The charm of the recent past

Professor Gugerli, the title for the conference was "The Good Years! An International Conference on Recent History 1980-2010". What exactly was good about those years in which so much fell apart and became fragile?
The names of eras have a programmatic character in terms of research and results. One could interpret the recent past as a requiem for the economic prosperity prior to 1973/1974. In other words, it is the period following the boom and can be viewed as the rapid beginning of the end, brought about by isolation, economisation, and hedonism. However, we believe this concept is far too narrow for a comprehensive understanding of social change. It is only an expression of cultural pessimism, which long ago became habit, or an overemphasis on the remote impact of a time when Bretton Woods and Keynesian economic policy still appeared to work. We therefore wanted to conduct a thought experiment and, for once, we did not want to gaze spellbound at everything that has gone down the drain since 1980, which can be summed up by the English Punks' phrase "No Future".

Nevertheless, the title The Good Years sounds somewhat cynical. What exactly are the positive impacts of this time period for those who seek to defend this description?
A new world order had come into existence by 1985, bringing with it many new and surprising methods of communication, new public spheres and different spheres of privacy in numerous channels. The 1980s and 1990s were also a time of hope, justifiable promises, successful emancipation and additional gains in freedom. Emerging markets shifted the imbalances in the world economy. Productivity also increased in many production areas. We therefore believe that talking about the "Good Years" is both a productive and provocative line of questioning.

How did you introduce this viewpoint of the years between 1980 and 2010 at the conference?
We asked prominent historians to carry out a thought experiment as it pertains to their area of research, for example the history of economics, media or technology. What happens when one takes a question dealing with the destruction of the world and replaces it with one that focuses on hopes and expectations? At the same time, we asked two young colleagues to provide a short, critical commentary on every presentation given by the "big shots". Following a coffee break packed with exciting discussions, we reserved a further hour at the conference for precise discussions, additions, corrections, and fine-tuning of the statement. This format led to a very lively debate.

You hold the Professorship for the History of Technology. What are the most notable changes that occurred between 1980 and 2010 in your view?
There are many. Clearly, the most important change is that an ever increasing proportion of our work, transactions, trade and understanding occur with and via computers, both privately and in the public sphere. Of note here is the emergence of a scenario-analysis culture in the 1980s and 1990s. The future was increasingly reflected in computer simulation models, provided with a range of options and therefore planned to a lesser extent and certainly not programmed any more. This phenomena can be found in climate research, demographics, and economic forecasting. The prerequisite for this approach to designing the future is largely a return to the minimal, along with highly flexible, combinable elements. At the extreme, a bit or a pixel. Add to this the combination of playful creativity and mechanistic social physics. Since the 1980s, for example, the field of agent-based modelling has brought together game theory questions with reductionist models of social interactions.

What is the importance of the exponential growth of computer power?
I don't believe that technology makes an impact in a deterministic way. However, I believe that computers offer opportunities to configure machines, resources, people, securities, and product lines to operate according to highly individualized preferences and to make suitable decisions. This is true not only for supercomputing and large data bases, but for simple spreadsheets such as Visicalc in 1979, Excel in 1985, and Quatro Pro in 1987. The impressions that we have of our world and according to which we act must already exist in order for the increasing computing power, visualisation on the desktop, or office work on smart phones to be used at all.

What kind of consequences does this have for society?
Some say it has led to the end of society. Others believe that society has become more dynamic. Both views focus on computer-assisted monitoring of situations. When they find the monitoring suspicious, they call it big brother, bean counting or morally destructive. When it suits them, however, they describe it as creating transparency, increasing flexibility, quality assurance or improved compliance. This culture of control no longer relates just to more technical or business processes, but rather to the evaluation of school programmes, the physical development of children, the monitoring of public spaces, threshold values, and melting glaciers.

Did the conference take a look into the future based on this historical analysis?
We of course discussed the Eurozone problem. What happened? What is going on? What are the stakes? What is to be expected? The first three questions were answered with a high level of competence. But the last one proved difficult. Change brought about by crisis is characterised by the fact that the rules of the game and stability in terms of expectations are lost. The time when one needs forecasts the most is precisely when they cannot be made. We are specialists in social change. We possess the ability to observe this change through analytical skills where possible, namely in the past. As far as future change is concerned, we will leave it to others to speculate.