Essay on Development Policy

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF PEACEBUILDING FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

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In the last two decades, an increasing number of development actors have been involved in peacebuilding activities. This paper focuses on some critical issues as regards this engagement. Firstly, it highlights the concept of liberal peace and its influence on parts of the peacebuilding activities of the international peacebuilding actors. Secondly, it discusses that recent research had pointed out that development cooperation actors were mainly focusing on not relevant peacebuilding activities. Thirdly, peace and conflict assessment tools try to evaluate peacebuilding activities of development cooperation, but they are still under-theorised in terms of an understanding of peace. The paper argues that development cooperation actors have to be aware of these shortcomings and that additional normative critical peace research is needed. Further, actors need to work more on locally adapted and well-directed strategies that are based on a solid understanding of peace and peacebuilding. In addition, efforts to evaluate peacebuilding activities as regards their impact on peace must be improved.

INTRODUCTION

Armed conflicts are a serious obstacle to development. They severely hamper civilians’ livelihoods and set back development activities in affected regions for many years. After the end of the Cold War the number of inner-state conflicts worldwide increased dramatically.¹ Some researchers perceived it as the start of a new era of so-called ‘new wars’ that would have substituted the Trinitarian wars, as described by von Clausewitz.² None-state actors as warring party and asymmetrical warfare was defined as a feature of these ‘new wars’. Civilians were to be even more the target of violence in such conflicts.³

¹ See Harbom and Wallensteen (2007). It has to be noted that after 2000, the number of conflicts decreased to a level similar to the end of the 1970s.


³ However, critics argued that there were no ‘new wars’ as the features mentioned could have been observed in earlier wars as well, even during the Cold War in low-intensity conflicts.
In the mid-1990s there was an increase of peacebuilding activities that was accompanied by an international debate on how to react on the new challenges of managing inter-state armed conflicts (Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 16). In 1992, the UN “Agenda for Peace” proposed a framework to manage international conflicts. In particular, it propagated preventive diplomacy and military peacekeeping. In addition, it introduced post-conflict peacebuilding as an international policy goal that aimed “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

Development actors became involved in peacebuilding in the early 1990s as they started to take over new tasks in response to the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding (Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 17). Since mid-1990s, bilateral donors, multilateral institutions and NGOs have integrated a wide range of peacebuilding activities into their policies and programmes. This evolution gave way to a rapidly increasing of peacebuilding projects, budgets and staff within foreign ministries and development agencies. In the last decade, peacebuilding had experienced a professionalizing as peacebuilding experts

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4 Following the definition of Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), the term peacebuilding in this essay shall describe a long-term process covering all activities with the overall objective to prevent violent outbreaks of conflicts or to transform armed conflicts into sustainable constructive peaceful ways of managing conflict.
and conflict analysts were recruited to manage numerous projects devised to promote peace in conflict areas worldwide (Goetschel/Hagmann 2009: 56).

This essay aims to reflect about limits and challenges for peacebuilding interventions of development cooperation. However, in the framework of this paper it is not possible to discuss the whole range of challenges and limits at full length. Instead, the essay focuses on three major challenges of peacebuilding: The theoretical and normative basis, the practice and the evaluation. In a first step, some thoughts shall be made about the difficult interpretation of peacebuilding. Afterwards, the question which actor on which level can carry out successful and effective peacebuilding shall be discussed. The evaluation of peacebuilding shall be a further point of this essay. The findings will be discussed in the conclusion and some recommendations will be suggested.

THE DIFFICULT INTERPRETATION OF PEACEBUILDING – THE CONCEPT OF LIBERAL PEACE

Few peacebuilding programmes actually define what they mean by peace. The most basic definition is negative peace which means the absence of large scale violence. Therefore peacebuilding would mainly be the prevention of violence or the resuming of violence immediately after wars or armed conflicts. According to this definition peacebuilding ends when a post-conflict country is perceived by the international community to be able to ensure a minimum security to its citizens as well as establishing working democratic structures, generally understood as national governments legitimized through internationally observed and recognized elections (Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 15).

Positive peace is a much broader term and much more difficult to define. It doesn’t allow a clear definition of the end of peacebuilding because it includes a range of activities and outcomes as trauma healing, poverty reduction and democratization. Current peacebuilding projects of development actors are covering several of these areas with their activities. This gives evidence that the implementing actors perceive peace as more than just negative peace. However, a review of peacebuilding documents and conflict analysis guidelines of governments and NGOs revealed the surprising fact that many do not define peace but rather conceptualize it by tautological terms (Goetschel/Hagmann 2009: 61).

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5 See among others Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (2003), German Development Service (DED) and Department for International Development (DFID) (b).
This leads to the question on how peacebuilding is being interpreted by peacebuilding actors. In the early 1990s, for instance, development actors claimed that poverty reduction, and therefore almost all development activities would contribute to long-term peacebuilding (Paffenholz/Struck 2006: 18). By the end of the 1990s it became evident that poverty reduction alone does not automatically lead to more peaceful societies.

In the end of the 18th century, the philosopher Immanuel Kant had propagated the idea of democratic republics, equivalent to a modern democracy, as being ‘naturally’ peaceful states. Because citizens of such a democratic state would have to bear all consequences of their own decisions they would rather decide not to wage war against another state (Kant 1795). It seems as if this idea has been partly taken up by modern interpretations of peacebuilding. Many donor agencies nowadays hold the view that conflict is caused by poverty, economic inequality, ethnic discrimination or – as Kant argued – the lack of democracy (Goetschel/Hagmann 2009: 62). According to them, good governance is fundamental for peace. Concepts of good governance in international cooperation mainly base on models of liberal democracy and free markets. An increasing number of researchers have expressed their concern about the general belief of a nexus between liberal democracy and peace. This liberal peace is roughly to be understood as peace promoted not only by liberal political democracy but also fostered by a liberal economy. According to Duffield (2001, 2007), the Western world sees underdevelopment as a source of international insecurity. The fragility of underdeveloped regions could also affect the developed world.

Development would reduce poverty and hence the risk of future instability. Therefore it would also improve international security. Duffield argued that this ‘enlightened self interest’ had lead the West “to protect and better the lives of people living in ineffective states” (Duffield 2007:2).

The chosen measures to foster international security would be regulatory mechanisms of global governance of liberal peace. They would be carried out through interventionist management of those

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6 See e.g. SDC (2003), OECD (2001), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

7 See e.g. DFID (2007), Australian Government’s Overseas Aid Program (AusAID) (2000).


9 In particular, after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, the spill over risk of insecurity from fragile developing countries was considered as a substantial threat for the Western world. However, it was not assumed that underdevelopment, respectively poverty would cause terrorism, but it would lead to exclusion and alienation which could be exploited by terrorist organizations for public support or even recruitment (Duffield 2007).
deemed at risk. In Duffield’s opinion, human insecurity discourse is trying to globalise regional security problems by propagating the responsibilities of the West to intervene and manage insecurity. In parallel, this discourse would aim to contain the risks of instability through a focus on non-material development, i.e. the promotion of liberal peace. In the view of different authors, international NGOs and governmental agencies would rather uncritically approve democratic peace theory fully or partly by means of the adoption of good governance, market liberalisation or civil society promotion as universal recipes for peace.\(^\text{10}\)

The incorporation of these conceptually vague, but politically powerful assumptions about peace can be perceived as problematic. It seems that it is aimed at a possible transformation of war-shattered states into stable societies that resemble the industrialized market democracies of the West as closely as possible (Paris 1997: 63). The concept of trying to impose a model on the partners in the developing world or at least to promote the own Western model reminds of the history of learning processes of development cooperation of the last decades. Could it be that mistakes of development cooperation are being repeated in the field of peacebuilding?

To totally abandon liberal internationalism as peacebuilding strategy and, for instance, to encourage rival parties to share power in a nondemocratic regime instead of trying to promote elections in order to avoid problems associated with political liberalization would be a difficult option for a development actor originating from a Western democracy.\(^\text{11}\) Besides moral scrupulosity, such activities could not be justified in front of the public back home that finally sponsors the development work.\(^\text{12}\) However, Collier (2004: 9) highlighted that democracy seemed to increase the risk of civil war in low-income countries.\(^\text{13}\) As consequence, Collier and Rohner (2008) recommended that promotion of democracy in fragile developing countries should be accompanied by an international strengthening of security. The immediate establishment of democracy in a post conflict country, e.g. by holding elections, cannot be


\(^{11}\) See e.g. Monshipouri (1995: 3).

\(^{12}\) Further, experiences from history suggest that support for autocratic regimes do not guarantee sustainable stability: After the end of the Cold War and the drying out of support for autocratic governments by the respective actors from West and East, the formerly supported regimes collapsed and violent civil wars broke out, e.g in former Yugoslavia, former Zaire and other countries.

\(^{13}\) According to him, only in countries with a per capita income of above US$700, democracy would be stabilizing in a post-conflict situation (Collier 2004: 9).
considered as a guarantee for sustainable peace. Duffield suggested, that the West should develop “a willingness to help without expecting anything in return”, i.e. abandoning the assumption, that the West could get security in return for development work (Duffield 2007: 234). However, recent public discourse has been criticising development cooperation for their lack of verifiable results and hence of wasting tax payers’ money. As consequence, development actors have made efforts to be able to produce evidence of the impacts of their doing by increasingly applying logical and result-based frameworks with verifiable indicators. Therefore, development work, including the one that is aiming at peacebuilding, has to set objectives and ask for verifiable results. In addition, the shift of peacebuilding approaches from a pure focus on security and peacekeeping to establishing the socio-economic conditions for peace had been justified and reinforced by evidence on the linkages between poverty and conflict (Collier et al. 2003). Collier pointed out that aid for economic recovery could be effective in reducing post-conflict risks (Collier 2004: 9). However, its effect would be particularly depending upon the quality of policy, governance and institutions. Governance and security would have to be fostered at the same time to decrease the risk of a relapsing into conflict. In addition, Collier stressed that economic recovery would be a lengthy process and that it would need at least a decade to achieve a decreased risk of renewed conflict.

The fact that many peacebuilding actors are working with a vague definition of peace is striking. As Goetschel and Hagmann suggested, additional critical research in peace theory as well as in peacebuilding practice could be useful for the further development of strategies for peacebuilding (Goetschel/Hagmann 2009: 67). Actually, research should reflect on underlying norms of peacebuilding and therefore focus on more than just the practical issues of improving the effectiveness. According to Jutila et al. (2008: 639), such research has to be critical and reflective on the one hand, and, it has to

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14 The current fragile situation in Nepal is an example: Elections had been held just after the signing of the peace agreement but other relevant questions about security sector reform, the reintegration of the former rebels and human rights violations during conflict had not been addressed adequately (ICG 2010).


16 Low per capita income, low rate of economic growth and dependence on natural resource exports were statistically relevant to increase the risk for civil war in a data set of all civil wars of the world between 1965 and 1999 (Collier et al. 2003).

17 It is questionable if the rather short term focus of projects is able to take such long term effects adequately into consideration as regards impact monitoring. See also the section about the evaluation of peacebuilding.
include dialogue that calls for “the willingness to engage in interdisciplinary exchange and to go beyond merely academic exercises” on the other hand. Based on his empirical findings, Collier has argued that aid for economic recovery could have a stabilizing effect on peacebuilding processes if it would be accompanied by the promotion of governance and security. However, practitioners should be alert and aware of the risks of uncritically applying strategies that follow the assumptions of the ‘liberal peace’. In particular, they should pay special attention to design well-directed and locally adapted solutions and strategies and avoid applying a vague global one-catch-all approach.

**DO THE ACTORS REALLY TACKLE THE PROBLEM?**

The traditional peacebuilding approach perceives external diplomats from bilateral or multilateral organizations as peacebuilding actors (Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 20). This outcome-oriented approach aims to identify and bring leaders of the conflict parties to the negotiating table. Its main focus is the short-term management of armed conflicts. Sudan’s peace accord or the Camp David agreement could be examples of this approach.

A more comprehensive conflict transformation approach by Lederach (1997) is combining short-term conflict management with long-term relationship-building. In addition, the focus lies on the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict. This approach has not been criticized fundamentally and has become leading in the field. Lederach used a pyramid to display on which levels different peacebuilding efforts could take place. Figure 2 shows this pyramid that divides society into three levels. On the top (track 1), there is the high level leadership represented by widely recognized military, political or religious leaders. They can be reached by mediation at state level, similarly to the traditional peacebuilding approach. In the middle (track 2), there are sectoral leaders that could range from ethnic, religious to intellectual or humanitarian leaders. These could e.g. also be national NGOs. They can be accessed by means of more resolution-oriented approaches, like problem-solving workshops or peace-commissions. On the basis of the pyramid (track 3), grassroots leadership as local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs or community developers are the relevant actors. They can be reached through a variety of peacebuilding approaches as local peace commissions, trauma healing or community dialogue projects.
Figure 2: Lederach’s Levels of peacebuilding. Source: Lederach (2001).

Track 1 is not the main channel for peacebuilding by development actors. However, mainly governmental development cooperation can try to mitigate conflicts through targeted policy interventions such as conditionality of aid resources, negotiated benchmarks or international measures against war economies at the macro political level (Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 18). This is overlapping with traditional diplomacy and requires close cooperation between development and foreign policy actors. Here lies a specific quality of bilateral development agencies because they could ideally carry out joint peacebuilding efforts together with external diplomats and military representatives on critical peacebuilding issues as regards security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR). Further, the usually good access of bilateral agencies to relevant local governmental partners in the post conflict country can be used for technical support and capacity building for the respective actors.

Track 2 and 3 seem to be essential for peacebuilding work by development cooperation. The concept by Lederach had considerable influence on the practice of peacebuilding because, at the time of its introduction, the international community was receptive to civil society peacebuilding initiatives (Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 25). Increasingly, multilateral agencies and bilateral donors have affirmed the importance of non-state actors in peacebuilding processes and adjusted their policy frameworks and
increased their operational support to civil society in peacebuilding (track 2 and 3).\(^{18}\) According to Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), as an achievement, this led to an uncontested acceptance that national actors should play the leading role in peacebuilding and that non-governmental peace initiatives would be as essential as diplomatic efforts, and cooperation and communication between governmental actors and INGOs had become more frequent or even institutionalized.\(^{19}\) Basket funds for peacebuilding as e.g. the Nepal Peace Trust Fund sponsored by a range of bilateral and multilateral donors are efforts to increase ownership of the partner government and to support different peacebuilding projects implemented by civil society actors.\(^{20}\) Critics see the civil society increasingly ‘tamed’ because institutionalized and professionalized NGOs have become the key actors (Kaldor 2003: 589). Others see a mushrooming of NGOs, lacking legitimacy and sometimes without a real membership base, only set up to collect donor money (Smith 2006: 88ff.). Development cooperation has to deal consciously with this challenge to choose the right partners and check their legitimacy.

Despite all critics, civil society actors seem to be the essential partner of development cooperation in terms of peacebuilding. Paffenholz (2009) analyzed different areas\(^{21}\) of peacebuilding activity for civil society actors and concluded that they actually had an important supportive role. However, she stated that the relevance of the activities differed according to the phase of conflict and the effectiveness of civil society varied according to its function.\(^{22}\) Her analysis revealed that there was an imbalance between implemented civil society activities and their relevance for peacebuilding. According to Paffenholz, particularly activities for social cohesion and socialization, including dialogue projects, conflict resolution workshops, exchange programmes and peace education had proved to be highly inefficient in terms of establishing peace, but they were the main activities of civil society actors, supported and guided by development cooperation (Paffenholz 2009: 6). Other more effective activities

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\(^{18}\) See e.g. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (2005) or SIDA (website).

\(^{19}\) See e.g. the Swiss Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) or the German Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt).

\(^{20}\) The efficacy of such funds is not always optimal and depends heavily on the capacity and willingness of local partners (government and civil society actors).

\(^{21}\) The seven areas were: protection of citizens against violence from all parties; monitoring of human rights; advocacy for peace and human rights; socialization to values of peace and democracy; inter-group social cohesion; facilitation of dialogue on national and local level; service delivery to create entry points for peacebuilding.

\(^{22}\) Phases of conflict: (1) War, (2) armed conflict, (3) windows of opportunity for peace negotiation and (4) post-large scale conflict.
as protection, monitoring, advocacy and facilitation were not carried out that often, some of them are typically not development cooperation activities. These findings have been highly contested by peacebuilding and development actors. Additional research is needed to be able to verify or adjust the findings. However, it seems obvious that there is space for improvement of peacebuilding activities by development actors. Development cooperation needs to be even more flexible and open to change its strategies according to the peacebuilding needs of the specific situation. Bilateral and multilateral development cooperation actors should try to use their capacity to mobilize high level actors in order to carry out jointly relevant peacebuilding activities according to the specific requirements. In addition, they should make even more use of their – compared to non-state actors – usually better funding and organisational capacity to implement larger projects, especially in the areas of humanitarian and emergency aid just after a conflict – which would be service delivery that seemed to be very efficient for peacebuilding according to Paffenholz (2009). Finally, local partners for peacebuilding (e.g. NGOs) need to be selected carefully and after thorough examination of their motivations and legitimacy.23 They should also be monitored adequately to ensure a proper implementation.

EVALUATION OF PEACEBUILDING: PEACE AND CONFLICT ASSESSMENTS

In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, research showed that aid can actually do harm in conflict situation and may have unintended negative effects on conflict dynamics (Anderson 1999). Over the past years, the development community had been engaged in discussion on the linkages between armed conflict, peace and development. As consequence, the ‘Do no harm’ approach had been developed with a planning matrix and check list to find out the potential effects of aid projects on conflict and peace. Subsequently, other peace and conflict impact assessment tools for development actors had been developed.24 These tools and frameworks can be seen as an achievement of lessons learned by the international development and peacebuilding community. However, critics see the standardization of peace and conflict assessments as an over-simplifying of peacebuilding impact assessment that “allowed peacebuilders to follow a recipe-like approach to peace promotion” (Goetschel/Hagmann 2009: 60). It seems to be true that the various peace and conflict assessment tools used by development cooperation tend to reduce the complexity of the real situation in an under-theorised understanding of peace. The current assessment tools are a compromise that allows the

23 Development cooperation faces this problem not only in peacebuilding, but in its other activity areas as well.

participatory self-evaluation of a project by local and international staff, sometimes even including the beneficiaries of the project. Obviously, such an assessment has a different scientific quality than one conducted by professional researcher or consultant. But a local assessment might have other advantages as e.g. the process of reflection by the staff itself that may have relevant impact on the evolution of a project. However, the mentioned ‘self-reflective tools’ could bear the risk that they tend to produce ‘desired’ results. A project team hardly wants to disavow its own work. Hence, a positive appraisal of the project’s impact seems to be highly probable. Finally, the measuring of peacebuilding impacts – in particular positive results – and defining success is extremely difficult and challenging. Many evaluations therefore tend to focus on short-term effects and avoid analyzing long-term processes. Such analysis probably needs a more in-depth research than a quick participatory peace and conflict assessment could provide.

A better way would probably be to combine these two approaches and to enhance existing assessment tools. In that way the advantages of an independent evaluation and the self-reflection could come together. Accordingly, many studies on the evaluation of peacebuilding emphasize the need to make evaluation processes participatory and, if possible, ensure that the process is accompanied by research.

The question, however, is to what extent this ambition is being fulfilled in current evaluation practice. Peacebuilding actors who have not yet incorporated such practices into their evaluation modes should try to make it to their standard. The existing assessment tools should further be enhanced in order to incorporate a better theoretical basis of an understanding of peace.
CONCLUSIONS

This paper aimed to highlight some critical challenges and limits of peacebuilding for development cooperation. It has become evident that the uncritical incorporation of the assumptions of liberal peace can be problematic. Accordingly, peacebuilding could become a Western-centred intervention mechanism. However, to totally abandon e.g. the support of democratic institutions in fragile states is a difficult option for the Western peacebuilders. Duffield’s (2007) suggestion not to expect anything in return for help doesn’t seem to take well into consideration the need of development cooperation for verifiable evidence of the impact of their work. In particular peacebuilding work has to set objectives that are based on a solid understanding of peace. The result of peacebuilding activities has to be monitored by well chosen indicators. On the other hand, practitioners should be aware of the risks of an unconsidered application of ‘liberal peace’-building strategies. Critical peace research should be reinforced as it is a precondition for transformative peacebuilding. Contributions to peacebuilding can only be effective if they base on profound knowledge and scientific analysis of the causes and dynamics of conflicts and a critical understanding of the preconditions for success or failure of peace processes (Fischer 2009: 94).

Peacebuilding has to be considered holistically and should not rely only on one sector, respectively track: A multitude of supporting activities carried out by different actors seems to be able to support peacebuilding – ranging from poverty reduction, governance to trauma healing or security sector reform and from diplomats and military representatives to development workers and civil society actors. Recent research (Paffenholz 2009) had pointed out that a number of development cooperation actors were mainly focusing on not very efficient peacebuilding activities. Among others, service delivery just after conflicts seemed to be relevant and efficient – an activity that could probably be carried out by non state actors, but especially by governmental agencies. Even if the mentioned study (Paffenholz 2009) does not reflect all activities and is highly contested among development actors, the findings underline that there is a need for concise and well-planned impact monitoring of peacebuilding activities. For this purpose, peace and conflict assessment tools have been developed by a variety of actors in order to assess the relevance of the work. However, they are still under-theorised in terms of an understanding of peace. In addition, there is the danger that evaluations are mainly targeted at measuring short-term results of peace activities and hence tend to ignore longer-term processes, changes in the political context and consequently the need for the change of strategies (Fischer 2009: 90). Still, peace and
conflict assessments might have the advantage that, provided that they are conducted in a participatory way within a project, can provoke a continuous self-reflection of the involved staff that might have a direct impact on the way how project activities are being carried out. However, independent evaluation and research is needed to overcome the shortcomings, as a biased outcome and the lack of scientific analysis of such assessments. A combination of the two evaluation approaches seems to be a more useful option for peacebuilding actors.

Development cooperation can support peacebuilding in post conflict countries. However, its actors have to be aware of the challenges and limits as regards peacebuilding. Definitely, there is need for further self-reflection of peacebuilding work. Actors need to work more on locally adapted and well-directed strategies that are based on a solid understanding of peace and peacebuilding. In addition, efforts to evaluate peacebuilding activities on their impact on peace and conflict in a more sophisticated way must be even more emphasized. Verifiable evidence of the impact of peacebuilding would help the implementing actors to justify their activities. In addition, it could lead to a more competent peacebuilding, possibly better adapted at specific local situations and conditions. Such evaluations would also require the flexibility and the determination to actually change peacebuilding strategies if results show the need to – instead of trying to justify conventional strategies by biased interpretation of the findings. Finally, a balance between more sophisticated evaluation tools and more research needs to be found. Peacebuilding actors should not ignore the need for more critical peace research. A focus only on developing more detailed evaluation tools and criteria tools for impact assessment would mean an increasing shift to a merely technical peacebuilding. Critical research on underlying norms and the legitimacy of current peace strategies is essential for the future of peacebuilding.
LITERATURE


Easterly, William (2006): The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Penguin Press HC.


Newspaper articles:


Websites:


Example: German Technical Cooperation’s (GTZ) Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA):

GTZ’s Peace and Conflict Assessment is usually being conducted in a participatory way and consists mainly of following steps:

*Peace and Conflict Analysis:* According to GTZ’s PCA, the peace and conflict analysis is a process in which a situation, often consisting of many different conflicts is examined so that its complexity will be recognised and it will be better understood.

*Peacebuilding Needs:* Peacebuilding needs would cover the entire (potential) social and political areas of action in which changes would be necessary for a peaceful conflict transformation. In order to identify these needs, the stakeholders involved in the PCA prepare a joint vision for peace. The PBN are derived by comparing the peace and conflict analysis (current state) with the vision for peace (desired state). They could be said to describe what is required to go from one state to the other.

*Peace and Conflict-related relevance assessment:* Assessing the relevance of a project/programme or country portfolio to peace and conflict would involve comparing the set-up of the project/country portfolio (goals, approaches and results) with the Peacebuilding Needs (PBN).

*Risk management:* In GTZ’s PCA, risk management is the process that highlights dangers for the people involved, the investments and the achievement of the goals of development cooperation and in which measures are taken to minimise the dangers for those involved and to guarantee that the goals of development cooperation are achieved with acceptable risks.

*Peace and conflict-related Impact monitoring:* GTZ’s Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring, finally, would ascertain positive and (unintended) negative changes in the peace and conflict dynamics of a country that could be attributed directly or indirectly to the development cooperation measure.