). Finally, the exposure to globalization produced economic and cultural winners and losers; it thereby deepened a transnational, integration-demarcation cleavage in European politics and boosted the electoral fortunes of Eurosceptic parties (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006).

These crises and challenges have led to steps of *rebordering*: stagnation in EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies, the closure of borders in the migration and Corona crises, the strengthening of common control capacities in migration (such as Frontex) and defence policy (such as PESCO), and moves to protect the internal market against outsiders as different as China and the UK. This shift from debordering to rebordering has the potential of reconfiguring European integration substantially. Yet it is an open question whether the external challenges and their internal repercussions strengthen external borders or re-establish internal borders (or both). Different boundary reconfigurations will again put the EU on fundamentally different integration

trajectories. *It is the main research objective of EUROBORD to develop and test a bordering theory that explains how debordering and rebordering processes develop over time and across policies, and under which conditions they produce integration or disintegration.*

#### *The neglect of external bordering in European integration theory*

For all the political attention and contestation the external boundaries of the EU currently attract, it is remarkable how marginally they feature in general theories of European integration. The focus of these theories has always been on the opening up of *internal* boundaries between member states, the empowerment of supranational organizations to promote and enforce internal openness, and the internal dynamics of integration (see Hooghe and Marks 2019 and Schimmelfennig 2018a). External bordering (e.g. through external tariffs or asylum rules) is generally seen as a side effect of internal border removal (e.g., the creation of a customs union or a free-travel area) – not as a driver of or constraint on integration in its own right.

The major integration theories are (liberal) intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism. Exogenous, international factors still featured prominently in early *intergovernmentalist accounts* of European integration (Hoffmann 1966). Yet liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) focuses on the internal economic integration from the European Economic Community to monetary union. It assumes that integration preferences are rooted in the domestic interests of the member states, integration outcomes result from the intergovernmental bargaining of the member states, and supranational institutions are established to strengthen the commitment of member state governments in the face of domestic incentives of non-compliance. ‘Geopolitical ideas and interests’ – which include federalist ideology and power and security concerns among the member states – play a minor role (Moravcsik 1998: 28, 474).

*Neofunctionalism* sees domestic pluralism as a fertile ground for integration and attributes progress in integration to a variety of functional, political and institutional ‘spill-overs’ of earlier integration steps (Haas 1968). With the minor exception of ‘geographical spillover’ (Haas 1968: 314-317), these spillovers are internal to the integration process. Only when Haas speculated about the ‘obsolescence’ of integration theory did he bring up concerns about policy ‘externalization’ as an integration-undermining process (Haas 1976). In proposing a revised neofunctionalist framework, Niemann stipulates that ‘any framework seeking to theorize [...] integration should take account of exogenous pressures’ (Niemann 2006: 291). Finally, *postfunctionalism* focuses on the domestic politicization of European integration resulting from the removal of internal borders and the deepening of supranational integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Yet Hooghe and Marks regard ‘inadequate attention to geopolitics’ as an important lacunae of their theory (2009: 23).

This is not to say that EU research has ignored the external borders of the EU. Yet studies of specific border policies generally do not engage with integration theory. Nor do they connect with internal political developments in the EU and the dynamics of European integration. Rather, they examine the institutional development and effects in specific policy domains such as foreign and security policy (e.g., Jones 2007; Smith 2017), migration policy (e.g., Lavenex 2001; Zaun 2017) or energy policy (Goldthau and Sitter 2015). Studies of EU accession are a partial exception, as they engage with integration theory and dynamics (Schimmelfennig 2003) and internal political developments (Vachudova 2005). In sum, whereas integration theories mostly neglect the external borders, studies of individual border policies usually fail to embed their analysis in a larger theoretical argument about integration. EUROBORD therefore proposes a novel approach that puts borders and bordering front and centre in theorizing European integration.

#### *Beyond integration theory: border studies and state formation*

EUROBORD takes the classical – ‘modernization’ – literature on borders and state formation in Europe going back to Stein Rokkan (1973; 1974; Flora et al. 1999) as a conceptual and theoretical point of departure. Rokkan builds his analysis of the formation of the European nation-state on the mutual relationship between (external) bordering and (internal) structuring. To theorize the relationship, he starts from Albert Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice and loyalty as responses to decline in organizational performance. Put simply, ‘exit’ means leaving the organization, whereas ‘voice’ refers to expressing dissatisfaction within it. As the barriers to entry and exit, the prospects for the effective use of voice, and the loyalty of the membership increase, individuals shift their behaviour from exit to voice (Hirschman 1970: 34, 37, 93).

Rokkan (1974) applies Hirschman’s ideas to territorial social systems and sets himself the task to study ‘the strategies for differential control [of boundaries] and the consequences of such strategies for the configurations of political resources inside each territory’ (1974: 43). For one, he attributes variation in European state formation to the relative difficulty of military-administrative, economic and cultural bordering, which are in

turn affected by the ‘geopolitics of centre-building, the vitality of trade routes and the ethnic-linguistic conditions for the development of a distinct national culture’, respectively (Rokkan 1974: 47). In a second step, Rokkan assumes systematic interactions between the control of external boundaries and the development of the democratic welfare state (1974: 49).

Rokkan did not extend his analysis beyond the nation-state (except for a few cursory remarks). It took until the mid-2000s for others to apply it to European integration. Whereas Maurizio Ferrara’s ‘Boundaries of Welfare’ (2005) focuses on the effects of debordering on social policies, Stefano Bartolini’s ‘Restructuring Europe’ (2005) proposes a broad analysis of the political development of European states. Bartolini spells out the theoretical link between boundaries (exit) and structuring (voice) in significantly more detail than Rokkan. First, the capacity of the centre to control the external boundaries of a territory and lock in actors and resources strengthens in-group identity and behavioural conformity, on the one hand, and inter-group conflict, on the other. Second, closure reduces the options of societal actors to withdraw from public policies, increases pressures for social cooperation and secures the resources required for effective collective action. It facilitates internal learning and trust building, and it generates demand for the legitimation of and participation in political authority (Bartolini 2005: 40-47). Finally, effective boundary control and the concomitant reduction of exit opportunities set in motion a process of political structuring (strengthening ‘voice’) and political production (public goods provision). Conversely, open borders and the exit opportunities they create lead to political de-structuring and decline in political production (Bartolini 2005: 53). In the Rokkan-Bartolini analysis, the development of the European state is predicated on a progressive closure of territorial boundaries – and the positive effects that closure has had on political structuring and production. Bartolini claims that European integration partly reverses this development. It lowers or removes internal boundaries between EU member states, thereby strengthening exit at the expense of voice. Exit opportunities in turn weaken national democracies and welfare states without offering genuine compensation at the European level (Bartolini 2005: 242-245, 369-381).

This analysis speaks directly to the research objectives of this project. It provides a historically informed analysis of the interplay between boundaries and political development – and a theoretical account of the micro- and macro-level mechanisms that create this interplay. Integration theories stand to benefit strongly from engaging with theories of state formation and the Rokkanian approach in particular (Kelemen and McNamara 2017; Vollaard 2018). Yet it also has systematic limits. First, it retains a nation-state perspective. It takes the nation-state as its starting point and model, and is mostly interested in the effects of integration on the nation-state – rather than explaining the development of the EU. Relatedly, it mainly addresses internal rather than external EU boundaries. Whereas Bartolini emphasizes the parallel internal and external debordering as a core feature of European integration since the mid-1980s, the actual analysis focuses on the borders of the state rather than the borders of the EU. Moreover, Rokkan and Bartolini theorize the effects of bordering on political structuring and production, but neither the initial choice nor the subsequent changes of boundary formation – except for vague references to ‘the costs and the payoffs of the institution of barriers to transactions’ (Rokkan 1974: 44). Finally, Bartolini’s application of Rokkanian theory to European integration is mainly conceptual and theoretical and lacks original empirical data and analysis. Published in 2005, it also predates the EU’s crises.

EUROBORD elaborates Rokkan’s and Bartolini’s superb theoretical account of the effects of boundary formation on political development, which integration theory is lacking, and puts it to a comprehensive empirical analysis and test. In addition, EUROBORD complements and uses the main integration theories to account for the political process of boundary making, which is largely absent from Rokkan and Bartolini.

### *Towards a bordering theory of European integration*

In a sociological, systems-theoretical perspective, integration has two faces: the internal cohesiveness of the units and sub-systems of a system and the external demarcation of the system from its environment. Put in ‘bordering’ language, integration comprises both internal debordering and external rebordering. In this perspective, concepts and theories of European integration that focus exclusively on internal cohesiveness are incomplete by definition. A comprehensive analysis of European integration requires describing and explaining the development of both its internal and external boundaries – and their interaction. Moreover, if integration depends on the combination of internal *debordering* with external *rebordering*, the traditional linear concept of integration is too simple. Theories of European integration have generally focused on explaining ‘integration’ as the progressive deepening and widening of common institutions (Schimmelfennig 2018a). Even though scholars have recently started to consider ‘disintegration’ as well (Vollaard 2018; Webber 2018), the analysis remains one-dimensional between ‘more’ and ‘less’ integration. This is also true of the current

debate on the consequences of the EU's crises (e.g. Börzel et al 2018; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018; Jones et al. 2016; Schimmelfennig 2018b).

Table 1 *Bordering and European integration*

	<i>External rebordering</i>	<i>External debordering</i>
<i>Internal debordering</i>	(Effective) Integration	Dilutive integration
<i>Internal rebordering</i>	Defensive integration	Disintegration

The bordering theory therefore starts from a two-dimensional concept of integration yielding a four-fold typology of integration patterns and trajectories (Table 1).

- *(Effective) Integration* combines the debordering of internal boundaries and the rebordering of external boundaries. This process jointly realizes the two dimensions of successful integration.
- *Disintegration*, by contrast, results from resurrecting borders between member states and removing common borders towards the international environment. It approaches a traditional interstate system.
- *Dilutive integration* means internal and external debordering. While it strengthens the internal cohesiveness of member states, it fails to differentiate them from the international environment.
- *Defensive integration*, finally, combines internal and external rebordering. Member states strengthen joint barriers against the international environment, but also uphold or rebuild borders between themselves.

These types of integration – which can vary across time and policy areas – are the basic *explananda* of the bordering theory. It aims to explain how the performance and politicization effects of a given external boundary configuration reinforce or change a given trajectory of integration. However, uneven developments across the EU's functional boundaries (and their closure and control dimensions) as well as gradual changes within the four types, however, will require EUROBORD to develop sub-categories and continuous measures.

Fig. 1 *The Bordering Process*




Fig. 1 illustrates the bordering process stipulated by the bordering theory. The analysis starts with a given institutional boundary *configuration* that defines the location, closure and control of the boundary. Each boundary configuration generates or marks boundary *gaps* between the spaces on each side of the boundary, such as wealth, religious or political regime gaps. Together, the

boundary configuration and gaps enable and constrain *transactions* across boundaries. These transactions affect the performance of the EU and its member states. Negative *performance* – and the boundary configurations, gaps and transactions to which it is attributed – becomes a salient issue of political conflict. *Politicization* triggers boundary negotiations, which may result in the reconfiguration of the boundary. Cumulative boundary reconfigurations result in (effective, dilutive or defensive) integration or disintegration. The new boundary configuration starts another bordering process. Performance and politicization are the main intermediate outcomes of the bordering sequence. By contrast, boundary transactions and negotiations represent the main processes through which the boundary configuration affects performance, and politicization affects reconfiguration and integration.

The theory assumes a *scale-community dilemma* as the core driver of the bordering process. This dilemma or trade-off is discussed in various conceptual guises in the literature on international organizations, multilevel governance and globalization (e.g. Dahl 1994: 27-32; Dahl 1999: 21-22; Hooghe and Marks 2016: 7-19; Hooghe et al. 2019: 12-19; Rodrik 2011: 200-205; Zürn 1998: 237-245). ‘Scale’ stands for the benefits of debordering. Opening borders for economic and cultural exchange improves factor allocation and knowledge. It enhances individual freedoms – e.g. to travel, find (better-paid) employment or escape culturally or politically oppressive social conditions. Larger governance regimes internalize cross-border policy externalities and help produce collective goods at lower per capita costs (economies of scale). In addition, they facilitate exchange by bringing together a larger group of potential cooperation partners with diverse beliefs, preferences and capabilities. Finally, allowing boundaries to be incongruent (differentiated integration) increases efficiency by bringing together the optimal group of actors and finding the optimal level of closure and control for each individual policy problem.

On the other hand, open borders are likely to dilute the identity, solidarity, security and democratic self-rule of a community. While members of the community emigrate, foreigners with other mother tongues, values and cultural practices immigrate. The weakening bonds of identity may undermine the willingness of individuals to contribute to the public good and engage in social sharing. Solidarity suffers from exit opportunities such as tax evasion, capital flight or brain drain. Incongruent functional borders encourage boundary arbitrage and

cherry-picking behaviour. With regard to security, open and weakly controlled borders reduce the capacity of the community to protect itself against transnational organized crime, espionage, and military attacks, but also external political interference. This is one way, in which debordering weakens democracy. In addition, large and open units increase the distance and lengthen the chain of accountability between citizens and the authorities, and they increase the costs and reduce the opportunities for participation. Finally, weak collective identity and solidarity undermine the social foundations of democracy.

By contrast, higher and better-enforced barriers and congruent external boundaries reduce exit and entry opportunities and boundary arbitrage. Locking in actors and resources helps to preserve the cultural homogeneity and identity of the people living inside the territory, strengthen institutions of social sharing, protect the territory from outside threats to security – and thereby build the social foundations of democracy (Rokkan 1974: 49; Bartolini 2005: 36-53). Community protection, however, often comes at the price of curbing individual freedoms and of scale deficits, such as inefficient factor allocation and governance failure.

To formulate a set of initial hypotheses, let us assume that policy-makers design boundary configurations so that the balance of scale and community effects matches societal preferences. Major changes in the boundary gaps and transactions upset this scale-community equilibrium. The research designs for testing these hypotheses will be explicated in Section b.

*(1) Wider boundary gaps increase rebordering pressures. Narrower gaps increase debordering pressures.*

Boundary gaps – disparities between territories on each side of the border – affect the demand for and the kind of boundary transactions. For instance, large income gaps generate demand for economic migration; small cultural and political gaps facilitate friendly and frequent transactions. States adjust the closure and control of their borders to the perceived threats and opportunities of the boundary gap and the (anticipated) boundary transactions. Generally, the narrowing of boundary gaps facilitates debordering. They reduce perceived threats to community, increase opportunities of scale and provide for symmetrical transactions. As a peaceful and multilateralist club of wealthy liberal democracies, the EU is most likely to open its borders to states of the same type. Conversely, it is likely to close and control its borders with poor, autocratic, nationalist, aggressive and conflict-ridden states for lack of common values and interests, as well as opportunities to cooperate, and for fear of migration, interference and corruption.

*(2) Shocks to boundary transactions increase pressures to change the boundary configuration.*

Boundary transactions can also be subject to changes that are unrelated to differences and similarities of territories on both sides of the border. In particular, exogenous systemic shocks lead to major disruptions in the ‘normal’ quality and quantity of transactions, which underpin the existing boundary configuration. The global financial crisis, the Mediterranean refugee crisis and the Corona pandemic were such shocks causing desired transactions (such as foreign credit) to stop and undesired transactions (such as asylum requests and virus infections) to surge. Existing rules, competences and capacities of boundary closure and control, which face such shock-induced transaction changes and fail to provide expected scale benefits and prevent dreaded community deficits, worsen the boundary performance and produce demand for boundary reconfiguration. Whether pressures go in the direction of debordering or rebordering depends on the balance of negative scale and community effects of the transaction shock.

*(3) Community deficits generate boundary politicization. Scale deficits generate boundary depoliticization.*

Community and scale deficits likely have differential effects on the politicization of boundaries. Politicization consists in the growing public salience of boundaries, the polarization of opinions and preferences and the expansion of actors and audiences engaged in politics (De Wilde et al. 2016: 4). Community deficits – such as rising inequality, threats to national identity, or an increase in crime and military vulnerability – lead to the politicization of boundaries. Boundary issues come to define the main axes of political conflict and shape political coalitions. Both the economic (left-right) and the cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of politics are interpreted in terms of boundary openness (e.g. free trade and multiculturalism) vs. boundary closure (e.g., trade protectionism and burqa bans) – strengthening the ‘transnational’ (Hooghe and Marks 2018) ‘integration-demarcation’ (Kriesi et al. 2006) or ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian’ (Koopmans and Zürn 2019) political cleavage. Communitarians supporting closure and control form parties, enter into political alliances and coalitions, and gain political support and influence by mobilizing the economic, cultural and political losers of debordering. In the case of scale deficits, we may also see a process of boundary politicization, but with a rise in positions, frames and coalitions favouring openness and support for ‘cosmopolitan’ actors. More likely, however, scale deficits generate a depoliticized bordering process, based on a tacit understanding of boundaries as functional lines to be determined according to efficiency considerations, while political conflict and elections focus on non-boundary issues (Hellwig 2015).

*(4) The choice of internal vs. external bordering depends on relative costs.*

The higher the community deficits are (in relation to scale gains) and the stronger ‘communitarian’ political actors become, the more likely the trajectory of integration shifts towards rebordering. Whether boundary negotiations result in internal or external rebordering, however, depends on the procedural and substantive costs of these options. The same goes for internal vs. external debordering. The more difficult external boundary reconfiguration is to negotiate, the less effective it promises to be, and the more scale and community costs it produces relative to the internal solution, the more likely EU negotiators will agree on internal bordering. This calculation will differ depending on the issues and territories involved, leading to incoherent bordering dynamics. Overall, however, rebordering pressures are likely to produce external rather than internal rebordering. This is because the scale losses of rebordering are typically more pronounced for internal than for external closure: interdependencies between member states are usually higher than interdependencies between member and non-member states. For the same reason, pro-integration parties and governments are likely to support calls for external rebordering in order to safeguard internal debordering. Moreover, the EU-level institutional constraints for internal debordering are higher than for external debordering: EU treaty rules and the power of supranational organizations for securing the openness of internal boundaries are more robust than in the case of external boundaries. Additionally, internal debordering is likely to outpace external debordering. For one, the community losses of internal debordering are typically lower than for external debordering. In addition, EU actors can decide on internal debordering among themselves, whereas external debordering normally requires agreement with non-EU actors.

In contrast to existing theories of European integration, the bordering theory – in its still rudimentary form – has a systematic place for external boundary gaps and boundary transactions as drivers and triggers of institutional and political developments. Moreover, it explicitly theorizes the choice between internal and external re- and debordering rather than the binary options of integration and non-integration. It thereby expands both the available explanations and the conceivable outcomes of European integration, and thus the conceptual and theoretical tools that promise to provide a better understanding of the EU’s current crises, challenges and options as well as its long-term trajectory of integration.

*Objectives*

EUROBORD pursues the overall objective to develop and test a novel bordering theory of European integration, which assumes a dynamic relationship between the configuration of the EU’s boundaries and the institutional and political trajectory of the EU. To this end, EUROBORD generates a wealth of novel data(sets) on boundary configurations, transactions, performance and claims that will prove useful for a broad research community. It will also test and improve the use of natural-language processing tools for analysing legal text and political discourse. Whereas conceptual and theoretical innovation is the primary objective of EUROBORD, it thus also seeks to make a relevant empirical and methodological contribution. The overall objective breaks down into specific objectives corresponding to five work packages (WPs).

WP1 is dedicated to theory building. Starting from the basic assumptions, the general causal mechanism and the sample hypotheses presented above, it further specifies how and to what extent the boundary configuration produces scale and community effects, and how and to what extent scale and community deficits affect the structure and process of political conflict as well as negotiations and decisions on integration. For each link in the causal process, WP1 will take into account additional factors that modify the boundary configuration effects and the scale and community effects at the core of the theory.

Whereas the outlined bordering theory focuses on the aggregate dynamics of integration, WP1 will further develop propositions that relate to the ‘comparative statics’ of bordering. First, it will pay attention to the variation in the characteristics of functional boundaries, specific cross-border transactions and border territories. How do their effects differ? Second, it will theorize the effects of boundary incongruence. How does variation in location, closure and control of different functional boundaries affect transactions, performance and politicization? Which configurations are efficient? Third, how do internal and external boundaries interact? How do internal bordering processes relate to external bordering? And how do different internal and external boundary constellations affect the politics of bordering? Analyses of this kind also have the potential to generate policy-relevant knowledge.

The other WPs consist of the empirical research required to test and elaborate the bordering theory. WP2 maps the boundaries of the EU. It starts from a detailed conceptualization of boundaries and explores the use of NLP methods to analyse EU legal documents for a descriptive analysis. WP3 collects data on a variety of transactions across the boundaries of the EU and on the development of EU member states. Based on this data, it conducts panel analyses of the effects of the external boundary configuration on the direction, intensity and

balance of cross-border transactions and on the scale and community performance of the EU and its member states. WP4 describes and explains the politicization of external boundaries. It collects data on party positions and frames on boundary issues from parliamentary debates, again making use of NLP techniques. WP5 analyses the link between politicization and integration outcomes. In another set of panel analyses, it tests whether and to what extent the preference and conflict constellations on external boundary issues affect the reconfiguration of the EU's internal and external boundaries. In addition, it conducts case studies on the negotiation and renegotiation of the EU's external boundaries for several major EU border policies. The next section describes the empirical research in the work packages in more detail.

## Section b. Methodology


### WP2 Configuration

*Conceptualization.* WP2 conceptualizes the external boundaries of European integration, measures their configuration and traces their development. EUROBORD starts from a territorial, institutional, functional and relational concept of boundaries.

- (1) Boundaries are *territorial*: they are geographically localizable – but not necessarily physical or visible – and they separate territories.
- (2) Boundaries are *institutional*: they consist of a set of rules, made and implemented by organizations, which regulate behaviour at boundaries, and movements and exchanges across territories.
- (3) Boundaries are *functional*: they regulate different types of transactions differently, and the location of boundaries may vary between functions. Conventionally, the literature distinguishes economic, cultural, political and military boundaries in line with the respective functional subsystems of territorial social systems (Bartolini 2005: 13-20; Rokkan 1974). The economic boundary regulates the movement and exchange of goods, services, capital and labour, and the cultural boundary the flow of messages and ideas. The political boundary sets restrictions on legal competences and political rights to control the scope of authoritative decisions and political influence. The military boundary regulates the entry and exit of coercive agents (armies, police forces or criminals).
- (4) Finally, boundaries are *relational*: they not only separate but also relate territories and their characteristics to each other. Irrespective of the regulatory barriers their boundaries create, adjacent territories may be more or less similar, e.g. in culture or political regime. In other words, boundaries create boundary gaps.

How does EUROBORD map external boundaries and construct the boundary configuration dataset? The unit of analysis is the '*functional boundary dyad-year*'. As illustrated in the stylized map in Fig. 2, the EU has various boundaries that differ by function or sector (b1, b2). The location of each functional boundary is determined by the participation of states in individual EU policy regimes. Because of this differentiated integration, formal EU membership is not sufficient to delineate the EU's external boundaries. In the case of monetary policy, the relevant boundaries are those of the Eurozone, whereas the Schengen area of free travel includes EU non-member states (such as Norway and Switzerland).

Figure 2 Boundary Mapping



Each functional boundary creates a series of territorial dyads (AC, AD, BD, DE and EF for b1 and CF, DF and EF for b2 in Fig. 2). The default dyads in EUROBORD are states, as functional boundaries in European integration generally run along state borders. To capture change over time, the data for each boundary dyad is collected annually. The dataset covers roughly 45 years. It starts in 1980, a few years ahead of the end of the Cold War, the major period of reform in the EU and the breakthrough of globalization. And it runs until the end of the funding period. Correspondingly, the boundary configuration dataset is structured as shown in Table 2.

Each functional boundary dyad is identified by a unique identifier (ID) and has a set of variable institutional and relational properties. The institutional variables are closure and control. *Closure* determines how rigid the rules for boundary transactions (exits and entries) are; it varies between 'fully open' and 'fully closed'. *Control* refers to the (de iure) competence and the (de facto) capacity of the centre (the Union) to enforce these rules (cf. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014). Competence varies between 'exclusively national' and 'exclusively supranational', whereas capacity ranges from 'low' to 'high' depending on the budget, equipment and personnel allocated to boundary control. Closure and control are independent of each other in principle. Rigid border rules may be weakly enforced and vice versa. The relational variables refer to the similarity or difference in the state features relevant to the functional boundary in question, e.g. wealth, religion, political system or military capabilities –



resulting in narrow or wide ‘boundary gaps’ between the adjacent territories. Fine-grained measures for the variables will be developed at the start of the work package.

Table 2 Structure of Boundary Configuration Dataset

ID	function	insider	outsider	year	closure	control (competence)	control (capacity)	Relation
1 ... n	Specific economic, cultural, political and military policy regimes	state on inner side of the boundary	state on outer side of boundary	1980-2025	open-closed	national-supranational	low-high (budget, equipment, personnel)	narrow-wide gaps (several dimensions)

It is important to disaggregate the EU external border by dyadic sections because, for one, closure rules and control capacities differ between dyads of the same functional boundary. See, for instance, the varying border fortifications during the migration crisis or the patchwork of closures during the Corona pandemic. Moreover, boundary gaps and transactions vary between border sections. Finally, boundary politicization initially takes place at the national level. The variable values for each dyadic section of the functional boundaries can be aggregated to the EU level, of course, to describe the overall state and development of the EU’s boundary configuration. In some cases, the analysis needs to be extended beyond geographically adjacent ‘outsider’ territories. Examples are economic transactions with China or military transactions with the US – neither of which share a geographical border with the EU. EUROBORD will therefore include relations with relevant remote outsiders (above a certain threshold of transactions) in the boundary configuration dataset.

Moreover, the dataset provides information on the *congruence* of boundaries. Congruence captures the overlap of functional boundaries with regard to location, closure and control. Congruence is high if functional boundaries delimit the same territories, if they are equally open or closed, and if the centre possesses similar control competences and resources to police them. In order to obtain an aggregated measure of congruence, EUROBORD will develop a congruence index for the EU’s external boundaries.

*Data and measurement.* The EU defines its external boundaries legally through international treaties (primary European law), EU legal acts (secondary and tertiary European law) and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. The legal documents of the EU therefore contain most of the information necessary to map the boundary configuration of the EU. They provide data on the policy they refer to (function), the countries to which they pertain (location), their entry into force (year), the rules regulating cross-boundary transactions (closure) and the competences of states and supranational organizations in relation to the implementation and enforcement of these rules (control).

The PI and his team have gathered significant experience in coding EU legal documents for a project on differentiated EU integration (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020). For EUROBORD, we plan to move from manual coding to automated or, at least, semi-automated coding using NLP tools. Such automation would significantly reduce the resources needed to code a large body of law. EU legal documents have several features conducive to automated text classification. First, legal language is highly formalized and standardized. Second, EU legal documents come from a single institution and are available completely in English. Finally, the relevant EU documents can be accessed automatically at the EU law portal EUR-LEX (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>) and the underlying CELLAR, the EU’s common repository for metadata and content (Publications Office of the European Union 2018). Some important information such as function and year can be parsed easily from the metadata of legal documents.

For the other variables, EUROBORD plans to apply machine-learning tools. Earlier hand-coded datasets of the territorial reach of EU treaties and legislative acts (EUDIFF1 and EUDIFF2; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020) will serve to train, validate and test the machine-learning algorithms. Closure and control are also usually indicated by specific combinations of terms, e.g. describing the competencies of supranational organizations or the conditions for the entry of products and persons into the EU. We assume, however, that the text relevant for measuring closure and control will be less standardized than for the other variables so that searches based on exact word matches will not be sufficiently reliable. EUROBORD therefore plans to apply up-to-date NLP techniques based on ‘word embeddings’ or ‘neural networks’, which have recently been used for legal text (e.g., Ash and Chen 2019) and trained on legal corpora, including European law (Chalkidis and Kampas 2019). ‘Feed-forward networks’ in particular have been shown to improve text classification significantly (Goldberg 2017). Should these methods still prove too unreliable for the automatic mapping of the EU’s boundary configuration, they will at least greatly facilitate the identification and extraction of relevant parts of text for manual coding.

In addition to EU law, WP2 needs to analyse international treaties and the law of other international organizations (such as the World Trade Organization WTO) to map the external boundary. To the extent that



the EU is a party to such treaties, the relevant law will be included in the EU databases. Other relevant treaties can be found in the United Nations Treaty Collections (<https://treaties.un.org/>) or the International Treaties Collection (<http://www.worldlii.org/int/special/treaties/>). Moreover, the measurement of boundary control capacity requires non-legal data on the budget, the equipment and the personnel of EU and national boundary enforcement agencies, which can typically be found on their websites and in EU and national budget plans. Finally, the measurement of the gap between the states of a boundary dyad requires standard national data related to the functional domain of the boundary. For this task, WP2 will use secondary data that WP3 will collect to measure national performance. Finally, WP2 will visualize the boundary configuration in maps by feeding shape files with the data of the boundary configuration dataset. Shape files are openly available, for instance from GADM (<https://gadm.org/>) or Eurostat's GISCO (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/overview>). WP2 will develop visual features that will enable the users of the maps to grasp the location, closure, control and boundary gaps of the EU's external boundary at a glance.

### WP3 Performance

WP3 analyses the effects of external boundary configurations on boundary transactions and national 'scale' and 'community' performance. In a first step, it measures the intensity and balance of entries and exits for each functional boundary in order to test the influence of the boundary configuration and gap on boundary transactions. In a second step, it examines the consequences of these transactions, and major shocks to them, on a variety of scale and community indicators. The analysis is guided by the conjecture that boundary closure, control and congruence generate positive community but negative scale effects, whereas the opening of boundaries produce positive scale but negative community effects. It also examines how the size and type of transactions affects performance.

*Conceptualization.* WP3 collects data on cross-boundary transactions and a series of country-level indicators measuring potential scale and community effects. Table 3 provides an overview. In each functional domain (left column in Table 3), boundaries establish barriers to transactions between insider and outsider territories. Their closure, control and congruence with other boundaries, and the boundary gap between these territories, affect the intensity and direction of cross-boundary transactions. WP3 distinguishes entries (from the outsider to the insider territory) from exits (from the insider to the outsider territory) and, for both entries and exits, the movement of products (imports and exports) and persons (immigration and emigration). According to the functional domain, transactions concern the import and export of economic goods, cultural products, political support or military weapons – and immigration and emigration of workers and service providers, believers and teachers, political activists and legal advisors, soldiers and organized criminals.

Finally, WP3 analyses the effects of the boundary configuration and transactions. In the area of 'scale', WP3 collects and examines indicators of economic performance (such as wealth, growth or unemployment), individual freedoms and governance quality – which are often attributed to the larger scope of markets and organizations. In the area of 'community', the relevant measures are socioeconomic inequality, individuals' identity (sense of belonging) and trust (in institutions and people), and the quality of democracy, sovereignty and security of the state.

Table 3 Boundaries, transactions and effects

Boundary	Transactions		Effects	
	Between insiders and outsiders	From outsiders to insiders	From insiders to outsiders	Within insiders
Barriers to ...	Entries	Exits	Scale	Community
ECONOMIC - trade - investment - establishment	Imports/exports of goods, services and capital; labour immigration/emigration		Wealth Growth Unemployment Individual freedoms Governance quality Education Environmental protection	Inequality Cultural homogeneity Identity Trust Democracy Sovereignty Security Crime
CULTURAL - language - beliefs - practices	Imports/exports of media and cultural products; immigration/emigration of cultural practitioners			
POLITICAL - freedoms and rights - influence - authority	Imports/exports of political support and rules; immigration/emigration of political refugees, supporters and rule-makers			
MILITARY - assistance - deployment - violence	Imports/exports of armaments and financial assistance; 'immigration/emigration' of armed forces and criminals; fatalities			

*Data and measurement.* WP3 collects and analyses secondary data on boundary transactions and boundary effects. The wide scope of WP3 is feasible because most of the data required is available for all countries and long periods of time from international public sources: the World Bank (<https://data.worldbank.org/>) – in particular the World Development Indicators (WDI at <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/>) and World Governance Indicators (WGI at <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>) – and EUROSTAT (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/home>). Some of the data will have to be collected from specialized sources such as the International Institution of Strategic Studies (<https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance-plus>) and SIPRI (<https://www.sipri.org/databases>) for military and conflict data, or Eurobarometer as well as national and European social surveys for data on attitudes such as trust and identity. Some of the transactions data, however, especially on organized crime or political influences, will only be available sporadically and with questionable reliability.

Table 4 Structure of Boundary Transactions Dataset

ID	function	insider	outsider	year	import	export	immigration	emigration
					product measure for entry	product measure for exit	persons measure for entry	persons measure for exit

The boundary transactions dataset will follow the same structure as the boundary configurations dataset (WP2), i.e. it will be organized by boundary dyad years. For each functional boundary and each state dyad at the boundaries of the EU, it will contain an annual measure for imports and exports as well as immigration and emigration (see Table 4). Because the boundary transactions dataset uses the same unit of analysis and identifier as the boundary configuration dataset, it is easy to match the configuration and transaction data.

*Panel analysis.* To test the hypotheses about the effects of EU boundary configurations, WP3 will conduct a series of macro-quantitative panel analyses. Panel analyses benefit from the large cross-sectional (dyad or country) as well as time-series variation in the observational data to be collected. Fixed-effects (FE) panel regression analysis makes the best use of panel data for causal inference (Brüderl and Ludwig 2015) by focusing on the within-case variation over time and controlling for time-constant confounders. It offers the best chance for obtaining an unbiased estimate of the effect of changes in the boundary configuration on cross-boundary transactions and national performance.

A first set of panel studies analyse the *effect of (changes in) the external functional boundaries and the boundary gaps on (changes in) functional cross-boundary transactions* – both at the level of state dyads and at the EU level. These studies will show in which way the boundary configuration affects transactions across the EU's external boundaries, controlling for other influences on boundary transactions. A second set of panel studies examines the *effect of (changes in) the boundary configuration, boundary gaps and cross-boundary transactions on (changes in) scale and community performance* – in border countries, in other member states and in the EU as a whole. These analyses test to what extent the development of EU member states is affected by the EU's external boundaries.

#### WP4 Politicization

WP4 examines the effects of the performance of political systems on the politicization of boundary issues. It starts from the hypothesis that community deficits produce boundary politicization whereas scale deficits lead to boundary depoliticization. Correspondingly, WP4 will be concerned with the conceptualization, measurement and explanation of boundary politicization.

*Conceptualization.* WP4 studies politicization at the level of parties, the main political actors in European democracies. A widely shared definition of politicization (De Wilde 2011) is based on the three dimensions of salience, polarization and mobilization. *Salience* measures the political relevance of an issue, *polarization* the extent of conflict about the issue, and *mobilization* the scope of audiences and participants in the conflict. Because WP4 focuses on parties (only), however, it cannot analyse changes in types of audiences or participants. We will measure mobilization as voter support for parties politicizing the boundaries instead. In addition, the conceptualization includes not only the polarization, but also the position on and framing of boundary issues. The basic unit of analysis for the salience, positioning, framing and polarization dimensions of politicization is the 'boundary claim' – consisting of a statement expressing an actor's (negative or positive) position on a boundary issue (location, closure and control of an external EU boundary) and a frame to justify or motivate the position.

WP4 adds several dimensions of politicization that capture different features of boundary-related political structuring: issue and coalition alignment and intra-party and inter-party coherence (see Fig. 4 in B1). *Issue alignment* measures how much party positions on boundary issues align with the economic and cultural left-right axes. *Coalition alignment* refers to the extent to which parties with similar positions on boundary issues

enter into government coalitions. *Intra-party coherence* is the extent of agreement on boundary issues within individual parties, whereas *inter-party coherence* refers to agreement between parties in the same European party families and groups. For alignment and coherence, boundary claims are aggregated to the level of parties. Table 5 gives an overview of the dimensions of politicization and their operational definitions.

Table 5 Dimensions of Politicization

Dimension	Unit	Definition	Politicization	Depoliticization
Saliency	boundary claims	frequency	frequent	infrequent
Positioning		position	pro-rebordering	others
Framing		framing	community frames	scale frames
Polarization		distribution	divergent	convergent
Mobilization	parties	electoral support	pro-rebordering	others
Issue alignment		distance of boundary positions from economic and cultural positions	close	distant
Coalition alignment		distance of boundary claims between coalition partners	close	distant
Intra-party coherence		distribution of positions and frames among party claims	coherent	incoherent
Inter-party coherence		distribution of positions and frames among party families/groups	coherent	incoherent

In sum, bordering is being politicized if boundary claims become more frequent and conflictual and if they shift towards support for rebordering and the use of community frames (such as identity, security and sovereignty). Politicization also occurs if parties favouring rebordering obtain more electoral support, if parties' economic and cultural positions align with their boundary positions, if governing coalitions are formed by parties with similar boundary claims, and if boundary claims within the same party and party family or party group become more coherent.

*Data and measurement.* The most important existing data collections for party positions in Europe are the Manifesto Project Dataset, which is based on the coding of electoral party manifestoes (<https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets>) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (<https://www.chesdata.eu/>). The Manifesto Project covers the entire project period (1980-) and region and maps policy preferences extensively. It has a few items that relate at least vaguely to external boundaries ('military', 'internationalism', 'protectionism' and 'anti-imperialism'). The CHES has less coverage (fewer countries from 1999 only) but includes specific items for a few EU boundary policies (Turkish membership, asylum policy and foreign policy). Neither dataset captures positions on boundary issues in sufficient detail; nor do they measure framing at all. For these reasons, they will only be used for validation regarding the few boundary issues they cover and for measuring boundary issue alignment with economic left-right ('rile' in the Manifesto Project and LRECON in CHES) and cultural positions (GAL/TAN in the CHES dataset).

To gauge parties' positions on and framing of EU bordering, WP4 engages in an original analysis of party manifestoes, on the one hand, and records of parliamentary debates, on the other. The manifestoes corpus is available from the Manifesto Project website, and parliamentary records are generally digitized and accessible online from national websites. Both sources cover all EU member states and identify claims by party. Parliamentary debates have the additional advantage to refer to concrete legislative or ratification projects and are therefore more likely to be related to specific EU bordering issues.

Table 6 Structure of Boundary Claims Dataset

SETTING		ACTOR		ISSUE			POSITION	FRAMES
Date	Parliament/Election	Party	Country	Function	Location	Closure/control		

(setting) and the party and country of the manifesto or the parliamentary speaker (actor). In addition, the boundary dataset codes the (functional and spatial) boundary and the boundary features (closure and control) it refers to (issue), the (debordering vs. rebordering) position of the manifesto or speaker on the boundary issue, and the frame(s) they use. This data will allow us to measure the politicization of different types of functional borders and boundary gaps separately.

As in the case of legal documents (WP2), the project will apply and elaborate NLP techniques for analysing parliamentary records. In political science, interest in party positions has been at the origin of automated text analysis (Laver et al. 2003; Proksch and Slapin 2008). These early applications have focused on party manifestoes. Parliamentary records have become an important text corpus for the development and use of advanced NLP tools more recently – for instance, to identify policy topics (e.g. Quinn et al. 2010), sentiments (Rudkowsky et al. 2018), ideologies (Rheault and Cochrane 2019) and frames (e.g. Naderi and Hirst 2015).

Recent methodological contributions have moved away from traditional topic modelling and bags-of-words approaches to neural network architectures that EUROBORD also plans to employ. It is usually easy to parse context information on the setting and the actor (speaker) from the metadata of the website or the digital files. To some extent, the issue can be inferred from headlines or titles of debates, too. NLP can then be used to delineate individual claims, to identify the components of the issue with the help of topic classification tools, to code the position of the speaker using sentiment analysis and to detect frames around the issue position.

Apart from the Manifesto Project and CHES datasets, manually coded data from an ongoing project of the PI on parliamentary discourses on EU membership and enlargement is available for training, validating and testing the NLP analysis (Bélanger and Schimmelfennig 2020). If the NLP analysis proves successful, it is the ambition of EUROBORD to examine the politicization of a large number of national parliaments in the EU, representing different regions of Europe as well as border and non-border countries. The more that manual coding will be needed to produce reliable results, the more the analysis will be limited in time and space. At a minimum, however, WP4 will provide a full analysis of the European Parliament and studies of the parliaments of the largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK).


*Panel Analysis.* WP4 will conduct a series of descriptive analyses to map the politicization of boundary issues – by functional boundary, by location of the boundary, by party family, by country and over time. This analysis will provide a solid overview of the development and the structuring of boundary conflicts in the EU. WP4 will then go on to test the effect of performance on politicization. Because the performance measures use a country-year unit of analysis, the politicization data will also be aggregated to the country-year level. This data structure lends itself again to panel analysis. The quality of the panel analysis will depend on a sufficient number of member states and sufficient issue-specific detail on boundary positions. Whereas the analysis of party manifestoes will provide large country coverage, it will be weak on issue detail. Conversely, the data from the analysis of parliamentary debates might be less extensive but more detailed on boundary issues. The panel analysis will show whether, to what extent and under which conditions changes in the scale and community effects translate into the (de)politicization of boundaries.

#### WP5 Integration

WP5 studies the final step in the causal mechanism proposed by the bordering theory: the link between the politicization and renegotiation of boundaries. WP5 aims to explain the institutional outcomes of the bordering process: the debordering or rebordering of the external boundaries of the EU – together with or without a debordering or rebordering of the EU's internal boundaries. It starts from the general hypothesis that this outcome depends on the relative strength of community and scale problems, the constellation of preferences and power of political actors, and the institutional constraints of the negotiating and decision-making process.

*Analytical framework.* WP5 uses the standard analytical framework of European integration studies (Leuffen et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig 2018a) as illustrated in Fig. 3. It starts with the demand for integration (internal

Figure 3 Integration: Analytical Framework



and external re- or debordering) resulting from a process of preference formation. Demand triggers a negotiation and decision-making process. In this process, the supply-side conditions affect whether and how the demand for

integration will be met. The integration outcome depends on the constellation of bargaining power as well as supranational constraints (such as the competencies of supranational organizations), transnational constraints (such as market reactions) and domestic constraints (e.g. ratification by referendum).

*Panel Analysis.* WP5 tests the analytical framework and the hypotheses on bordering choice in another set of panel analyses. First, in the study of integration demand, it aims to explain the preferences of national governments as a function of national performance and national politicization. This study uses the performance and claims datasets of WP3 and WP4. The position of the national government can either be inferred from the claims of representatives of the national government made in parliament or from of a weighted average of the issue positions of the parties in government. The level of analysis for this study is the EU member state. Second, in the study of integration supply, the level of analysis shifts to the EU (boundary). This analysis draws again on the measures of national performance and politicization but aggregates them to EU-level measures of performance, politicization and preference constellation. In addition, the analysis includes measures of

bargaining power and institutional constraints (Jupille 2004; Thomson et al. 2006; König 2018). The main dependent variable is the boundary configuration (WP2).

*Case studies.* The main empirical research strategy for WP5 consists in a set of long-term process-tracing case studies of bordering policies. This is the standard method in research on European integration dynamics (Schimmelfennig 2015). The case studies make an important contribution to the overall research design of EUROBORD, which focuses on macro-quantitative (panel) analyses in WPs 2-4. Given the trade-offs, strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2011), the case studies help EUROBORD benefit from a multi-method design (e.g. Gerring 2017; Seawright 2016). First, multi-method research combines breadth and depth. Whereas the panel data analyses include many boundaries but analyse each link of the causal chain from configuration to integration separately, the case studies focus on a single or a few functional boundaries but follow policy development through the entire causal chain. Second, case studies help to validate the findings of the panel studies by checking the measurements, retracing the general relationships and uncovering omitted and confounding actors and factors.

In line with multi-method design, the final case selection will depend on the initial results of the descriptive analysis of the boundary configuration and the panel analyses. They aim is to contrast case with variation in the main explanatory factors as well as typical and deviant cases of bordering. In addition, the selection aims to represent policies that are substantively important, differ in functional domain, and have faced external crises and challenges. The following selection should be taken as indicative and preliminary. In the course of the project, the cases will be more precisely and narrowly defined.

- In the economic domain, EUROBORD will study the EU's *external commercial policy*, which regulates access of goods, capital and services to the EU's internal market. Whereas the EU has pursued a policy of gradual internal debordering in this policy area, external bordering varies depending on the non-member state and over time. In fact, some EU non-members participate fully in the internal market (the European Economic Area EEA), whereas trade relations with others range from a customs union (Turkey) via 'deep and comprehensive' free trade (e.g. Ukraine) to non-preferential trade (Belarus). Moreover, the EU is embedded in the global trade regime, which expanded and liberalized in the 1990s but has been stagnating and deteriorating since. Commercial policy is an area of high control with EU exclusive competence and significant delegation to the European Commission. This domain has experienced change from the 'hyper-globalization' of the 1990s to the rise of protectionism in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the challenge of China's rising economic power. In addition, Brexit has triggered negotiations on the reconfiguration of the EU's economic boundaries.
- The case study on the *promotion and defence of 'EU values'* straddles the cultural and political domains. The EU defines itself as a community of liberal values, which are not only cultural beliefs but also influence political authority. The EU uses a variety of tools to project these values beyond its borders, e.g. through human rights clauses in agreements with third countries and financial support for civil society and institutional reforms. By contrast, the EU has traditionally done little to regulate cultural entries. Recently, however, it has stepped up its efforts to counter 'disinformation' and increased the respective budget of the European External Action Service. In contrast to commercial policy, however, central competencies and capacities have remained weak. This policy has been affected by the alternation of regional democratization and autocratization waves and the rule-of-law crisis in the EU.
- The case study on *EU migration policy* covers the political and economic domains. Whereas migration policy regulates both the entry and the exit of persons, the EU focus is on barriers to entry. In the political domain, migration policy concerns the rights and freedoms of non-citizens to enter EU territory as visitors or refugees; and as employees or entrepreneurs in the economic domain. In the project period, the EU has established the Schengen free-travel area together with rules for a common asylum, immigration and visa policy, and it has negotiated a variety of travel and refugee regimes with outsider countries. This case study will cover the shift from post-Cold War debordering to the effects of the migration crisis.
- Finally, in the military domain, EUROBORD will study *EU military cooperation*. As in migration policy, the EU has gradually developed a common boundary policy in the military domain since the 1980s. Military cooperation has developed in the framework of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. It ranges from joint peacekeeping missions outside the EU's borders to the development of joint military capabilities among member state armies. This case study will examine developments from the end of the East-West conflict to the recent geopolitical changes in the EU's relationship with the US and Russia.

In all of these domains, the EU has recently faced rebordering pressures, but could respond or could have responded to these pressures with effective or defensive integration or disintegration. Why and how challenges and crises result in either of these bordering options is a major research question for all the case studies. The



case studies consist in a mix of congruence and process-tracing analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2019; Bennett and Checkel 2015, Blatter and Haverland 2012). The congruence analysis checks whether the case-specific boundary, performance and politicization conditions and integration outcomes match with the theoretical expectations of the bordering theory and the empirical findings of the quantitative analysis. The process-tracing analysis follows the causal mechanism linking these conditions and outcomes. Each case study will examine the preference-formation, negotiation and feedback processes in its functional domain. For the preference-formation process, the case studies will start from the external boundary transactions and their effects on national performance, which create demand for debordering and rebordering, and then analyse the competitive political process of determining governmental preferences. The analysis of the negotiation process focuses on EU-level intergovernmental negotiations and decision-making (subject to domestic ratification and supranational institutional constraints). In addition to the data of WPs 2-4, the case studies will use additional data sources, in particular media reports, official documents and interviews on the negotiation processes.

### Conclusions

Global crises, geopolitical shifts and neighbourhood threats have moved the external borders of the EU into the limelight. It is becoming clear that European integration is shaped considerably by outside challenges, their internal repercussions and the EU's boundary policies. Yet integration theories have largely ignored external boundary configurations and their effects in their explanations of political and institutional integration developments. Taking inspiration from, but also pushing beyond border studies and the Rokkanian analysis of state formation, EUROBORD develops and tests a bordering theory of integration. It aims to explain how boundary configurations affect gaps and transactions at the EU's borders; how developments at the external boundaries influence the performance and politics of member states; and how the politicization and negotiation of boundary shape the trajectory of European integration. To this end, EUROBORD will collect novel data, in part benefiting from recent advances in NLP techniques, and conduct comprehensive mixed-methods (panel data and case study) empirical analyses. It provides the academic and policy-making communities with new datasets, original maps of European boundaries, an innovative historical account of integration in the post-Cold War globalization period, and empirical evidence on the effects of boundary formation on integration. A website will give access to the data and maps.

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